scholarly journals Is the “show-the-flag” strategy relevant for Visegrad countries in securing the EU?

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (54) ◽  
pp. 223-246
Author(s):  
Hana N. Hlaváčková ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Visegrád Countries ◽  
The Eu

The European security environment has changed and the EU has become more independent in its security policy. New threats faced by the EU in 2014 (the migration crises) and other remaining threats (such as terrorism, organised crime, piracy) need solving by its greater involvement in the region. One problem that the EU tries to solve is the inconsistency of member states in security issues. In this article, we focus on the V4 group and their opinions towards EU security. This article examines strategies adopted by small/new EU member states to protect European borders and European territories and regions outside the EU that affect their security. For a long time, the V4 countries only participated sporadically in EU missions. The article shows what changes took place and what were the reasons for the decision to participate or not in the EU activities. The article raises the question of whether the show-the-flag strategy adopted by the V4 countries and their participation in EU missions is relevant for ensuring European security nowadays.

Kosovo and the European Union

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spyros Economides
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Regional Security ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Military Capability ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Eu

The European Union’s involvement with and in Kosovo is of three main types. First, it participated in war diplomacy in the late 1990s in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to the Kosovo conflict between Kosovar Albanians and the Serb forces of the former Yugoslavia. This demonstrated of the Union’s limited ability to influence less powerful actors in its backyard through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This resulted from the difficulty the EU found in attempting to forge a consensus among its member states on a significant matter of regional security with humanitarian implications, the limitations in effectiveness of the EU’s civilian instruments of foreign policy, and the low credibility and influence stemming from the lack of an EU military capability. Second, the EU took a leading role in economic reconstruction and state-building in Kosovo following the end of the conflict. Initially, this was in tandem with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Subsequently, the EU became the lead organization, focusing its efforts not only on the physical and economic reconstruction of the territory but also on building human and administrative capacity and democratic institutions and establishing good governance and the rule of law, especially through its EULEX mission. Third, the EU attempted to help transform Kosovo beyond democratization toward EU integration through instruments such as the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). A significant part of this process has also been linked with EU-led mediation attempts at resolving outstanding issues between Kosovo and Serbia through a process of normalization of relations without which EU accession cannot be envisaged. Throughout the post-war phases of the EU’s involvement in Kosovo, its efforts have been undermined by the most important outstanding issue, the disputed status of Kosovo. Kosovo was set on the path to increasing self-government and autonomy at the end of the conflict in 1999, but it was still legally part of sovereign Yugoslavia. In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence. While over 100 states recognized Kosovo, it never acquired enough recognitions to be eligible for UN membership: Serbia does not recognize it and, most importantly, neither do five EU member states. This status issue has seriously complicated the EU–Kosovo relationship in all its aspects and slowed down the prospect of “Euro-Atlantic integration” for Kosovo.

ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning

2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 178-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muriel Asseburg ◽  
Ronja Kempin
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
European Security ◽  
Global Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
The Eu

In 2003, the EU declared its civilian and military crisis management instruments ready for deployment. Since then, EU member states have demonstrated their capability to act as a global security player. They have deployed civil missions and military operations to Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, the Eastern neighbourhood, the Near and Middle East, and even to Asia. Th ese engagements have encompassed a variety of approaches and tools to crisis management and stabilisation, ranging from the training of security forces and the support for the rule of law, to the provision of a military or civilian presence, to safeguard elections or to monitor border arrangements and ceasefire agreements, to the fight against piracy or other forms of organised crime. Altogether, by the end of 2009, the EU had conducted 23 missions and operations under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU has made considerable progress on its way to becoming a global security actor. However, case studies show that many ESDP engagements face substantial shortcomings – chief among them the lack of long-term, strategic planning for future deployments, a binding and institutionalised “lessons learned” process as well as a consistent follow-up by member states and EU institutions involved.

International Cooperation in Combating Human Trafficking in the EU: Evidence from Turkey

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gönül Oğuz
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Human Trafficking ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
Human Smuggling ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Irregular Migrants ◽  
The Eu

Human trafficking lies at the heart of international organised crime. It is concerned with profits in terms of the exploitation of human beings. It is an abuse of basic rights. The enormous interest and concern for trafficking and human struggling is factual evidence. In the EU, policy on irregular migration is driven by the perception that the member states risk being overwhelmed by large numbers of irregular migrants thought to constitute a threat to national security. This has implications for policy measures designed to combat trafficking and human smuggling, which may not work without international cooperation. In most cases, victims are brought to the EU member states from abroad. This creates a demand for international obligations for cooperation and related instruments for combating human smuggling and trafficking. Therefore, the member states and their law enforcement agencies cannot tackle human trafficking alone. A question arises as to whether Turkey can be a vital partner, based on the facts that it is a transit country, with a strong border and assuming that it has a role to play, through its expertise and its commitment to dealing with the effects of trafficking. Unfortunately, these facts are still overlooked, while disproportionately intensive efforts are expended on dealing with questions of national security by the member states. Combating illegal immigration and reducing and controlling migration are frequently seen through the magnifying glass of the struggle against human trafficking. This article focuses on the international factors involved and how the wider international community might be able to play an effective role in helping to tackle human trafficking. It argues that continued coordination and collaboration across the countries is vital. The article reviews the empirical evidence from Turkey, as non-EU/candidate countries' cooperation and assistance in human trafficking may have an important dimension.

scholarly journals Traktat lizboński i jego implikacje dla francusko-niemieckiej współpracy w obszarze Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej

Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (54) ◽  
pp. 287-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Paterek
Keyword(s):  
Sleeping Beauty ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
European Security ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
External Pressures ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
Defence Cooperation ◽  
New Framework ◽  
The Eu

The Lisbon Treaty and Its Implications for French‑German Cooperation in EU’s Common Security and Defence PolicyFaced with internal and external pressures the EU’s security and defence policy has become one of the most dynamic fields of European integration. This paper describes declared ambition of Franco‑Germancooperation to strengthening the EU in European security and defence. In light of a more demanding security environment Berlin and Paris have awakened the so‑called „Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty”, The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), introduced by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. They managed to find a compromise and to turn PESCO into a process as much as to create a new framework to deepen defence cooperation amongst EU Member States. The conclusions argue that the relaunch of the Franco‑German motor is key to European defence.

scholarly journals The EU Battlegroups (EUBGs) – a successful story or a paper tiger?

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (68) ◽  
pp. 106-127
Author(s):  
Beatrica Šmaguc
Keyword(s):  
Significant Role ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Added Value ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The World ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Eu

Abstract After decades of reliance upon NATO in security matters, the EU ought to develop security assets of its own in order to protect its interests and citizens. The Common Foreign and Security Policy as an expression of EU readiness and willingness to play a more significant role in security matters on the international stage led to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy, thus putting at the EU’s disposal civilian and military capabilities for dealing with the crisis spots around the world. The EUBG concept originated with the first member states’ pledges in November 2004 which gave added value to the EU in the security and defence area, at least on paper, while so far no EUBG has been deployed in the theatre of operations.

Counter-Terrorism and the EU Strategy for Border Security: Framing Suspects with Biometric Documents and Databases

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anneliese Baldaccini
Keyword(s):  
Border Security ◽  
Biometric Data ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
The Us ◽  
Biometric Systems ◽  
New Policies ◽  
And Storage ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThis article examines the way in which the EU amd its Member States have approached border security issues since the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. A key aspect of this approach has been to tighten control of borders and the safety of documents by the use of biometric systems. The new policies on border security and document security are resulting in the mass collection and storage of biometric data in relation to third-country nationals seeking entry into the territory of EU Member States, and in relation to EU nationals within the context of travel and identity documents. These developments are significant as the Union is considering the potential offered by biometrics not only for the effective management of borders but also for the prevention and combating of crime.

scholarly journals PESCO – MORE SECURITY FOR EUROPE

2018 ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
LILIANA BROŽIČ
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Security Problem ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
Migration Crisis ◽  
Defence Cooperation ◽  
The Eu

The end of this year, more precisely 13 December, will mark the first anniversary of the initiation of PESCO. The acronym PESCO is derived from the English name Permanent Security Cooperation. The objective of PESCO is to deepen defence cooperation of EU Member States (EU) in the development of common defence capabilities, joint projects and operational readiness as well as military contribution. In its early beginnings, the EU devoted most of its attention to the economic progress of its member states, which was a very logical goal in the decade following the end of World War II. Later on, the rudiments of security and defence appeared in the form of the Western European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy and the like. Until the start of war in the former Yugoslavia, the EU did not have a serious need or reason to particularly focus on security. Security policy was just one of the policies that had mainly been present on paper and in various debates. This became particularly obvious in the case of the intensive developments in the Balkans. This case very well tested the functioning of the EU and revealed the need for fundamental changes. One of the results was also an increased engagement in the field of international operations and missions: an observation mission in Georgia, a police and the rule of law mission in Kosovo, mission to assist in the aftermath of a tsunami in Indonesia, a counter-piracy mission in Somalia, and a mission protecting refugees in Mali. The second key milestone in the EU's security and defence engagement was the European migration crisis in 2015. Here, the lack of appropriate policies at the EU level became most evident. More precisely, it revealed the contradictory application of the policies within the EU to member states and their citizens, and to those other countries and their inhabitants who do not benefit from the high values, ethical standards and social advantages when they arrive in unimaginably large numbers. Before the important EU bodies met, consulted, decided and acted, many problems in different areas had been identified. One of the key issues was the security problem. However, there were still many other influences that gave rise to the creation of PESCO. They are discussed by the authors in this issue. Nevertheless, let me just mention that the EU has in some way found itself at a turning point due to the increasingly present Euroscepticism, which was also discussed at this year’s Strategic Forum at Bled.

scholarly journals Intergovernmental mechanisms for security and defense R&D funding in the European Union

2021 ◽  
pp. 99-107
Author(s):  
V. Yu. Slepak
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Integrated System ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Loosely Coupled ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Research Areas ◽  
Long Time ◽  
The Eu

The need to create a new technological base through joint efforts is well understood both in the EU member states and in the Union itself, but the situation has not changed at all for a long time. Over time, Member States have come to realize that instead of increasing funding that does not address inefficiencies in this area, it is necessary to reduce duplication of efforts to develop loosely coupled capacities, platforms and systems. Since 2016, at the level of the European Union, a sufficiently integrated system has been formed, which makes it possible to coordinate the actions of the member states on funding scientific research for defense needs, as well as, by identifying the highest priority research areas for all EU member states, to co-finance such research from the EU budget. The most striking examples of such measures are the European Defense Fund and the financing from it of projects of the member states, implemented in the framework of PESCO. Such measures are predominantly intergovernmental in nature, but contribute to the formation of a single European market for scientific research by stimulating cross-border research projects.

scholarly journals The Security Environment of the V4 Countries

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaroslav Ušiak
Keyword(s):  
Policy Development ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Security Policies ◽  
Internal Variables ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
State Security ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Development Processes ◽  
Political Decision Making ◽  
Visegrád Countries

Abstract State security policy is not created in a vacuum. In general, policy‑making is affected by external and internal variables and influences on the security environment as well as by responses to all these factors. Political decision‑making is another significant intervening variable. The aim of this study is to define the security environment of the Visegrad countries in both its narrow and broader senses. To this end, I consider common factors that have affected - and continue to influence - all four countries in order to reveal and evaluate the policy development processes in these states up to the present day. My methodology relies on case studies that trace the security policies of each of the Visegrad countries since the end of the bipolar standoff. The comparison in my conclusion highlights significant challenges now affecting the security policies of all these countries including defence budgets, the crisis in Ukraine, the position of EU member states and growing nationalism and extremism.

scholarly journals Euroscepticism 's Impact upon European Union's Foreing Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-14
Author(s):  
Maryna Yakymchuk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
External Action ◽  
The United States ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

In the article, the author overviews and analyzes the impact of Euroscepticism on EU foreign policy. In particular, we identify the key actors involved in implementing the European common foreign policy and level of their affiliation with the ideas of Euroscepticism. EU Commissioners, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the staff of the European External Action Service are not eurosceptic. However, they do not have sufficient political influence decision making process. Thus, the European Council faces some obstacles achieving a compromise on international relations' issues. The European Parliament is more dependent on the Member States. Positions of the Member States are also different. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have a much higher level of opposition to strengthening internal integration in foreign policy, but they support EU enlargement. The Nordic countries support the deepening of foreign policy cooperation but are wary of the accession of new members. Therefore, the biggest opposition to the common foreign policy observed in the EU member states. Under the influence of Eurosceptic ideas, they slow down the process of integration. The population supports the common foreign policy with hopes to resolve the migration problem. Besides, citizens believe that common foreign policy can prevent the economic intervention of third countries. Excessive interference in the EU by Russia, China and the United States is also an obstacle to deepening integration. Despite this, European officials and citizens of EU member states support of strengthening cooperation in this area. To sum up, it is difficult to realise a common foreign policy without decreasing level of eurosceptism.

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