Alt-Right Transgressions in the Age of Trump

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 76-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Pollard

Abstract The alt-right movement dates from 2008 when white supremacist Richard Spencer invented the term to identify contemporary right-wing and far-right socio/political movements. The movement relies on mass media, communicating graphically and symbolically through “trolls,” “tropes,” and “memes.” The “Sadomasochist trope” valorizes aggressive actors like Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, while demonizing “passive” individuals like Hillary Clinton and Barak Obama. Trolls communicate through memes, single-frame or short video phrases matched with photos and cartoons, to attract online audiences. When not attacking liberals and progressives, alt-right memes turn on traditional conservatives. The alt-right community maintains it is “under assault” in today’s politically correct, overly secularized, culturally diverse society. However, Donald Trump elevated alt-right icon and former Breitbart ceo Stephen Bannon to chief advisor, providing the alt-right movement access to the highest government levels. Will alt-right organizations continue their recent expansion, or will the public lose interest in the movement?

Politics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 026339572110109
Author(s):  
Katharine M Millar ◽  
Julia Costa Lopez

Imagery associated with the Knights Templar appears in the public discourse and symbolism of many white supremacist and white nationalist groups. The 2011 Norwegian mass murderer cited the Templars in his manifesto, as did the 2019 New Zealand shooter. Templar crosses were on display at the 2017 white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, North Carolina. To understand the security imaginary behind these racialised medievalisms and their contemporary animation within right-wing extremism, this article develops the concept of ‘conspiratorial medievalism’. The Knights Templar imaginary blends a specific, racialised, and romanticised vision of history with the grammar of conspiracy theory. This is characterised by (a) a belief in the racialised decline and victimisation of a ‘righteous’ White Christendom; (b) a sense of threat posed by racialised Others and betrayal by insiders; and (c) an anachronistic view of near-omnipotent individual agency. Significantly, conspiratorial medievalism demonstrates an aspiration to not merely combat ‘undue’ agency of racialised Others, but to reclaim and perform extreme agency themselves. Agency is cast in the idiom of medieval chivalry and framed as the moral obligation of righteous White men. Although Knights Templar imagery may appear superficial, this article finds it is an important justificatory and enabling discourse for racist violence.


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-363
Author(s):  
Feliciano De Sá Guimarães ◽  
Irma Dutra De Oliveira E Silva

Abstract In the last two decades, far-right populists have formed governments all over the world. However, systematic analyses on how far-right leaders recreate their countries' foreign policy identity are still underdeveloped. In this article, we analyse how far-right populist leaders use their conservative identity-set to align with other right-wing governments and how they use the same conservative repertoire to deal with ideological rivals. More precisely, we argue that these leaders tend to overemphasize a deep conservative identity-set towards other far-right populist governments, something we call ‘thick conservative identity’. This profoundly conservative identity-set is composed of three national role conceptions: anti-globalism, nationalism and anti-foe. However, they do not repeat this identity-set towards ideological rivals, preferring to use a more nuanced and contradictory one, something we call ‘thin conservative identity’. The trigger of such difference is the anticipated mutual expectation of conservatism between Ego and Alter, in which Ego mimics Alter's deep conservatism. We use Jair Bolsonaro's alignment with Donald Trump and Bolsonaro's relationship with China as illustrative cases. We use the main concepts of role theory to understand both how conservative alignments are created and how far-right governments deal with ideological rivals.


Author(s):  
Rodney A. Smolla

This chapter begins with an account of Anna Anderson, an immigrant to the United States who claimed to be the Grand Duchess Anastasia of Russia that was exposed to be fake after a DNA test. It discusses the collusive connections between Russia and the American radical alt-right. It also identifies several figures that were prominent in the Unite the Right events in Charlottesville in 2017 and strongly supported the candidacy and presidency of Donald Trump. The chapter highlights how alt-right groups idolize Russia's leader Vladimir Putin, seeing him as the sort of strong-willed authoritarian dedicated to “traditional values” that the world needs. It discloses how Russia has been the hospitable home and host of American right-wing extremists, such as David Duke who moved to Russia in 1999.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL F. MILLS

This article examines the politics of American “doomsday” prepping during Barack Obama's presidency. It challenges claims that growing interest in prepping post-2008 arose exclusively from extreme apocalyptic, white supremacist, and anti-government reactions to Obama's electoral successes – claims that suggest prepping to be politically congruent with previous waves of extreme right-wing American “survivalism.” Drawing on ethnography, this paper argues that, while fears of Obama have been central to many preppers’ activities, much of their prepping under his presidency centred on fears that sit outside survivalist politics. Building on this, the article illuminates connections between prepping and America's twenty-first-century electoral mainstream. Engaging with discussions about the “remaking” of American conservatism during Obama's presidency, it particularly frames prepping's growth as being engaged with, and shaped by, currents of mainstream anti-Obama fear that similarly undergirded the Tea Party's rise within popular Republicanism at this time.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Blazakis ◽  
Colin Clarke

The global far right is extremely broad in nature and far from monolithic. While the “far right” is often used as an umbrella term, using the term runs the risk of over-simplifying the differences and linkages between white supremacist, anti-immigration, nativist, and other motivating ideologies. These beliefs and political platforms fall within the far-right rubric, and too often the phrase presents a more unified image of the phenomena than is really the case. In truth, the “far right” and the individual movements that comprise it are fragmented, consisting of a number of groups that lack established leadership and cohesion. Indeed, these movements include chauvinist religious organizations, neo-fascist street gangs, and paramilitary organs of established political parties. Although such movements largely lack the mass appeal of the interwar European radical right-wing extreme, they nevertheless can inspire both premeditated and spontaneous acts of violence against perceived enemies. This report is intended to provide policymakers, practitioners, and the academic community with a roadmap of ongoing shifts in the organizational structures and ideological currents of radical right-wing extremist movements, detailing the difference between distinct, yet often connected and interlaced echelons of the far right. In particular, the report identifies and analyzes various aspects of the broader far right and the assorted grievances it leverages to recruit, which is critical to gaining a more nuanced understanding of the potential future trajectory of these movements.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-324
Author(s):  
FERNANDA TARABAL LOPES ◽  
ALESSANDRA DE SÁ MELLO DA COSTA

Abstract Recent years have witnessed the rise of far right-wing leaders in various parts of the world. Stanley (2019) recognizes the particularities of the different nations where this phenomenon is observed but advocates for generalizing it. The author uses the label “fascism” to refer to a variety of ultranationalism. When analyzing the current Brazilian situation, Souza (2019) also refers to fascism, exploring its irrational origins and particularities in Brazil, noticing the emergence of a neo-fascism. Against this backdrop, there are cases of people leaving their countries due to the increasing violence experienced. This study explores this particular situation, presenting the history of Tiburi’s exile, a philosopher, writer, university professor, and Brazilian politician. Concerning the theoretical discussion of the case, the study recalls, among other contributions, the debate about the centrality of work and its psychological function and how it presents itself as a form of existence and resistance for political exile. The article also discusses solidarity and the ‘public space of word’, a possibility that ceases in the country of origin and is sought in expatriation, primarily through work as a mode of existence and resistance. This study uses life history research, which is a rich possibility of apprehending the social experience and the subject in their practices. It is a method particularly fruitful in the study of phenomena such as migration. It is also essential through this research to register and reflect on work in the context of the recent Brazilian political exile.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Abdulfattah Omar ◽  
Wafya Ibrahim Hamouda ◽  
Mohammed Aldawsari

This study is concerned with investigating the implications of the new nationalist and populist discourse of the far right-wing movements to immigration in different Arab countries, with a focus on Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. For this purpose, the study is based on a corpus of different genres, including political speeches, newspaper articles, as well as social media posts and comics. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is used in order to explore speakers’ ideologies and how rhetoric and discursive strategies are employed to influence public opinion and persuade citizens about certain views and policies and even prompt them to take the desired action. Results indicate that the new nationalist and populist discourse adopted by different politicians and far right-wing parties and movements have negative impact on the rights of migrants and refugees in Arab countries. Migrants and refugees are used as scapegoats for political gains. They are blamed for all social, economic, and political challenges and crises these countries are suffering today. Right-wing movements are embedding some hidden ideologies in their political discourse that are related to the hate and rejection of migrants and refugees. It can also be concluded that the increasing popularity of anti-immigration movements and radical right-wing political leaders hint at the influence of the nationalist and populist discourse on the public opinion in their countries. Populist discourse has led to fear and rejection of the “Other”, and even to racist acts and xenophobia.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Bradley Byington

Conspiracy theories, and especially antisemitic conspiracy theories, form a core ideological component of right-wing violent extremism in the United States. This article argues that conspiracy narratives and their psychological antecedents are key to understanding the ideological appeal of right-wing extremist formations such as white supremacist and Christian Identity movements, providing insight into the motivations and behaviors of those individual participants who become sufficiently radicalized to carry out terrorist actions. It is further proposed that standard radicalization models can be enhanced for applications specific to right-wing extremism through an understanding of conspiracy thinking (both antisemitic and otherwise), and that this understanding can assist in addressing the motivated roots of the ideologies that sustain this particular type of violent extremism through a public health approach to counter-radicalization that aims to “inoculate” the public against the cognitive tendencies exemplified in antisemitic con- spiracy theories and in conspiracist culture more generally. The proposed approach would complement existing efforts in a unique way, as it would have the potential not only to improve public security, but also to provide further societal benefits by countering other negative tendencies associated with conspiracy belief (for example, decreased intention to vaccinate). This would provide an exceptional cost versus benefit ratio while supporting existing counter-radicalization programs and leaving them intact.


Experiment ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-116
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Norris

Abstract This article focuses on anti-Semitic cartoons published in the right-wing, satirical, illustrated newspaper Pliuvium, which appeared in Russia after the 1905 Revolution. The illustrated journal represented one of the new, far-right media outlets in the wake of the events of 1905 and its editors sought to redefine Russia as a traditional monarchy, home to ethnic Russians. To accomplish this aim, Pliuvium employed caricaturists who drew contrasts between Russians and Jews, turning the latter into the antithesis of the nation. Through close readings of several anti-Semitic images from the newspaper, the author seeks to reveal the broader historical forces contained within them. In the end, these cartoons help us understand the “unholy trinity” comprising the ugly side of Russian nationhood, racism in Russian imperial culture, and the emergence of far-right publics by 1905.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-241
Author(s):  
Miglena Sternadori

This analysis identifies the dominant media frames in the coverage of four right-wing populist actors — Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Silvio Berlusconi, and Roman Abramovich — by the Bulgarian editions of Elle and Cosmopolitan. Although the political platforms of these men are not, in fact, anti-establishment, which is the core characteristic of populism, they are referred to as populist actors because of their use of populist tools and discourses to practice so-called “neo-populism from above.” The four men were framed as: a carriers of a “golden touch”; b sources of profound/problematic wisdom; and c admirable collectors of “trophy” women. The findings are discussed as illustrative of the tabloidization of U.S. women’s magazine brands in the post-communist context of Bulgaria.


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