Revisiting Rorty’s Notion of Truth

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Rahul Kumar Maurya
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
The Way

Abstract This paper is intended to explore the Rorty’s notion of truth and its vicinity and divergences with Putnam’s notion of truth. Rorty and Putnam, both the philosophers have developed their notion of truth against the traditional representational notion of truth but their strength lies in its distinctive characterization. For Putnam, truth is the property of a statement which cannot be lost but the justification of it could be. I will also examine the importance of Putnam’s idealized justificatory conditions without which he may succumb to the charge of relativism at the same time how does Putnam overcome the tension between metaphysical and relativistic stances of truth. For Rorty, truth is not representational rather it is social, which means the justification for a true belief is not external but internal to the community of believers. I would further examine how Rorty tries to dispel the charge of relativism which is hard to overcome. Finally, I shall try to defend the concept of truth which is free from metaphysical baggage and relativistic threats; and in this enterprise Rorty walks half the way and Putnam completes the journey.

Sed ubi Socrates currit? On the Gettier Problem before Gettier

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Risto Hilpinen
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Current Belief ◽  
The Future ◽  
Late Nineteenth ◽  
The Gettier Problem ◽  
The Way ◽  
Forward Looking

Medieval philosophers presented Gettier-type objections to the commonly accepted view of knowledge as firmly held true belief, and formulated additional conditions that meet the objections or analyzed knowledge in a way that is immune to the Gettier-type objections. The proposed conditions can be divided into two kinds: backward-looking conditions and forward-looking conditions. The former concern an inquirer’s current belief system and the way the inquirer acquired her beliefs, the latter refer to what the inquirer may come to learn in the future and how she can respond to objections. Some conditions of knowledge proposed in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century epistemology can be regarded as variants of the conditions put forward by medieval authors.

Plantinga on warrant

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD SWINBURNE
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Christian Belief ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Statistical Probability ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Design Plan ◽  
Cognitive Environment ◽  
The Way

Alvin PlantingaWarranted Christian Belief(New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).In the two previous volumes of his trilogy on ‘warrant’, Alvin Plantinga developed his general theory of warrant, defined as that characteristic enough of which terms a true belief into knowledge. A belief B has warrant if and only if: (1) it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly, (2) in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which the faculties were designed, (3) according to a design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs, when (4) there is a high statistical probability of such beliefs being true.Thus my belief that there is a table in front of me has warrant if in the first place, in producing it, my cognitive faculties were functioning properly, the way they were meant to function. Plantinga holds that just as our heart or liver may function properly or not, so may our cognitive faculties. And he also holds that if God made us, our faculties function properly if they function in the way God designed them to function; whereas if evolution (uncaused by God) made us, then our faculties function properly if they function in the way that (in some sense) evolution designed them to function.

The Meno

2019 ◽  
pp. 159-181
Author(s):  
Lindsay Judson
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines various aspects of two central themes of the Meno, how knowledge (epistēmē) is related to true belief, and how it is acquired. This chapter argues that the Meno’s definition of knowledge as true belief ‘tied down with a reasoning out of the cause’, is best understood as a characterisation of a form of knowledge constituted by understanding, rather than by justified true belief. It argues that the best way to construe Meno’s paradox as a serious threat to the possibility of acquiring knowledge is to take it to be concerned with inquiry as the search for understanding something for oneself. The chapter advances a new version of the unjustly neglected interpretation of Plato’s response as principally cast in terms of recollection and recognition, as against the dominant interpretation, which sees it as principally cast in terms of the use of true beliefs as the way to knowledge. In the last section the chapter considers knowledge and true belief in the final part of the Meno, arguing that what Socrates says about their relationship here cannot be reconciled with his earlier account: this confirms the view that the arguments of the final section are not intended to be taken at face value.

Gettiered Belief

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. J. Coffman
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Propositional Content ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
The Way

Gettiered beliefs are beliefs that fall short of knowledge in the way illustrated by Gettier cases: cases like those Edmund Gettier employed to show that justified true belief doesn’t suffice for knowledge. What has happened to a belief that falls short of knowledge in the way such cases illustrate? I focus initially on two leading substantive answers, what I call the Ease of Mistake Approach and the Lack of Credit Approach. After critically assessing and rejecting each of these approaches, I introduce and evaluate two less prominent approaches to gettiered belief. According to the view I settle on—a species of what I call the Risk of Misleading Justification Approach—a gettiered belief is one which is justified and true, yet held in such a way that the belief’s subject either actually is justified in believing many falsehoods similar to its propositional content or could well have been so justified.

scholarly journals Why No True Reliabilist Should Endorse Reliabilism

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij ◽  
Jeffrey S. Dunn
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Side Constraints ◽  
The Way

Abstract Critics have recently argued that reliabilists face trade-off problems, forcing them to condone intuitively unjustified beliefs when they generate lots of true belief further downstream. What these critics overlook is that reliabilism entails that there are side-constraints on belief-formation, on account of which there are some things you should not believe, even if doing so would have very good epistemic consequences. However, we argue that by embracing side-constraints the reliabilist faces a dilemma: she can either hold on to reliabilism, and with it aforementioned side-constraints, but then needs to explain why we should allow the pursuit of justification to get in the way of the acquisition of true belief; or she can deny that there are side-constraints – and in effect give up on reliabilism. We'll suggest that anyone moved by the considerations that likely attract people to reliabilism in the first place – the idea the true belief is good, and as such should be promoted – should go for the second horn, and instead pursue a form of epistemic utilitarianism.

scholarly journals "But where's the bloody horse?" Die NG teologie in Afrika

2001 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 418-433
Author(s):  
A.S. Van Niekerk
Keyword(s):  
Dutch Reformed ◽  
African Theology ◽  
Reformed Church ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
African Writers ◽  
The University ◽  
The Way ◽  
Dutch Reformed Church

The relation between theology in the Dutch Reformed Church and the African world is discussed with reference to: (a) the relation between theology in the Dutch Reformed Church and science, and specifically the university with its policies; (b) the relation between science and the African world, especially as seen by African writers; and (c) the way that certain theologians in the Dutch Reformed Church have dealt with the African world and African theology. The relation between theology and praxis depends on the conception of truth held by the theologian involved. If truth is seen as the product of the theologian as subject (each subject produces his or her own truth), or if truth is identified with propositions or statements, the related theology can be expected to be unrelated to the praxis. A relation concept of truth is where God addresses a person and confronted by the realities of life and discovers truth in these relationships. Such a concept of truth does offer the prospect of a theology that interacts with reality. It is suggested that opportunities to engage existentially in such relations should become a strong characteristic of the way in which our theology is structured.

scholarly journals Truth Without People?

Philosophy ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 72 (279) ◽  
pp. 85-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Johann Glock
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Consensus Theory ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
Similar Vein ◽  
Independent Reality

There is a venerable tradition according to which the concept of truth is totally independent of human beings, their actions and beliefs, because truth consists in the correspondence of mind-independentpropositions to a mind-independent reality. For want of arespect. One way of doing so is relativism, the idea that whether a belief is true or false depends on the point of view of individuals or communities. A closely related position is a consensus theory of truth, according to which a belief is true if it is held by a (suitably qualified) group of people. In a similar vein, the pragmatist theory maintains that a true belief is one which it is expedient for us to accept.

Rationality and public evidence: a reply to Richard Swinburne

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALVIN PLANTINGA
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Christian Belief ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Richard Swinburne ◽  
Mere True Belief ◽  
Public Evidence ◽  
The Way

First, my thanks to Richard Swinburne for his probing and thoughtful review of my book Warranted Christian Belief (WCB). His account of the book's mainline of argument is accurate as far as it goes; it does contain an important lacuna, however. The focus of the book is twofold; it is aimed in two directions. First, just as Swinburne says, I argue that there are no plausible de iure objections to Christian belief that are independent of de facto objections; any plausible objection to the rationality of Christian belief, or to its warrant (the property that distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief), or its justification, will either be obviously mistaken or will (as with Freud, and Marx and a thousand others) presuppose one or more de facto objections. This is intended as a contribution to apologetics; it is important, because many or most objections to Christian belief are of just the sort I attempt to discredit. (‘I don't know whether Christian belief is true or not – who could know a thing like that? – but I do know that it is irrational, or unwarranted, or not rationally justified, or…’.) Second (and this is the focus Swinburne fails to mention), I proposed the extended A/C (Aquinas/Calvin) model as, from the perspective of Christian belief, a plausible account of the way in which Christian belief is, in fact, justified, rational and warranted. So the book is aimed in two directions: first towards readers generally, whether Christian believers or not, and second towards Christian believers.

scholarly journals The Specific of the Concept of Truth in the Scripture

2015 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 75-82
Author(s):  
Iulian Faraoanu
Keyword(s):  
The Bible ◽  
Dei Verbum ◽  
Historical Accuracy ◽  
Sacred Scripture ◽  
Age Of Enlightenment ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
General Aspects ◽  
Sensitive Issues ◽  
The Way

The theme of this work is represented by the truth’s concept in the Bible. By means of the pages of the Sacred Scripture, God, Truth par excellence, conveys the truth on him and on his plan of salvation. The theme on the truth in the Bible has been debated starting from the age of Enlightenment. Even nowadays, people are trying to identify solutions to the sensitive issues of historical accuracy and truth. The following pages are aimed at presenting certain aspects on the theme represented by the truth in the Bible, as well as the solutions to find such truth. Following a series of general aspects, the indications in Dei Verbum, we focus on the example of truth as reflected in the Gospel. The work ends with conclusions and the presentation of the way to identify the truth God wants to convey to us.

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