Locke on Punishment, Property and Moral Knowledge

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 218-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Ward

AbstractLocke's admittedly 'very strange' sounding doctrine of natural executive power, according to which the individual has the right to execute the law of nature, has long been one of the most controversial features of his moral philosophy. In contrast to the many commentators who deny its theoretical innovation and challenge its individualist premises, this study proposes that the philosophical significance of Locke's natural right to punish derives from its critical departure from earlier moral and political theory. It also argues that the individualist political and religious implications of the natural punishment doctrine are only fully intelligible in light of Locke's theory of property and the assessment of the epistemological limits and possibilities for acquiring moral knowledge in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

Hegel's Value ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 222-275
Author(s):  
Dean Moyar

This chapter utilizes the structure of life and valid inference to analyze the internal structure of Civil Society and the State as well as the relationship between the two institutional spheres. The chapter unpacks the passage from the Logic in which Hegel describes the State as a totality of inferences with the three terms of individuals, their needs, and the government. It is shown that the “system of needs” itself forms a quasi-living institutional system of estates centered on the division of labor. This system’s inadequacy motivates the role of the “police” and corporation as ethical agencies, forms of the Good, within Civil Society. While the move to the State overcomes the individualism of “needs,” the right of the individual remains in the dynamics of “settling one’s own account” in receiving from the State a return on one’s duty to the State. Hegel treats the State proper as a constitution consisting of three powers of government that form a totality of inferential relations that has the full structure of a living organism. The executive power is examined in detail as the particularizing element in the system.


1982 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. B. Drury

In this paper I hope to show that the differences between the Lockian and Nozickian ideas regarding the foundation of private property are far greater than is generally assumed. My purpose is not to criticize Nozick, but to show that the accepted interpretation of Locke on which he relies is mistaken. In particular, I hope to show (1) that the theory of appropriation by labour is not applicable after the invention of money; and is meant to show that the right to property is based on the right to life and self-preservation, and (2) that property arrangements after the introduction of money are justified primarily by utility rather than natural right, and (3) that the conditions created by the invention of money make the ‘regulation’ of private property necessary for the preservation of mankind which is required by the law of nature.


Author(s):  
Leonardo Barros da Silva Menezes

To which rights refugees are entitled? In this paper, I analyze the many challenges that two interrelated theoretical traditions of Refugee Studies have implicitly posed to one another. First, I examine the analytic philosophers’ assumption that we cannot understand the nature of a refugee claim until we know what entitles an individual to make it – i.e., what root cause for displacement could explain, and justify, such status. Second, after examining Critical Citizenship Studies, I mainly discuss a renewed Arendtian tradition whose cosmopolitan claim has advocated granting the right of citizenship to all forced displaced persons. By demonstrating why each response leaves room for strong rebuttals from the other side, I make clear the urgency of rethinking today’s international refugee regime as well as the place of political theory in it.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Edward S. Yeung

Most of my research directions were opportunistic. Having worked with lasers in the early stages of laser applications in analytical chemistry, attending conferences, workshops, and administrative meetings that were not exactly aligned with our own research, locating to a building or in a department that housed scientists with different backgrounds, having certain specialized equipment at the right time, and having funding agencies that were broad-minded clearly contributed to my ventures into diverse fields. Most of all, it had to be the many eager minds that I have had the fortune to work with. I have always tried to suggest research topics that might be interesting to the individual coworker rather than something straight out of my own research proposals. Only then did each person actually own the project rather than consider it a chore. After all, we work in the field of analytical chemistry, in which almost anything we do can fit in.


1940 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 218-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. J. Friedrich

IN A FAMOUS dialogue between the Athenian ambassadors and the Council of the small island of Melos, Thucydides has given the classical statement of the “right” of the stronger. “The brave Milesians soon see that they cannot appeal to the Athenians' sense of justice, because the Athenians recognize no standard but their own political advantage…By making the Athenians justify the right of the stronger through the law of nature, and transform God from the guardian of justice into the pattern of all earthly authority and force, Thucydides gives the realistic policy of Athens the depth and validity of a philosophical doctrine.” The Dutch, in the days of Peter Breughel, used to say: “the big fish devour the little fish” to which Spinoza added “by natural right.” That is the doctrine of the “state,”as inherited from the Greeks. Similar situations still haunt us. Did the Russians by natural right seek to destroy Finnish independence?


1926 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 524-547
Author(s):  
B. F. Wright

When James Otis in 1764 declared that government “has an everlasting foundation in the unchangeable will of God, the author of nature, whose laws never vary,” and that “there can be no prescription old enough to supersede the law of nature and the grant of God Almighty, who has given to all men a natural right to be free,” he was at once making use of one of the oldest and most important conceptions in the history of political thought and giving to that concept a distinctly American meaning. His was merely one of the earliest examples in this country of a kind of political theory which was to find reflection in the Declaration of Independence in one generation, in the higher law doctrine in another, and in a famous trilogy of decisions of the Supreme Court in still a third. However, the natural-rights theory is by no means the only usage found for the natural-law concept in the political thought of this country, and it is the purpose of this paper to trace briefly the various interpretations placed upon it and the different forms through which it has passed.It is easy enough to say that natural law has meant just what the individual theorist desired to have it mean; for its content has varied from philosophical anarchy to paternalistic aristocracy, and from the assertion of strongly individualistic democracy to the defence of highly centralized government. But this statement does not dispose of the problem. It is necessary to know why and when these varying interpretations were advanced and what their exponents meant when they spoke so confidently of the laws of nature.


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 446-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Porter

AbstractAccording to a widely held view, Aquinas does not have a notion of subjective natural rights, understood as moral powers inhering in individuals. This article argues that this way of reading Aquinas is wrong, or at best, seriously misleading. Aquinas does identify the right, the object of justice, with the relation established between parties to an equitable exchange or interaction, and in this sense he identifies right with an objective state of affairs. But this line of analysis does not commit him to any particular construal of what constitutes a just relation. In particular, it leaves open the possibility that in some situations, the right, understood as an objectively equitable relation, presupposes that someone's claim of a right, is duly acknowledged. Moreover, in many contexts Aquinas says that individuals can claim certain liberties and immunities on the basis of some natural right, in terms that make it clear that these claims lie within the discretion of the individual. His overall conception of natural law and natural right implies that individuals can legitimately make certain claims by right, claims that emerge within some contexts and not others. He does not have a theory of rights, but neither do the scholastic jurists of the time, and his appeals to what someone can claim by right are reminiscent of their views. If they can be said to have a notion of subjective natural rights, the same can be said of Aquinas himself.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-287
Author(s):  
Tone Jagodic ◽  
Zlatko Mateša

Sponsorship represents very important source of finances for many sports organizations. The aim of the article is to analyze structural elements of sponsorship contract and to propose a proper definition of a sponsorship contract, while leaning on the many sources of comparative law. The review of foreign legislation shows that not one country has yet legally enacted the sponsorship contract. Some legislation regulate sponsorship in an indirect way using common rules of contractual law or some elements of other contracts, which are already well known and regulated by legal systems. In determining the validity of the arguments cited by the individual authors in the literature our aim is to come to some conclusions which have been summarized in following parts of this article. It seems that the Code of sponsorship of the International Chambers of Commerce (ICC) gives the real foundation which can be useful for different sport organizations. Following the ICC International Code on Sponsorship, the definition of a sponsorship agreement “is any commercial agreement by which a sponsor, for the mutual benefit of the sponsor and a sponsored party, contractually provides financing or other support in order to establish an association between the sponsor’s image, brands or products and a sponsorship property in return for the rights to promote this association and/or for the granting of certain agreed direct or indirect benefits.” Brand of the sponsor, identification with the property of the sponsored subject, commercial agreement, right to promote and mutual benefit are the vital components of a sponsorship contract which are contained in the ICC definition. We also believe that in the future, this definition could lead to the right definition for a possible codification of a sponsorship contract on the national level. At the same time it is important to mention the special characteristic of the specific value of the sponsored subject contained in a sponsorship contract. From the angle of the sponsor this value can be compared with a special and characteristic element of the sponsored subject which brings to the sponsor a very precious value /”pretium affectionis”/ and is consequently extremely important in a rational economic decision of a sponsor to sign a sponsorship contract. Taking into account that all these elements represent the “causa” of a sponsorship contract the position of the sponsor could be defined as the tendency to identify with the value of the sponsored party, with the aim to further manifest itself by promoting these links, both of which lead to the goal of a sponsor to raise or improve its image in public or in a society. The essential challenge of the sponsor is to manage to change the opportunity into the advantage given in the contract relationship. Opportunities should be taken from the challenges which are given to the sponsor and this represents the original motive of the sponsor to sign a sponsorship contract.


2020 ◽  
pp. 32-41
Author(s):  
Lyubov Lobanova ◽  
Alexey Rozhnov ◽  
Larisa Larionova

Freedom is a natural-legal value that makes up the essence of human nature and therefore it is innate. The latter determines a research interest in how freedom in all the variety of its essential features (freedom, choice, freedom of will, boundaries of freedom, independence of an individual, etc.) manifests itself in various forms of human life, including such a segment of positive law as criminal law. Being a guarantee of personality development, allowing it to break out of the circle of diverse social connections determining its behavior, freedom, nevertheless, has certain limits of its activity. The establishment of these boundaries is necessary to ensure the freedom of each person so that the freedom of one does not become the non-freedom of the other. These boundaries are set by all positive law, including criminal law. Hence, ensuring personal freedom should be the goal of criminal law-making and criminalization of dangerous forms of human behavior. However, ensuring freedom and educating a person in the spirit of a conscious and responsible choice is not the same thing. Therefore, mixing or combining these goals in criminal law is contrary to the goals of legal regulation and testifies to the right of paternalism, incompatible with the purpose and possibilities of law in general and criminal law in particular. The realization of freedom outside is the act of a person, which is the result of a conscious choice of one of the many options for the behavior of the individual as a rational being. Consequently, a set of conscious behaviors themselves, as well as criminal ones which have not gone beyond the limits of its mental activity, i.e. not taken place in the act, under no circumstances can be declared criminal. Hence, the authors once again emphasize that the occurrence and revealing intent to commit a crime are indifferent to the criminal law and are outside its scope. Freedom as a choice embodied in a person's deed is ensured by the establishment of norms in criminal law aimed at protecting external freedom. The latter, through criminal law, legally guarantees an individual the possibility of unimpeded movement, choice of place of residence, place of stay, acting in this capacity as a prerequisite for the realization of freedom in its anthropological dimension. But human freedom manifests itself most vividly as a sign of guilt, which is an indispensable sign of any corpus delicti – the only basis for criminal liability and, therefore, the most serious personality restrictions. It should be noted that the principle of guilt (liability for guilt) is enshrined in the criminal law (Article 5) among the fundamental principles of the industry. Subject to Art. 5 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation criminal liability is possible only if there is guilt as a conscious-volitional attitude of a person to the deed and its consequences.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 232-236
Author(s):  
Manol Stanin

AbstractLimitation of rights is a measure proved its effectiveness with positive results for the community in war, military or another emergency.Attitude to rightsmust be human with a view to the right-to-human relationshipbecause the crossing of a certain boundary leads to a disintegration of rights and a negative impact on the personality.This implies necessity from legal institutionalization of clear criteria to refine the limitation of rights, both for the purpose of their protection and for the purpose of protecting the individual.


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