The Sources of Scepticism

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 203-227
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Closure Principle ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Radical Scepticism ◽  
Rational Evaluation

It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct sub-problems—a formulation that turns on the closure principle and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal—at least when properly formulated—can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. It is also claimed, however, that this account fails to gain any purchase on underdetermination-based radical scepticism. The antidote to this latter form of radical scepticism lies elsewhere—with, it is suggested, epistemological disjunctivism.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM: NEO-WITTGENSTEINIAN AND MODERATE NEO-MOOREAN

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 438-457
Author(s):  
Joshua Stuchlik
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Epistemic Modesty ◽  
Rational Evaluation

ABSTRACTDuncan Pritchard proposes a biscopic solution to the problem of radical skepticism, which consists in epistemological disjunctivism and a theory about the limits of rational evaluation inspired by Wittgenstein's On Certainty. According to the latter theory, we cannot have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, a consequence that Pritchard finds attractive insofar as he thinks that claims to know the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses are epistemically immodest. I argue that there is room for a neo-Moorean to dispute Pritchard's argument for the Wittgensteinian proposal and I raise some doubts about its underlying motivation. Finally, I put forward an alternative, which I call “moderate neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivism.” While this theory contends that we possess rationally grounded anti-skeptical knowledge, it also allows for a degree of epistemic modesty, by conceding that perceptual knowledge never amounts to knowledge that is absolutely certain.

2. Is knowledge impossible?

2019 ◽  
pp. 23-46
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Theoretical Innovation ◽  
Radical Scepticism ◽  
Sceptical Paradox ◽  
Sceptical Hypothesis ◽  
Sceptical Argument

‘Is knowledge impossible?’ considers an influential argument that purports to show that we do not know much of what we take ourselves to know. If this argument works, then it licenses a radical sceptical doubt. It first looks at Descartes’s formulation of radical scepticism—Cartesian scepticism—which employs an important theoretical innovation known as a radical sceptical hypothesis. The closure principle is also discussed along with the radical sceptical paradox. If this radical sceptical argument works, then we not only lack knowledge of much of what we believe, but we do not even have any good epistemic reasons for believing what we do.

scholarly journals The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-135
Author(s):  
Genia Schönbaumsfeld
Keyword(s):  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
The Real ◽  
Radical Scepticism ◽  
Sceptical Conclusion ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure’s holding it in place, but because we’ve already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate.

scholarly journals Précis of The Illusion of Doubt

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Genia Schönbaumsfeld
Keyword(s):  
Closure Principle ◽  
Epistemic Practices ◽  
Radical Scepticism

The Illusion of Doubt shows that radical scepticism is an illusion generated by a Cartesian picture of our evidential situation—the view that my epistemic grounds in both the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ cases must be the same. It is this picture which issues both a standing invitation to radical scepticism and ensures that there is no way of getting out of it while agreeing to the sceptic’s terms. The sceptical problem cannot, therefore, be answered ‘directly’. Rather, the assumptions that give rise to it, need to be undermined. These include the notion that radical scepticism can be motivated by the ‘closure’ principle for knowledge, that the ‘Indistinguishability Argument’ renders the Cartesian conception compulsory, that the ‘New Evil Genius Thesis’ is coherent, and the demand for a ‘global validation’ of our epistemic practices makes sense. Once these dogmas are undermined, the path is clear for a ‘realism without empiricism’ that allows us to re-establish unmediated contact with the objects and persons in our environment which an illusion of doubt had threatened to put forever beyond our cognitive grasp.

Introduction

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
The Face ◽  
Rational Support ◽  
The One ◽  
Rational Evaluation

This introductory chapter argues that integrating epistemological disjunctivism with Wittgenstein's radical account of the structure of rational evaluation can solve the problem of radical skepticism. On the face of it, these proposals look very different; indeed, they look antithetical and competing. Whereas the one proposal emphasizes the locality of rational evaluation, and hence rational support, the other emphasizes the strength of the rational support available to us in paradigm conditions, in that it is factive. But these differences are superficial, the chapter asserts. In fact, these proposals work very well with each other, in that they are not only compatible, but also mutually supporting and philosophically in the same spirit.

scholarly journals The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox

Erkenntnis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 85 (5) ◽  
pp. 1269-1288
Author(s):  
Changsheng Lai
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Epistemic Principle ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Radical Scepticism ◽  
The One ◽  
Sceptical Conclusion ◽  
Sceptical Paradox

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution to the radical sceptical paradox. A sceptical paradox purports to indicate the inconsistency within our fundamental epistemological commitments that are all seemingly plausible. Typically, sceptics employ an intuitively appealing epistemic principle (e.g., the closure principle, the underdetermination principle) to derive the sceptical conclusion. This paper will reveal a dilemma intrinsic to the sceptical paradox, which I refer to as the self-hollowing problem of radical scepticism. That is, on the one hand, if the sceptical conclusion turns out to be true, then the epistemic principle employed by sceptics would lose its foundation of plausibility; on the other hand, if the sceptical conclusion does not follow, then the sceptical problem would not arise. In either case, the so-called sceptical paradox cannot be a genuine paradox. This new solution has three theoretical merits: it is undercutting, less theory-laden, and widely applicable.

Thermodynamics of the interaction between the spike protein of severe acute respiratory syndrome- coronavirus-2 and the receptor of human angiotensin converting enzyme 2. Effects of possible ligands

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Garcia-Iriepa ◽  
Cecilia Hognon ◽  
Antonio Francés-Monerris ◽  
Isabel Iriepa ◽  
Tom Miclot ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Angiotensin Converting Enzyme ◽  
Molecular Mechanisms ◽  
Molecular Design ◽  
Binding Free Energy ◽  
Transmembrane Protein ◽  
Spike Protein ◽  
Converting Enzyme ◽  
Angiotensin Converting Enzyme 2 ◽  
Rational Molecular Design ◽  
Rational Evaluation

<div><p>Since the end of 2019, the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has caused more than 180,000 deaths all over the world, still lacking a medical treatment despite the concerns of the whole scientific community. Human Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme 2 (ACE2) was recently recognized as the transmembrane protein serving as SARS-CoV-2 entry point into cells, thus constituting the first biomolecular event leading to COVID-19 disease. Here, by means of a state-of-the-art computational approach, we propose a rational evaluation of the molecular mechanisms behind the formation of the complex and of the effects of possible ligands. Moreover, binding free energy between ACE2 and the active Receptor Binding Domain (RBD) of the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein is evaluated quantitatively, assessing the molecular mechanisms at the basis of the recognition and the ligand-induced decreased affinity. These results boost the knowledge on the molecular grounds of the SARS-CoV-2 infection and allow to suggest rationales useful for the subsequent rational molecular design to treat severe COVID-19 cases.</p></div>

Reflective Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chienkuo Mi ◽  
Shane Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Extended Cognition ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Recent Account

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence.

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