Epilogue

The book closes with an epilogue that addresses the current health and economic conundrum that Latin American societies face and some of their political repercusions. The text registers how these societies have been affected by the pandemic, economic deceleration, rising unemployment and growing challenges to the livelihood of millions of citizens. While representative democracy weakens under such pressures and populist projects are recreated, the region has a strong tradition of highly participatory societies pressing demands and making their voices heard in the public arena. Under those conditions, one should expect outbursts of popular mobilization and unrest to develop that will challenge personalist rule and decision-making, most likely supported by countervailing visions of democracy that reverberate cyclically in the public spheres of Latin America.

From Cần Vương to Viêt-Nam Duy-Tân Hội to Thanh Niên

This chapter details the first waves of large-scale organized mobilization that unfolded across the territories that came to comprise Việtnam. It draws heavily on the discursive tradition and sociological infrastructure of Sinographic cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and on various forms of support and solidarity from neighboring China, on the other. The chapter then shifts to the Cần Vương insurrection, which did not provide the bases for sustained popular mobilization or systematic command and coordination across Annam and Tonkin, enabling a French counterinsurgency campaign to achieve “pacification” within a few short years. The chapter also introduces a new movement led by Phan Bội Châu called the Viêt-Nam Duy-Tân Hội (Việtnam Modernization Society), in which he started to assemble a clandestine network of supporters not only in Annam and Tonkin but also in Cochinchina. Ultimately, the chapter discusses the emergence of a new revolutionary network established by Nguyễn Ái Quốc known as the Việt Nam Thanh Niên Cách Mệnh Đồng Chí Hội (Revolutionary Youth League of Việt Nam), or Thanh Niên for short.

Soekarno and the Promise of Nasakom

This chapter begins by introducing an article titled “Nationalism, Religion, and Marxism” by the twenty-five-year-old, Dutch-educated ingenieur named Soekarno. It discusses the conflicts, tensions, and mistakes that had come to divide the variously Islamic- and Marxist-oriented leaders of the Sarekat Islam and the broader field of political and social action in the Indies, now described, as the title of the journal indicated, as Indonesia. The chapter details Soekarno's rallying call for unity among Muslims and Marxists and for Indonesian independence in 1926, which represented the rise of classically Andersonian nationalism among the bilingual Dutch educated elite stratum of society in the late colonial Indies. The chapter also argues that the late interwar era in Indonesia helped to lay the groundwork for communist and Islamic revolution making by sustaining transoceanic connections to diverse sources of real, imagined, and potential solidarity and support across the world, and by maintaining or (re)building discursive and institutional structures for popular mobilization in the name of communism and Islam. Ultimately, the chapter contends that the Japanese occupation period severely constrained opportunities for organization and mobilization by activists inspired by communism and other strains of revolutionary socialism in the Indonesian archipelago.

Organizing Culture Scale For PMF From Physical Educators’ Point Of View

The aim of the research is to design organizational culture for physical educators and military training staff for PMF as well as identifying the level of organizational culture in popular mobilization forces PMF. The researcher used the descriptive method on (300) physical educators of PMF. Ten physical educators as well as 10 officers were selected for the pilot study. The researcher suggested (25) items for this scale to collect the data and come up with the conclusions. The results showed that origination is a vital means for making a difference in the PMF performance.

France Speaks!

In 1851 more than 1.6 million signatures endorsed a petition for an amendment to the 1848 constitution that would have allowed Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte to stand for reelection. Following contemporary critics who claimed that the movement had been orchestrated by the government, scholars have been little impressed by this mobilization, which produced the largest petition of nineteenth-century France. By analyzing the petitions and the signatures themselves, official reports, correspondence of key actors, and the public debate, this article reappraises the campaign, making three claims: that a government-sponsored petition merits analysis in the context of the explosion of popular mobilization that followed 1848, that the depiction provided by the republicans of the participation of the administration in the campaign is partial and incomplete, and that the petitioners were not dependent and manipulated individuals but purposeful citizens who understood and supported the petition they signed. The article concludes that the campaign would not have succeeded without the genuine popularity of the president and the surfacing of a strong popular Bonapartist undercurrent. En 1851, des pétitions, rassemblant plus de 1,6 million de signatures, ont demandé une révision de la Constitution permettant à Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte de se porter candidat à un deuxième mandat présidentiel. Selon les républicains, le mouvement avait été orchestré et manipulé par le gouvernement, et les historiens ont aussi dédaigné cette mobilisation, alors qu'elle était la pétition la plus signée en France au dix-neuvième siècle. En analysant les pétitions et les signatures elles-mêmes, les rapports officiels, la correspondance des acteurs clés et le débat public, l'article réévalue cette campagne et propose trois arguments : (1) que les pétitions parrainées par le gouvernement font partie de l'histoire des mobilisations populaires ; (2) que l'image d'une administration toute-puissante mise au service de la campagne ne correspond pas à la réalité ; et enfin (3) que la plupart des pétitionnaires n'étaient pas des individus manipulés, mais des citoyens conscients du sens de leurs actions. La campagne n'aurait pas réussi sans l'expérience de la démocratie depuis 1848, la popularité du président et l'émergence d'un bonapartisme populaire.