scholarly journals Why No True Reliabilist Should Endorse Reliabilism

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij ◽  
Jeffrey S. Dunn
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Side Constraints ◽  
The Way

Abstract Critics have recently argued that reliabilists face trade-off problems, forcing them to condone intuitively unjustified beliefs when they generate lots of true belief further downstream. What these critics overlook is that reliabilism entails that there are side-constraints on belief-formation, on account of which there are some things you should not believe, even if doing so would have very good epistemic consequences. However, we argue that by embracing side-constraints the reliabilist faces a dilemma: she can either hold on to reliabilism, and with it aforementioned side-constraints, but then needs to explain why we should allow the pursuit of justification to get in the way of the acquisition of true belief; or she can deny that there are side-constraints – and in effect give up on reliabilism. We'll suggest that anyone moved by the considerations that likely attract people to reliabilism in the first place – the idea the true belief is good, and as such should be promoted – should go for the second horn, and instead pursue a form of epistemic utilitarianism.

Sed ubi Socrates currit? On the Gettier Problem before Gettier

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Risto Hilpinen
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Current Belief ◽  
The Future ◽  
Late Nineteenth ◽  
The Gettier Problem ◽  
The Way ◽  
Forward Looking

Medieval philosophers presented Gettier-type objections to the commonly accepted view of knowledge as firmly held true belief, and formulated additional conditions that meet the objections or analyzed knowledge in a way that is immune to the Gettier-type objections. The proposed conditions can be divided into two kinds: backward-looking conditions and forward-looking conditions. The former concern an inquirer’s current belief system and the way the inquirer acquired her beliefs, the latter refer to what the inquirer may come to learn in the future and how she can respond to objections. Some conditions of knowledge proposed in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century epistemology can be regarded as variants of the conditions put forward by medieval authors.

Plantinga on warrant

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD SWINBURNE
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Christian Belief ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Statistical Probability ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Design Plan ◽  
Cognitive Environment ◽  
The Way

Alvin PlantingaWarranted Christian Belief(New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).In the two previous volumes of his trilogy on ‘warrant’, Alvin Plantinga developed his general theory of warrant, defined as that characteristic enough of which terms a true belief into knowledge. A belief B has warrant if and only if: (1) it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly, (2) in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which the faculties were designed, (3) according to a design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs, when (4) there is a high statistical probability of such beliefs being true.Thus my belief that there is a table in front of me has warrant if in the first place, in producing it, my cognitive faculties were functioning properly, the way they were meant to function. Plantinga holds that just as our heart or liver may function properly or not, so may our cognitive faculties. And he also holds that if God made us, our faculties function properly if they function in the way God designed them to function; whereas if evolution (uncaused by God) made us, then our faculties function properly if they function in the way that (in some sense) evolution designed them to function.

Heuristics all the way up?

2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 758-759 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Morton
Keyword(s):  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Good Decision ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Similar Kind ◽  
The Way

I investigate whether heuristics similar to those studied by Gigerenzer and his co-authors can apply to the problem of finding a suitable heuristic for a given problem. I argue that not only can heuristics of a very similar kind apply but they have the added advantage that they need not incorporate specific trade-off parameters for balancing the different desiderata of a good decision-procedure.

Are speed/accuracy trade-offs caused by neuromotor noise, or not?

1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 306-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willem P. De Jong ◽  
Gerard P. Van Galen
Keyword(s):  
Kinematic Model ◽  
Psychological Processes ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Kinematic Theory ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Biomechanical Constraints ◽  
Speed Accuracy ◽  
Existing Data ◽  
The Way

Notwithstanding its overwhelming descriptive power for existing data, it is not clear whether the kinematic theory of Plamondon & Alimi could generate new insights into biomechanical constraints and psychological processes underlying the way organisms trade off speed for accuracy. The kinematic model should elaborate on the role of neuromotor noise and on biomechanical strategies for reducing endpoint variability related to such noise.

PREROGATIVES, RESTRICTIONS, AND RIGHTS

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 357-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Mack
Keyword(s):  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Samuel Scheffler ◽  
Side Constraints ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Consequentialist Argumentation ◽  
The Way

I offer a defense of the moral side-constraints to which Robert Nozick appeals in Anarchy, State and Utopia but for which he fails to provide a sustained justification. I identify a line of anti-consequentialist argumentation which is present in Nozick and which, in the terminology of Samuel Scheffler, moves first to affirm a personal prerogative which allows the individual not to sacrifice herself for the sake of the best overall outcome and second moves on to affirm restrictions (i.e., moral side-constraints) which prohibit the individual from suppressing others' exercise of their personal prerogatives even if that suppression would serve the overall good. I argue that one ought to follow this line of anti-consequentialist argumentation all the way to the affirmation of restrictions by showing that the rationale for the adoption of the personal prerogative is not satisfied unless the accompanying restrictions are adopted as well.

The Meno

2019 ◽  
pp. 159-181
Author(s):  
Lindsay Judson
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines various aspects of two central themes of the Meno, how knowledge (epistēmē) is related to true belief, and how it is acquired. This chapter argues that the Meno’s definition of knowledge as true belief ‘tied down with a reasoning out of the cause’, is best understood as a characterisation of a form of knowledge constituted by understanding, rather than by justified true belief. It argues that the best way to construe Meno’s paradox as a serious threat to the possibility of acquiring knowledge is to take it to be concerned with inquiry as the search for understanding something for oneself. The chapter advances a new version of the unjustly neglected interpretation of Plato’s response as principally cast in terms of recollection and recognition, as against the dominant interpretation, which sees it as principally cast in terms of the use of true beliefs as the way to knowledge. In the last section the chapter considers knowledge and true belief in the final part of the Meno, arguing that what Socrates says about their relationship here cannot be reconciled with his earlier account: this confirms the view that the arguments of the final section are not intended to be taken at face value.

Revisiting Rorty’s Notion of Truth

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Rahul Kumar Maurya
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
The Way

Abstract This paper is intended to explore the Rorty’s notion of truth and its vicinity and divergences with Putnam’s notion of truth. Rorty and Putnam, both the philosophers have developed their notion of truth against the traditional representational notion of truth but their strength lies in its distinctive characterization. For Putnam, truth is the property of a statement which cannot be lost but the justification of it could be. I will also examine the importance of Putnam’s idealized justificatory conditions without which he may succumb to the charge of relativism at the same time how does Putnam overcome the tension between metaphysical and relativistic stances of truth. For Rorty, truth is not representational rather it is social, which means the justification for a true belief is not external but internal to the community of believers. I would further examine how Rorty tries to dispel the charge of relativism which is hard to overcome. Finally, I shall try to defend the concept of truth which is free from metaphysical baggage and relativistic threats; and in this enterprise Rorty walks half the way and Putnam completes the journey.

scholarly journals CULTURAL TOURISM – AS ONE OF THE MECHANISMS FOR THE REVIVAL OF THE GREAT SILK ROAD

THE BULLETIN ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (390) ◽  
pp. 30-36
Author(s):  
G. A. Rizakhojayeva ◽  
A. Yu. Baltabayeva
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Tourism ◽  
Silk Road ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
East And West ◽  
The Silk Road ◽  
The Way

The study is devoted to the study of the form of the emergence of trade architecture of the cities of the Great Silk Road and their impact on the expansion of modern tourism in the region. Сaravanserais, trading cities (markets) of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are outlined as examples. The analysis of the types of planning structure and the situation that divulged the attributes of the trade architecture of the Great Silk Road. In the process of research, a measure of saturation with cultural and historical means of the Great Silk Road regions was deliberated. And also reviewed modern projects for the improvement of this trade and geographical interrelation of cultures of the East and West. The extent of the Great Silk Road was 12 thousand kilometers, so few traders proceeded all the way along the Silk Road. Essentially, they tried to travel in shifts and trade-off goods somewhere halfway. Throughout the Great Silk Road in the cities and villages through which caravans elapsed, there were caravanserais (inns). They had hujras (“lounges”) for merchants and caravan staff, rooms for camels, horses, mules and donkeys, and needed fodder and facilities. Caravanserais were a place where it was attainable to sell and buy in bulk goods interesting to a merchant, and most importantly, to get hold of the latest commercial news and, above all, prices for goods.

scholarly journals Culturing Belief

2021 ◽  
pp. 36-58
Author(s):  
Neil Levy
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Cultural Knowledge ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Epistemic Dependence ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Evolutionary Processes ◽  
Social Animals ◽  
Central Paradigm ◽  
The Way

What kind of being are we? This of course is one of the oldest questions in philosophy. In earlier eras, answers were often non-naturalistic (we are animals with souls, for instance). Today, one of the oldest answers is also one of the most popular: with Aristotle, we often think we are distinguished from other animals by our rationality. This chapter suggests that another answer is at least as defensible: we are epistemically social animals. In making the case for this answer, it provides some of the background for the account of belief formation developed in the book. It highlights evidence from cultural evolution for our epistemic dependence on one another. Cultural evolution shows how human flourishing is due to cultural knowledge that escapes the grasp of individuals and that is the product of evolutionary processes. The chapter then turns to our central paradigm of a successful epistemic enterprise: modern science. It argues that science, too, owes its success to the way in which cognition is distributed across agents, groups, and even artifacts.

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