The Dissolution of the Soviet Union

2022 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 188-218
Author(s):  
Mark Kramer
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Communist Regime ◽  
Soviet Regime ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Economic Changes ◽  
Soviet State ◽  
Communist System ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Short Period

Abstract In late December 1991—some 74 years after the Bolsheviks had taken power in Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin—the Soviet Communist regime and the Soviet state itself ceased to exist. The demise of the Soviet Union occurred less than seven years after Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Communist Party. Soon after taking office in March 1985, Gorbachev had launched a series of drastic political and economic changes that he hoped would improve and strengthen the Communist system and bolster the country's superpower status. But in the end, far from strengthening Communism, Gorbachev's policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (official openness) led inadvertently to the collapse of the Soviet regime and the unraveling of the Soviet state. This article analyzes the breakup of the Soviet Union, explaining why that outcome, which had seemed so unlikely at the outset, occurred in such a short period of time.

Gorbachev, ideology, and the fate of Soviet communism

2000 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-474
Author(s):  
R. Judson Mitchell ◽  
Randall S. Arrington
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Party Leader ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Democratic Centralism ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Party Elites ◽  
Basic Source ◽  
The Russian Federation

The collapse of the Soviet Union has spurred much scholarly debate about the reasons for the rapid disintegration of this apparently entrenched system. In this article, it is argued that the basic source of ultimate weakness was the obverse of the system’s strengths, especially its form of organization and its relation to Marxist–Leninist ideology. Democratic centralism provided cohesion for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) but also gave inordinate control over ideology to the party leader. Mikhail Gorbachev carried out an ideological revision that undercut the legitimacy of party elites and his restructuring of the system left the party with no clear functional role in the society. The successor party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), has made a surprising comeback for communism, utilizing the Leninist model of party organization, which has proved to be highly effective in the Russian political culture. Furthermore, the CPRF, under party leaders like Gennadi Zyuganov, has avoided Gorbachev’s ideological deviations while attempting to broaden the party’s base through the cultivation of Russian nationalism.

Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 81-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Astrid S. Tuminez
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Soviet Regime ◽  
Direct Impact ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Soviet Policy ◽  
Core Group ◽  
Soviet State ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Boris Yeltsin

Nationalism and ethnic pressures contributed to the breakup of the Soviet Union, but they were not the primary cause. A qualified exception to this argument is Russian elite separatist nationalism, led by Boris Yeltsin, which had a direct impact on Soviet disintegration. This article provides an overview of Soviet policy vis-à-vis nationalities, discusses the surge of nationalism and ethnic pressures in the Soviet Union in 1988–1991, and shows how ethnic unrest and separatist movements weakened the Soviet state. It also emphasizes that the demise of the Soviet Union resulted mainly from three other key factors: 1) Mikhail Gorbachev's failure to establish a viable compact between center and periphery in the early years of his rule; 2) Gorbachev's general unwillingness to use decisive force to quell ethnic and nationalist challenges; and 3) the defection of a core group of Russian elites from the Soviet regime.

The Russian Revolution and Music

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAULINE FAIRCLOUGH
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Communist Regime ◽  
Soviet Power ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Economic Failure ◽  
The Military

Nearly thirty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have got used to seeing the Bolshevik Revolution as the prelude to a failed political experiment, albeit one that lasted a remarkably long time. But why do we see it as a failure? After all, the Soviet Union was a vast empire regarded as the military equal of the United States, feared and hated by successive US presidents, whose influence extended far beyond Soviet borders to include regimes in Africa, South East Asia, Central and South America. Had Mikhail Gorbachev not been removed in 1991, and had the Soviet system been able to reform itself into something like the form of communism we see today in China, no one would regard those seventy-plus years of Soviet power as a failure at all. What is meant by failure, in truth, is not really military or economic failure so much as a failure to sustain and uphold the ideals of equality and social justice that originally drew so many to the communist cause. The haemorrhaging of members from the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in 1956, for instance, was a result of widespread feelings of shock and disgust after Nikita Khrushchev's revelations at the Twenty-First Party Conference that year, at which he delivered his so-called ‘secret speech’ condemning Stalin's regime. For those who left the CPGB, and other communist parties across Western Europe, it was painful to realize that what they had for decades dismissed as ‘anti-Soviet propaganda’ had in fact been accurate reportage. Most shocking of all was learning that the mass arrests and disappearances of the 1930s, and even the show trials of prominent Politburo and party members, were not proportionate, if regrettable, responses to plots to murder Stalin and overthrow Soviet power at all, but rather Stalinist crimes of epic and tragic proportions. Right up to the end of the Communist regime in Russia, reports of political and religious repression, the continued use of the Gulag system, confinement and forced treatment of dissidents in mental hospitals, literary and other cultural censorship continued to filter through the Iron Curtain.

Yeltsin and Gorbachev: The Politics of Confrontation

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Zlotnik
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Soviet State ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
History Of ◽  
Personal Interactions ◽  
Boris Yeltsin ◽  
Comparable Magnitude

The confrontation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps no event of comparable magnitude has been more affected by the personal interactions of two men. The history of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin relationship during the ªnal years of the USSR is largely the story of the collapse of the Soviet state. The passionate dislike and animosity that developed between the two leaders made compromise difªcult and accelerated the collapse of the union. Gorbachev's initial unwillingness to deal seriously with the new Russian leader probably did more to contribute to the disintegration of the Soviet Union than did Yeltsin's bluster and thirst for revenge. It was only when the tables were turned after the failed coup of August 1991, and when Yeltsin clearly had gained control of the situation, that he allowed his intense dislike of Gorbachev to drive his actions.

The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Knight
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Direct Part ◽  
Soviet System ◽  
Direct Control ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
High Ranking ◽  
State Security ◽  
The Soviet Union

This article examines the role of the Committee on State Security (KGB) during the turbulent six-and-a-half years under Mikhail Gorbachev, from March 1985 to December 1991. Contrary to popular impressions, the KGB was never an independent actor in the Soviet system; it acted at the behest of the Communist Party. When Vladimir Kryuchkov replaced Viktor Chebrikov as head of the KGB in 1986, the move signaled what was intended to be a new role for the KGB. But as the reforms launched by Gorbachev became more radical, and as political instability in the Soviet Union became widespread, many in the KGB grew anxious about the possible fragmentation of the country. These concerns were instrumental in the decision by Kryuchkov and other high-ranking KGB officials to organize a hardline coup in August 1991. Even then, however, the KGB was not truly independent of the party. On the contrary, KGB officials were expecting—and then desperately hoping—that Gorbachev would agree to order an all-out crackdown. Because Gorbachev was unwilling to take a direct part in mass repression, Kryuchkov lacked the authority he was seeking to act. As a result, the attempted coup failed, and the KGB was forced onto the defensive. Shortly before the Soviet state was dissolved, the KGB was broken up into a number of agencies that soon came under Russia's direct control.

Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia By Timothy J. Colton. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 324p. $65.00 cloth, $24.95 paper. Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia Robert G. Moser. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001. 183p. $19.95.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 233-235
Author(s):  
Sarah Oates
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Harvard University ◽  
Communist Regime ◽  
Soviet Regime ◽  
University Of Pittsburgh ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Russian Politics ◽  
Unexpected Outcomes

As the Soviet regime recedes farther into the past, two types of scholars are now working hard to put the post-Soviet experience in comparative context. Some are those who built their careers on a study of the Soviet Union and have now significantly expanded on their work, while another group comprises scholars of the post-Soviet regime who completed their dissertations after the collapse of the Communist regime. These two books represent some of the best of both of these groups, and both are important in their scope in bringing Russian politics into one of the most important fields in politics, namely, that of elections, parties, and voters.

The Soviet Union: Reform of the System or Systemic Transformation?

Slavic Review ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Archie Brown
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Clear Distinction ◽  
Large Element ◽  
Soviet System ◽  
Soviet State ◽  
Communist System ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Systemic Transformation

Archie Brown emphasizes the need to make a clear distinction between the transformation of the Soviet system and the end of the Soviet state and also holds that “reform” of the system does not do justice to the extent of the change in the polity. In contradistinction to Cohen, he argues that to regard the pre-perestroika system as “communist” rather than “socialist” brings out more clearly the extent of the transformation, whereby a communist system had been abandoned by 1989–90 even though the Soviet Union did not come to an end until December 1991. Brown also draws on recent evidence showing the large element of contingency involved in the dramatic changes of 1985–1991, including the opposition to Gorbachev's acquisition of power which, had it been successful, would have led to very different policies being pursued in the second half of the 1980s.

scholarly journals “Tsensuuri töö on väga vastutusrikas.” Dokumentaalne pilguheit Eesti NSV Glavliti tegevusele aastatel 1941–1948 [Abstract: “The work of censorship carries a great deal of responsibility”. A documentary glimpse of the activity of the Estonian SSR Glavlit]

2019 ◽  
pp. 337-353
Author(s):  
Tõnu Tannberg
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
The State ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Ussr Council ◽  
State Security ◽  
Control Functions ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Publishing Houses

Abstract: “The work of censorship carries a great deal of responsibility”. A documentary glimpse of the activity of them Estonian SSR Glavlit in 1941–1948" Censorship was one of the important social control mechanisms of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs, or Glavlit (in Russian Glavnoe upravlenie po delam literaturȳ i izdatel’stv), was established under the jurisdiction of the People’s Commissariat for Education on 6 June 1922 by decree of the Russian SFSR Council of People’s Commissars. Its task was to combat the ideological opponents of the Soviet regime. The censorship of essentially all printed works published in the Soviet Union was gradually placed under Glavlit’s jurisdiction. By the end of the 1930s, Glavlit was transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars (starting in 1946 the Council of Ministers), but substantially, censorship officials were placed under the direction of subordinate institutions and officials of the Communist Party, and of the state security organs. The same kind of institutions in the Soviet republics and oblasts were subordinated to the central Glavlit of the USSR. The Glavlit of the Estonian SSR was established by decree of the Estonian SSR Council of People’s Commissars on 23 October 1940. The task of Glavlit was to prevent the disclosure in print and in the media of Soviet military, state and economic secrets with the overall objective of banning the publication of all manner of ideas and information that was unacceptable to the regime. It was also to prevent such ideas and information from reaching libraries. To this end, both pre-publication censorship (the review of control copies of printed works before their publication) and post-publication censorship (review of published printed works, the physical destruction or obstruction of access to works that have proven to be unsuitable) were implemented. In order to carry out censorship, lists of banned literature were drawn up in cooperation with the state security organs, along with enumerations of information that was forbidden to publish in print. These formed the basis for the everyday work of Glavlit’s censors, in other words commissioners. Not a single printed work or media publication could be published during the Soviet era without Glavlit’s permission (departmental publishing houses practiced self-censorship). In addition to scrutinising printed works, the monitoring of art exhibitions, theatre productions and concert repertoires, the review of cinema newsreels, and provision of guidelines for publishing houses and libraries also fell within Glavlit’s jurisdiction. Censors also read mail sent by post and checked the content of parcels (first and foremost the exchange of postal parcels with foreign countries). In the latter half of the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev rose to lead the Soviet Union, Glavlit’s control functions in society gradually started receding. State censorship was done away with in the Soviet Union on 12 June 1990, depriving the former censorship office of its substantial functions. Glavlit was disbanded in Estonia on 1 October 1990. The Estonian SSR Glavlit activity overview for the years 1940–1948 is published below. This is a report dated 20 October 1948 from Leonida Päll, the head of the Estonian SSR Glavlit (in office in 1946–1950), to Nikolai Karotamm, the Estonian SSR party boss of that time. This document provides a brief departmental insight into the initial years of the activity of the Estonian SSR Glavlit. It outlines the censorship agency’s main fields of activity, highlights the key figures of that time, and describes the agency’s concrete achievements, including recording the more important works and authors that had been caught between the gearwheels of censorship.

scholarly journals Formation of the model of state of the whole people in Soviet constitutionalism

2020 ◽  
pp. 25-38
Author(s):  
Viktor Sergeevich Pletnikov
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Knowledge ◽  
Soviet State ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Third Stage ◽  
Three Stages

The analysis of sources of ideological and normative character demonstrates the process of formation of perception on the state of the whole people within the Soviet legal science and practice. The boundaries of this research are defined through correlation of the concepts: image – model – theory. This allows focusing attention on the significant, system-forming sources of legal knowledge that emerged in the period of 1947-1964, rather than paying attention to separate mentions regarding the need for building the state of the whole people. The theory of the state of the whole people started to develop after L. I. Brezhnev came to power. The author determines the stages in formation of the model of state of the whole people, which were passed by the Soviet State in its development. The three stages in formation of the model of state of the whole people with their legal peculiarities and forms of manifestation were highlighted: - The first stage is associated with the development and preparation of the draft program of the All-Union Communist Party Bolsheviks in 1947; - The second stage is characterized by adoption of the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961; - The third stage is associated with the process of drafting the Soviet Constitution of 1964. Formation of the model of state of the whole people enables formation of the theory of state of the whole people, implemented with adoption of the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union.

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