Towards a European Foreign Policy

2006 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-114
Author(s):  
Brian Crowe

AbstractThe Balkans have been the crucible of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the 1990s the appointment of David (Lord) Owen as a strong representative to manage the EU's Bosnian policy, the sidelining of the EU itself by the Contact Group, and American dominance at Dayton (what price 'this is the hour of Europe'?) and over Kosovo were important precursors to the important European Council decisions in June 1999 to appoint a high-profile international statesman as High Representative for the CFSP and to create the EU's own military capability in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Constitutional Treaty's further provisions, notably replacing the Presidency in external relations, will be sorely missed and will need to be brought back.ESDP is developing well, if modestly, and making a genuine contribution, mostly with a strong civ-mil component, in several parts of the world. The CFSP itself seems to be managing quite well. But the EU is not yet set up for serious 'events' or crisis management. Experience shows, and greater recognition is needed, that the EU (probably even with an EU Foreign Minister) needs to be represented by member states that carry conviction to outside interlocutors: some member states are inevitably more equal and carry greater weight than others, even if all have an equal voice. Since EU foreign policy is in large measure inescapably a function of US foreign policy, member states need to have a better common understanding among themselves about the nature of the transatlantic relationship. It will take confidence in the efficacy of the CFSP, to which all must give greater priority, before those member states that have alternatives will accept being bound to conducting their foreign policy (or being represented in the UN Security Council) through Brussels. at will take time and effort.

Author(s):  
Hylke Dijkstra ◽  
Sophie Vanhoonacker

The member states of the European Union (EU) coordinate, define, and implement foreign policy in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This policy area, often referred to as EU foreign policy, has a broad scope covering all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to security and defense. The CFSP is supported by a unique institutional framework, in which member states diplomats and officials from the EU institutions jointly make policy. It is led by the High Representative, who is the “face and voice” of EU foreign policy, and supported by the substantial European External Action Service and 140 EU delegations in other countries and international organizations. Because foreign policy is normally the business of sovereign states, the exceptional nature of the CFSP has long been a subject of inquiry. The CFSP has particularly puzzled advocates of the traditional theories of European integration and international relations, who have failed to appreciate what the EU does in the field of high politics. Given the absence of formal diplomatic recognition and a strong reliance on the resources of the member states, the EU is still not a full-fledged actor, yet it has a strong international presence nonetheless. Its presence and the gradual increase in “actorness” have also raised questions about whether the EU presents a different type of actor, a civilian or normative power, which derives its influence from non-traditional sources of power. Under the assumption that the EU has some actorness, the Europeanization of foreign policy has become an area of interest. Member states can act through the EU structure to achieve more impact internationally, can adjust national foreign policy on the basis of EU positions, and are socialized into greater European coordination. The relationship between national and EU foreign policy is thus a significant topic of debate. Finally, governance perspectives increasingly provide insight into the organization of the CFSP. How the member states and the EU institutions collectively coordinate, define, and implement EU foreign policy is not only an important question in itself but also matters for policy outcomes.


2021 ◽  
pp. 43-59
Author(s):  
Tomasz Dubowski

In the discussion on the EU migration policy, it is impossible to evade the issue of the relation between this policy and the EU foreign policy, including EU common foreign and security policy. The subject of this study are selected links between migration issues and the CFSP of the European Union. The presented considerations aim to determine at what levels and in what ways the EU’s migration policy is taken into account in the space of the CFSP as a diplomatic and political (and subject to specific rules and procedures) substrate of the EU’s external action.


Author(s):  
Spyros Economides

The European Union’s involvement with and in Kosovo is of three main types. First, it participated in war diplomacy in the late 1990s in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to the Kosovo conflict between Kosovar Albanians and the Serb forces of the former Yugoslavia. This demonstrated of the Union’s limited ability to influence less powerful actors in its backyard through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This resulted from the difficulty the EU found in attempting to forge a consensus among its member states on a significant matter of regional security with humanitarian implications, the limitations in effectiveness of the EU’s civilian instruments of foreign policy, and the low credibility and influence stemming from the lack of an EU military capability. Second, the EU took a leading role in economic reconstruction and state-building in Kosovo following the end of the conflict. Initially, this was in tandem with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Subsequently, the EU became the lead organization, focusing its efforts not only on the physical and economic reconstruction of the territory but also on building human and administrative capacity and democratic institutions and establishing good governance and the rule of law, especially through its EULEX mission. Third, the EU attempted to help transform Kosovo beyond democratization toward EU integration through instruments such as the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). A significant part of this process has also been linked with EU-led mediation attempts at resolving outstanding issues between Kosovo and Serbia through a process of normalization of relations without which EU accession cannot be envisaged. Throughout the post-war phases of the EU’s involvement in Kosovo, its efforts have been undermined by the most important outstanding issue, the disputed status of Kosovo. Kosovo was set on the path to increasing self-government and autonomy at the end of the conflict in 1999, but it was still legally part of sovereign Yugoslavia. In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence. While over 100 states recognized Kosovo, it never acquired enough recognitions to be eligible for UN membership: Serbia does not recognize it and, most importantly, neither do five EU member states. This status issue has seriously complicated the EU–Kosovo relationship in all its aspects and slowed down the prospect of “Euro-Atlantic integration” for Kosovo.


2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 178-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muriel Asseburg ◽  
Ronja Kempin

In 2003, the EU declared its civilian and military crisis management instruments ready for deployment. Since then, EU member states have demonstrated their capability to act as a global security player. They have deployed civil missions and military operations to Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, the Eastern neighbourhood, the Near and Middle East, and even to Asia. Th ese engagements have encompassed a variety of approaches and tools to crisis management and stabilisation, ranging from the training of security forces and the support for the rule of law, to the provision of a military or civilian presence, to safeguard elections or to monitor border arrangements and ceasefire agreements, to the fight against piracy or other forms of organised crime. Altogether, by the end of 2009, the EU had conducted 23 missions and operations under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU has made considerable progress on its way to becoming a global security actor. However, case studies show that many ESDP engagements face substantial shortcomings – chief among them the lack of long-term, strategic planning for future deployments, a binding and institutionalised “lessons learned” process as well as a consistent follow-up by member states and EU institutions involved.


Significance However, member states have the dominant foreign policy role in the EU. After Brexit, that will be France and Germany despite the United Kingdom insisting that it wants to maintain as close a relationship with the EU as possible. Impacts EU reformers will light on foreign policy as an area to drive forwarded integration. However, the EEAS lacks the competencies and institutional horsepower to be a force for integration. The strategic needs of the 27 post-Brexit EU members will be various, thus acting as a drag on integration. Smaller EU member states will see more advantage than larger ones in collectively pursuing foreign policy goals through Brussels. Larger member states will be unwilling to submit their national defence policies to greater EU authority.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (54) ◽  
pp. 223-246
Author(s):  
Hana N. Hlaváčková ◽  

The European security environment has changed and the EU has become more independent in its security policy. New threats faced by the EU in 2014 (the migration crises) and other remaining threats (such as terrorism, organised crime, piracy) need solving by its greater involvement in the region. One problem that the EU tries to solve is the inconsistency of member states in security issues. In this article, we focus on the V4 group and their opinions towards EU security. This article examines strategies adopted by small/new EU member states to protect European borders and European territories and regions outside the EU that affect their security. For a long time, the V4 countries only participated sporadically in EU missions. The article shows what changes took place and what were the reasons for the decision to participate or not in the EU activities. The article raises the question of whether the show-the-flag strategy adopted by the V4 countries and their participation in EU missions is relevant for ensuring European security nowadays.


Author(s):  
Maxime H. A. Larivé

This empirical and historical analysis of the Western European Union (WEU), an intergovernmental defense organization, contributes to the broader understanding of the construction and integration of European security and defense policy. The WEU was established in 1954 by the Modified Brussels Treaty after the failure of the European Defense Community and at the time of the construction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Over its lifetime, the WEU was confronted by two major trends: the centrality of collective defense agreement providing security on the European continent enforced by NATO and the construction of a European security and defense policy within the broad integration process of the European Union (EU). The WEU provided a platform for Western European powers, particularly France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, to engage in the construction of a European defense. Historically, these countries had diverging visions ranging from an autonomous force to one that should remain under the NATO auspice. The end of the Cold War accelerated the transfer of the WEU mission to the EU, but the crises in the Gulf region and in the Balkans in 1990s led to a period of activity for the WEU. The institutionalization of the EU, beginning with the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, accelerated the construction of a European defense and security policy within EU structures. The transfer from the WEU to the EU began in the late 1990s and the WEU was dissolved in 2011.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-20
Author(s):  
Alexander Berger

The world observed a well-developed Russian strategy and military model have had destabilizing consequences and wide-ranging implications for international security, in particular for Europe, and global stability since the Ukraine crisis. Needless to say, most European countries and notably NATO conclude that Russian policy, military strategy, and military practice in the Ukraine crisis challenge the European security and carry significant implications for NATO, therefore the Ukraine crisis force the EU and NATO to concentrate on measures against Russian strategy.[1] In reality, Russia has already given the signals of its intentions via the Military Doctrine 2010 and Defense Strategy 2013 that list destabilization of the near abroad, in other words buffer zone, and NATO or the EU expansion, including deployment of military forces, as most relevant military threats. Both documents highlight that “Russia faced the very real threat of being side-lined in international affairs.” [2] Furthermore MacKinnon suggests that in line with its new regime change strategy, the United States forced the former Soviet Union’s member states to establish their political institutions, provided funds for the opposition, and supported revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the revolutions added to the Kremlin’s perception that “Washington’s chief objective might have been to change the regime in Russia as well.”[3] Likewise, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said “NATO’s expansion by pulling more Russia’s neighboring countries into the alliance is unacceptable”.[4] Therefore it could be concluded from Russian point of view that everything should be done to prevent NATO and the EU expansion which can be characterized as the greatest threat to Russian security, and that’s why Russia must restore its status as a great power inside its own sphere of influence. It is the aim of this analytic paper to search why the EU and NATO have failed to manage the crisis emanating from Russian aggression and expansion in Ukraine, and to address the current strategic environment as well. I shall try to analyze the drivers and the reasons of NATO and the EU’s poor reaction against Russia, and finally I will emphasize why and how the roles of NATO and the European Security Strategy should be reconsidered in the light of energy security policy of the EU, and why NATO and the EU needs to improve their responsiveness rather than readiness.


2020 ◽  
pp. 80-86
Author(s):  
Ivanna Maryniv

Problem setting. In spite of the presence of numerous conventions, treaties and organizations in the world today, the issue of security is still a very acute issue for the world community. There are many reasons for this: the presence of nuclear powers, serious disputes between countries that are justly considered world leaders, the existence of numerous local conflicts and wars of a more global nature across the globe. These and other factors are pushing states around the world to allocate budget funds to ensure effective security policies. Given today’s realities, one can trace the tendency of several countries to pool their own efforts and resources to pursue a common security policy. The European Union is one of the clearest examples of this behavior. This intergovernmental organization is committed to maintaining peace, diplomacy, trade and development around the world. The EU also promotes cooperation with neighboring countries through the European Neighborhood Policy. Target research. The aim of the research is to study the role of the European Union’s institutional mechanism in the exercise of its powers to ensure the defense and foreign policy cooperation of the Member States. Analysis of recent research and publication. Many domestic and foreign scholars, including B. Tonro, T. Christiansen, S. Morsch, G. Mackenstein, and others. The institutional basis of foreign and security policy is analyzed in detail by J. Peterson, questions related to the European Union’s security policy. M. Shackleton. K. Gill, M. Smith and others study the general features of the development of a common EU security policy. Some contribution to the study of various problems related to European and Euro-Atlantic integration has been made by such national scientists as V. Govorukh, I. Gritsyak, G. Nemyrya, L. Prokopenko, O. Rudik, V. Streltsov, O. Tragniuk, I. Shumlyaeva, I. Yakovyuk and others. Article’s main body. The article examines the emergence and development of the European Union’s security policy from the date of the Brussels Covenant to the present. Particular attention is paid to the role of the European Union’s institutional mechanism in the exercise of its powers to ensure the defense and foreign policy cooperation of the Member States. A study of the officially adopted five-year global foreign and security policy of the EU is being done to improve stability in Europe and beyond, analyzing EU conflict resolution and crisis management activities. Conclusions and prospect of development. In view of the above, it can be concluded that the EU’s foreign and security policy institutional framework is an extensive system in which all the constituencies are endowed with a certain range of general and specific powers and are called upon to cooperate with one another to achieve a common goal. It cannot be said that such close cooperation puts pressure on Member States. Yes, a Member State has the right to refrain from voting for any decision that requires unanimity and such abstention will not prevent the above decision being taken. In this case, the mechanism of so-called “constructive retention” is triggered: the abstaining country is not obliged to comply with the decision, however, accepts the fact that it is binding on other Member States and takes this into account when concluding treaties, which should not contradict the said decision.


Author(s):  
Ian Bache ◽  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Owen Parker

This chapter examines the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). From 1993 to 2009, external political relations formed the second pillar of the EU, on CFSP. Although CFSP was officially an intergovernmental pillar, the European Commission came to play an important role. There were serious attempts to strengthen the security and defence aspects of the CFSP in the face of the threats that faced the EU from instability in its neighbouring territories. However, the EU remains far from having a truly supranational foreign policy and its status as a ‘power’ in international relations is debatable. The chapter first provides a historical background on the CFSP, focusing on the creation of the European Political Co-operation (EPC), before discussing the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It concludes with an assessment of EU power and its impact on world politics.


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