From Palestine to Syria: Three Intifadas and Lessons for Popular Struggles

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-103
Author(s):  
Wendy Pearlman

What lessons can the Palestinian national movement offer contemporary revolts in the Middle East in general, and Syria, specifically? Though the Syrian revolt to overthrow dictatorship is distinct from Palestinians’ mobilization against occupation, many issues and patterns link them as popular struggles. Looking for such patterns, this essay examines three major uprisings in Palestinian history: the Great Revolt of 1936–39, the first Intifada beginning in 1987, and the second Intifada beginning in the year 2000. Comparing these cases to the ongoing Syrian rebellion, it draws conclusions about the factors shaping the course and success of grassroots struggles. Specifically it points to the yearning for dignity as the fundamental engine of popular mobilization against oppressive rule, the effect of state repression in escalating protest, and the relationship between movements’ internal political unity and the effectiveness of their campaigns for change.

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 75-99
Author(s):  
Paul Gaston Aaron

Not until the Second Intifada did assassination emerge as an explicit, legally codified, and publicly announced doctrine of so-called targeted killing in Israel. This study, the first of a two-part series, explores the doctrine's historical roots and ideological lineage and tracks its rise under the premiership of Ariel Sharon. Targeted killing became institutionalized not just to reduce direct and imminent threats against Israelis but also to mobilize electoral support, field-test weapons and tactics, and eliminate key figures in order to sow chaos and stunt the development of an effective Palestinian national movement. The study frames the analysis within a wider meditation on Israel's idolatry of force. As much symbolic performance as military technique, targeted killing reenacts and ritualizes Palestinian humiliation and helplessness in the face of the Zionist state's irresistible power, making this dynamic appear a fact of life, ordained and immutable.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nihal Natour ◽  
Manal Badrasawi ◽  
Mariam Al-Tell

Abstract Introduction: The relationship between second intifada and risk factors of chronic diseases was not studied before in PalestineAims: The aims of this study is to describe differences in height , weight and BMI between different generations of Palestinians who were born at different times in the armed conflict. Also we wanted to know whether weight and height in West Bank follow any social pattern.Methods: This study was retrospective analysis of pooled data from many previous studies where participants reported their weight, height, place of residence, region in west bank and income.Results: Almost 61% of our study were females. Among female 12.8% were born before first intifada, 6.4% around first Intifada and 80.8% were born around second intifada. For males; 12.2% before first intifada, 5.7% around first intifada and 82.9% around second intifada. The generation born around second intifada had 12 cm higher height relative to generation before first intifada, 5 cm more height relative to first intifada generation (p=0.001), whereas females born before intifada had 20 Kg more weight than the generation of second intifada (p< 0.0001). In multiple regression model done for the second intifada generation weight and height were related to place of residence and income and age significantly.Conclusion: Political conflict have detrimental consequence on Palestinians wellbeing


2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beshara Doumani

An iron law of the conflict over Palestine has been the refusal by the Zionist movement and its backers, first Great Britain and then the United States, to make room for the existence of Palestinians as a political community. This non-recognition is rooted in historical forces that predate the existence of the Zionist movement and the Palestinians as a people. Consequently, there is a tension between identity and territory, with obvious repercussions for the following questions: Who are the Palestinians? What do they want? And who speaks for them? This essay calls for a critical reappraisal of the relationship between the concepts ““Palestine”” and ““Palestinians,”” as well as of the state-centered project of successive phases of the Palestinian national movement.


Author(s):  
Abeer AlNajjar

This book aims to shed light on core questions relating to language and society, language and conflict, and language and politics, in relation to a changing Middle East. While the book focuses on Arabic, it goes way beyond a purely linguistic analysis by bringing to the fore a set of pressing questions about the relationship between Arabic and society. For example, it touches on the development of language policy via an examination of administrative mandates (top-down) in contrast to grassroots initiatives (bottom-up); the deeper layers of the linguistic landscape that highlight the connection between politics, conflict, identity, road signs and street names; Arabic studies and Arabic identity and the myriad ways countries deal simultaneously with globalisation while also seeking to strengthen local and national identity, and more.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 189-216
Author(s):  
Jamil Hilal

The mid-1960s saw the beginnings of the construction of a Palestinian political field after it collapsed in 1948, when, with the British government’s support of the Zionist movement, which succeeded in establishing the state of Israel, the Palestinian national movement was crushed. This article focuses mainly on the Palestinian political field as it developed in the 1960s and 1970s, the beginnings of its fragmentation in the 1990s, and its almost complete collapse in the first decade of this century. It was developed on a structure characterized by the dominance of a center where the political leadership functioned. The center, however, was established outside historic Palestine. This paper examines the components and dynamics of the relationship between the center and the peripheries, and the causes of the decline of this center and its eventual disappearance, leaving the constituents of the Palestinian people under local political leadership following the collapse of the national representation institutions, that is, the political, organizational, military, cultural institutions and sectorial organizations (women, workers, students, etc.) that made up the PLO and its frameworks. The paper suggests that the decline of the political field as a national field does not mean the disintegration of the cultural field. There are, in fact, indications that the cultural field has a new vitality that deserves much more attention than it is currently assigned.


Author(s):  
Dustin Gamza ◽  
Pauline Jones

What is the relationship between state repression of religion and political mobilization in Muslim-majority states? Does religious repression increase the likelihood that Muslims will support acts of rebellion against the state? This chapter contends that the effect of repression on attitudes toward political mobilization is conditional on both the degree of enforcement and the type of religious practice that is being targeted. When enforcement is high and the repressive regulation being enforced targets communal (rather than individualistic) religious practices, Muslims expect state persecution of their religious community to increase, and that this persecution will extract a much greater toll. They are thus more willing to support taking political action against the state in order to protect their community from this perceived harm. The chapter tests this argument with two novel survey experiments conducted in Kyrgyzstan in 2019. It finds that the degree of enforcement has a significant effect on attitudes toward political mobilization, but this effect is negative (reducing support) rather than positive (increasing support). The chapter also finds that repression targeting communal practices has a stronger effect on attitudes toward political mobilization than repression targeting individualistic practices, but again, these effects are negative. The chapter’s findings suggest that the fear of collective punishment increases as the degree of enforcement increases, particularly when it comes to repression targeting communal practices. Thus, while Muslims are motivated to protect their community from harm, it may be that the certainty of financial and physical harm outweighs the expectation of increasing religious persecution.


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