Gorbachev, ideology, and the fate of Soviet communism

2000 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-474
Author(s):  
R. Judson Mitchell ◽  
Randall S. Arrington

The collapse of the Soviet Union has spurred much scholarly debate about the reasons for the rapid disintegration of this apparently entrenched system. In this article, it is argued that the basic source of ultimate weakness was the obverse of the system’s strengths, especially its form of organization and its relation to Marxist–Leninist ideology. Democratic centralism provided cohesion for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) but also gave inordinate control over ideology to the party leader. Mikhail Gorbachev carried out an ideological revision that undercut the legitimacy of party elites and his restructuring of the system left the party with no clear functional role in the society. The successor party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), has made a surprising comeback for communism, utilizing the Leninist model of party organization, which has proved to be highly effective in the Russian political culture. Furthermore, the CPRF, under party leaders like Gennadi Zyuganov, has avoided Gorbachev’s ideological deviations while attempting to broaden the party’s base through the cultivation of Russian nationalism.

2014 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-345
Author(s):  
Katya Vladimirov

The article presents a tumulus seventy-year history of the top party élite, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), by profiling the anatomy of historical generations that embodied it. Five district generations in power and various political “teams” had been locked in ferocious battle for access to political capital, high social status, coveted positions, ranks, and privileges. Their survival and advancement demanded perseverance, bargaining skills, and ruthless elimination of competitors. Purges and forced retirement were essential power tools used in their generational struggle for power and status. The article discusses these methods of compulsory “exclusion” and offers innovative and revealing perspective on the nature of the Soviet political structure as well as on the techniques of its internal combat.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Harris

In the winter of 1989-90 the unintended consequences of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's program of political and economic refonn had become obvious to all but his most optimistic spokesmen. The General Secretary's attempt to create a new ideology of perestroika by grafting "bourgeois" and "social democratic" concepts onto the conventional ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had divided the party, created immense ideological confusion, and led to the formation of non-Communist and anti-Communist political organizations. The attempt to shift authority from party officials to elected soviets on the union and republican levels had led to the emergence of separatist and nationalist movements in many of the USSR's republics, including the RSFSR. The decentralization of the state's administration of the economy and the encouragement of both private and cooperative economic activity had failed to reverse the deterioration of economic conditions. As anxiety swept through the CPSU, orthodox party leaders called for the establishment of an autonomous Communist Party for the RSFSR to counter Gorbachev's policies and to "save Soviet Russia" from destruction.


Author(s):  
Archie Brown

The chapter traces pre-Marxist ideas of a communist society before outlining the main elements of the Communist doctrine of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Particular attention is paid to the theory and practice of Communist parties in power. The Soviet Union, China, and Yugoslavia developed models which varied both over time and from each other. Nevertheless, six defining characteristics of Communist ideology are identified and elaborated—the monopoly of power of the ruling Communist party; democratic centralism; state ownership of the means of production; centrally planned rather than market economy; membership of an international Communist movement; and the aspiration, in principle, to move eventually to a stateless, classless communist society. During the Soviet perestroika all six of these features were discarded. In contemporary China only the first two of the six remain. Communism no longer exists as a serious ideological and political force.


2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Knight

This article examines the role of the Committee on State Security (KGB) during the turbulent six-and-a-half years under Mikhail Gorbachev, from March 1985 to December 1991. Contrary to popular impressions, the KGB was never an independent actor in the Soviet system; it acted at the behest of the Communist Party. When Vladimir Kryuchkov replaced Viktor Chebrikov as head of the KGB in 1986, the move signaled what was intended to be a new role for the KGB. But as the reforms launched by Gorbachev became more radical, and as political instability in the Soviet Union became widespread, many in the KGB grew anxious about the possible fragmentation of the country. These concerns were instrumental in the decision by Kryuchkov and other high-ranking KGB officials to organize a hardline coup in August 1991. Even then, however, the KGB was not truly independent of the party. On the contrary, KGB officials were expecting—and then desperately hoping—that Gorbachev would agree to order an all-out crackdown. Because Gorbachev was unwilling to take a direct part in mass repression, Kryuchkov lacked the authority he was seeking to act. As a result, the attempted coup failed, and the KGB was forced onto the defensive. Shortly before the Soviet state was dissolved, the KGB was broken up into a number of agencies that soon came under Russia's direct control.


2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (132) ◽  
pp. 452-469
Author(s):  
Emmet O’Connor

During the 1920s the Communist International, or Comintern, attached exceptional importance to Ireland for the potential of its anti-imperialist forces to foment revolution at home, enlist the Irish diaspora, and encourage unrest in Britain and the Empire. In this way the Comintern might strengthen its relatively feeble bridgehead in the anglophone world and embarrass Britain, the keystone of Russia’s enemies. However, the Comintern encountered repeated frustration in attempting to direct its Irish sections until 1929 when it approved an initiative to create a Bolshevised party. At national level, Bolshevisation meant the application of the Leninist principles of unity, discipline and democratic centralism. Crucially, Bolsheviks understood their national sections to belong to a world party directed by the Executive Committee of the Communist International (E.C.C.I.) in Moscow. In the global context, it also meant the subordination of the Comintern to the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (V.K.P./b.), as the Soviet party was called, and the interests of the Soviet Union. Both levels of Bolshevisation went hand in hand in Ireland, where a new party was built from scratch between 1929 and 1933.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
James G. Blight ◽  
janet Lang

Drawing on “critical oral history” conferences held after the demise of the Soviet Union, this article seeks to explain why the détente in U.S.-Soviet relations collapsed at the end of the 1970s. Both the U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, and the Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, had sought to improve bilateral ties, but instead they found that the relationship deteriorated and then broke down altogether after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The article suggests that neither side had a sufficient appreciation of how the other side perceived the relationship. The authors argue that the critical oral history helped officials on both sides to develop a sense of empathy for how the other side viewed its own interests and objectives. Empathy does not imply any sympathy; instead, it merely entails an effort to understand the other side's perceptions and goals. Presenting excerpts from an oral history conference, the authors argue that greater empathy in the policymaking process might have helped to avoid an outcome that neither side desired.


1977 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-201
Author(s):  
Silvia P. Forgus

Since its conception in 1898 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has had to contend with the nationality question. The Party has had to formulate programs and make organizational and functional decisions pertaining to national rights. It has had to dwell on political aspects of the issue and adopt resolutions touching on the social, economic, and cultural problems of non-Russian nations in the Russian Empire and the Soviet State. What were these resolutions and what effect, if any, did ideological considerations, domestic power struggles, situational factors, and personal styles of the party leaders have on the resolutions?


2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 980-998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jocelyn Olcott

This article examines work of Mexican singer and activist Concha Michel, particularly the pamphlet Marxistas y ‘marxistas’ that sealed her expulsion from the Mexican Communist Party (Partido Comunista de México, PCM). Michel wrote the pamphlet after her return from the Soviet Union, where her experiences only confirmed her belief that revolutionary governments in Mexico and the Soviet Union alike had failed to attend to the massive amounts of social and cultural labor performed overwhelmingly by women. In particular, Communists' emphasis on modernization and scientific theory privileged the ‘social economy’ of commodified production and devalued what she dubbed the ‘natural economy’ of subsistence, reproduction, and artistic labors. The pamphlet draws parallels with the capitalist exploitation of laborers and the sexual exploitation of women perpetrated even by Communist Party leaders. Michel’s refusal to submit to the Party line resulted in her high-profile expulsion from the party, a fate that befell much of her social circle. Over subsequent decades, however, her commitment to activism on behalf of women, celebration of Mexico’s indigenous cultures, and persistent critique of the elision of subsistence labors would earn her celebrity among Mexican maternalist feminists.


Author(s):  
Tõnu Tannberg

Abstract: “The work of censorship carries a great deal of responsibility”. A documentary glimpse of the activity of them Estonian SSR Glavlit in 1941–1948" Censorship was one of the important social control mechanisms of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs, or Glavlit (in Russian Glavnoe upravlenie po delam literaturȳ i izdatel’stv), was established under the jurisdiction of the People’s Commissariat for Education on 6 June 1922 by decree of the Russian SFSR Council of People’s Commissars. Its task was to combat the ideological opponents of the Soviet regime. The censorship of essentially all printed works published in the Soviet Union was gradually placed under Glavlit’s jurisdiction. By the end of the 1930s, Glavlit was transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars (starting in 1946 the Council of Ministers), but substantially, censorship officials were placed under the direction of subordinate institutions and officials of the Communist Party, and of the state security organs. The same kind of institutions in the Soviet republics and oblasts were subordinated to the central Glavlit of the USSR. The Glavlit of the Estonian SSR was established by decree of the Estonian SSR Council of People’s Commissars on 23 October 1940. The task of Glavlit was to prevent the disclosure in print and in the media of Soviet military, state and economic secrets with the overall objective of banning the publication of all manner of ideas and information that was unacceptable to the regime. It was also to prevent such ideas and information from reaching libraries. To this end, both pre-publication censorship (the review of control copies of printed works before their publication) and post-publication censorship (review of published printed works, the physical destruction or obstruction of access to works that have proven to be unsuitable) were implemented. In order to carry out censorship, lists of banned literature were drawn up in cooperation with the state security organs, along with enumerations of information that was forbidden to publish in print. These formed the basis for the everyday work of Glavlit’s censors, in other words commissioners. Not a single printed work or media publication could be published during the Soviet era without Glavlit’s permission (departmental publishing houses practiced self-censorship). In addition to scrutinising printed works, the monitoring of art exhibitions, theatre productions and concert repertoires, the review of cinema newsreels, and provision of guidelines for publishing houses and libraries also fell within Glavlit’s jurisdiction. Censors also read mail sent by post and checked the content of parcels (first and foremost the exchange of postal parcels with foreign countries). In the latter half of the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev rose to lead the Soviet Union, Glavlit’s control functions in society gradually started receding. State censorship was done away with in the Soviet Union on 12 June 1990, depriving the former censorship office of its substantial functions. Glavlit was disbanded in Estonia on 1 October 1990. The Estonian SSR Glavlit activity overview for the years 1940–1948 is published below. This is a report dated 20 October 1948 from Leonida Päll, the head of the Estonian SSR Glavlit (in office in 1946–1950), to Nikolai Karotamm, the Estonian SSR party boss of that time. This document provides a brief departmental insight into the initial years of the activity of the Estonian SSR Glavlit. It outlines the censorship agency’s main fields of activity, highlights the key figures of that time, and describes the agency’s concrete achievements, including recording the more important works and authors that had been caught between the gearwheels of censorship.


1970 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-42
Author(s):  
William A. Hoisington

Since the 1930's the French Communist party has faithfully endorsed the policy decisions of the Soviet Union, oftentimes despite disagreement with major Soviet pronouncements. In the 1920's, however, the French Communist leadership was divided over the appropriateness of Soviet instructions on matters that appeared to many French Communists clearly within the exclusive domain of the French party. The intrusion of the Comintern, the Soviet-dominated international Communist organization, into the pre-campaign discussion of the tactics for the 1928 elections to the French national assembly forced French Communists to re-examine their goals, their position in French politics, and their relationship with the Soviet Union. The decisions of the French party leaders, made amid what was perhaps the last animated and freewheeling public party debate, determined the party's relationship with the USSR for a full forty years.


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