The Triumph of Diplomacy and Leadership

2019 ◽  
pp. 129-146
Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Moral Leadership ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Mutual Interest ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
Security Concerns ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Arms

Triumphalism not only claims to explain the surprising end of the Cold War, it also stipulates how to cope with current conflicts. But triumphalism is a series of myths. President Reagan did not seek to destroy the USSR; rather, he sought to improve superpower relations so as to eliminate nuclear arsenals. Moreover, his initial hard-line policies did not compel the USSR to disarm, reform, and collapse. They strengthened the position of Soviet hard-liners who opposed disarmament, made it more difficult for Gorbachev to implement New Thinking, and brought the superpowers to the brink of war. In short, compellence failed miserably. The Cold War was resolved through diplomacy, not threats. President Reagan eventually engaged in meaningful dialogue so as to ease Moscow’s security concerns, build trust, and focus on the superpowers’ mutual interest in eliminating nuclear arms. For his part, Gorbachev sought to end the arms race so as to divert resources to democratization. He too sought dialogue and trust. The ending of the Cold War demonstrates the importance of moral leadership. Reagan and Gorbachev both rose above their differences and introduced new ideas about nuclear security. Consequently, both encountered serious domestic opposition. Each persevered, however, leading their nations toward a safer, more humane future.

New ''Cold War''

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-34
Author(s):  
Vladimir Batiuk
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Ideological Struggle ◽  
Nuclear Arms Race ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Nuclear Arms

In this article, the ''Cold War'' is understood as a situation where the relationship between the leading States is determined by ideological confrontation and, at the same time, the presence of nuclear weapons precludes the development of this confrontation into a large-scale armed conflict. Such a situation has developed in the years 1945–1989, during the first Cold War. We see that something similar is repeated in our time-with all the new nuances in the ideological struggle and in the nuclear arms race.

The Myth of Triumphalism

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
Moral Leadership ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Us Military ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Insight Into

Virtually no one anticipated the ending of the Cold War. Understanding how this long-standing conflict was peacefully resolved can give us insight into how to conclude other seemingly intractable conflicts. Triumphalists believe that President Ronald Reagan “won” the Cold War by building up US military power and threatening the USSR. His hard-line policies forced Moscow to reduce its arsenal, adopt democratic reforms, withdraw from its war in Afghanistan, and ultimately collapse. Triumphalists assert that contemporary leaders should follow Reagan’s example bycompelling adversaries into submission. However, triumphalism is a myth, a series of falsehoods about Reagan’s intentions, his policies, and the impact his administration had on the USSR.Drawing upon American and Soviet sources,this book demonstrates that Reagan’s initial hard-line policies brought the superpowers to the brink of war and made it more difficult for Moscow to disarm and reform. Compellence failed miserably. The Cold War was resolved through diplomacy, not threats. President Reagan eventually engaged in dialogue so as to ease Moscow’s security concerns, build trust, and focus on the superpowers’ mutual interest in eliminating nuclear arms. For his part, Mikhail Gorbachev sought to end the arms race so as to divert resources to democratization. He too sought dialogue and trust. The ending of the Cold War demonstrates the importance of moral leadership. Reagan and Gorbachev both rose above their differences and introduced radical new ideas about nuclear disarmament. Consequently, both encountered domestic opposition. Each persevered, however, leading their nations toward a safer, more humane future.

Russia and Peaceful Change

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrej Krickovic
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Russian Foreign Policy ◽  
Unmet Expectations ◽  
Soviet Empire ◽  
Communist Movement ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Over Time

Over the last four decades, Russia has been at the very center of peaceful change in international relations. Gorbachev’s conciliatory New Thinking (NT) fundamentally transformed international relations, ending the Cold War struggle and dismantling the Soviet empire and world communist movement. Contemporary Russia is at the forefront of the transition away from American unipolarity and toward what is believed will be a more equitable and just multipolar order. Over time, Russia has moved away from the idealism that characterized Gorbachev’s NT and toward a more hard-nosed and confrontational approach toward peaceful change. The chapter traces this evolution with a particular emphasis on the role that Russia’s unmet expectations of reciprocity and elevated status have played in the process. If they are to be successful, future efforts at peaceful change will have to find ways to address these issues of reciprocity and status, especially under circumstances where there are power asymmetries between the side making concessions and the side receiving them. Nevertheless, despite its disappointments, Russia’s approach to change remains (largely) peaceful. Elements of NT, including its emphasis on interdependence, collective/mutual security, and faith in the possibility of positive transformation, continue to be present in modern Russian foreign policy thinking.

The Development of the United Nations Law Concerning Peace-Keeping Operations

1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-281
Author(s):  
Robert Siekmann
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Central America ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The Cold War

Especially as a consequence of the termination of the Cold War, the détente in the relations between East en West (Gorbachev's ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy matters) and, finally, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the number of UN peace-keeping operations substantially increased in recent years. One could even speak of a ‘proliferation’. Until 1988 the number of operations was twelve (seven peace-keeping forces: UNEF ‘I’ and ‘II’, ONUC, UNHCYP, UNSF (West New Guinea), UNDOF AND UNIFIL; and five military observer missions: UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, UNYOM and UNIPOM). Now, three forces and seven observer missions can be added. The forces are MINURSO (West Sahara), UNTAC (Cambodia) and UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia); the observer groups: UNGOMAP (Afghanistan/Pakistan), UNIIMOG (Iran/Iraq), UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’ (Angola), ONUCA (Central America), UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait) and ONUSAL (El Salvador). UNTAG (Namibia), which was established in 1978, could not become operational until 1989 as a result of the new political circumstances in the world. So, a total of twenty-three operations have been undertaken, of which almost fifty percent was established in the last five years, whereas the other half was the result of decisions taken by the United Nations in the preceding forty years (UNTSO dates back to 1949). In the meantime, some ‘classic’ operations are being continued (UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, and UNIFIL), whereas some ‘modern’ operations already have been terminated as planned (UNTAG, UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG, UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’, and ONUCA). At the moment (July 1992) eleven operations are in action – the greatest number in the UN history ever.

The Strategic Defense Initiative

2019 ◽  
pp. 59-75
Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Strategic Defense Initiative ◽  
The West ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
Strategic Defense ◽  
Nuclear Arms

This chapter debunks the triumphalist claim that President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative so as to compel Moscow to surrender the arms race, if not collapse. In fact, the president hoped SDI would protect civilians from nuclear attack and considered the program a key part of his plan to eliminate nuclear weapons. Reagan repeatedly offered to share SDI with the Soviets in the belief that if both sides had defenses nuclear weapons would become obsolete. Thus, they could be eliminated. President Reagan’s revolutionary ideas about nuclear security caused deep rifts within the administration. His advisers rejected the notion that nuclear arms should or could be eliminated, believing instead that the threat of nuclear annihilation had successfully deterred the Soviets from attacking the West. With the exception of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, they opposed the costly SDI. However, they grudgingly came to support it in the belief that they might be able to trade it away in exchange for a Soviet pledge to reduce its arsenals. However, Reagan’s advisers were universally against the idea of sharing SDI with Moscow. If Reagan’s objective had been to compel Moscow to surrender the arms race, he would not have repeatedly offered to share SDI.

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