scholarly journals Précis of The Illusion of Doubt

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Genia Schönbaumsfeld
Keyword(s):  
Closure Principle ◽  
Epistemic Practices ◽  
Radical Scepticism

The Illusion of Doubt shows that radical scepticism is an illusion generated by a Cartesian picture of our evidential situation—the view that my epistemic grounds in both the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ cases must be the same. It is this picture which issues both a standing invitation to radical scepticism and ensures that there is no way of getting out of it while agreeing to the sceptic’s terms. The sceptical problem cannot, therefore, be answered ‘directly’. Rather, the assumptions that give rise to it, need to be undermined. These include the notion that radical scepticism can be motivated by the ‘closure’ principle for knowledge, that the ‘Indistinguishability Argument’ renders the Cartesian conception compulsory, that the ‘New Evil Genius Thesis’ is coherent, and the demand for a ‘global validation’ of our epistemic practices makes sense. Once these dogmas are undermined, the path is clear for a ‘realism without empiricism’ that allows us to re-establish unmediated contact with the objects and persons in our environment which an illusion of doubt had threatened to put forever beyond our cognitive grasp.

The Sources of Scepticism

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 203-227
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Closure Principle ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Radical Scepticism ◽  
Rational Evaluation

It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct sub-problems—a formulation that turns on the closure principle and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal—at least when properly formulated—can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. It is also claimed, however, that this account fails to gain any purchase on underdetermination-based radical scepticism. The antidote to this latter form of radical scepticism lies elsewhere—with, it is suggested, epistemological disjunctivism.

2. Is knowledge impossible?

2019 ◽  
pp. 23-46
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Theoretical Innovation ◽  
Radical Scepticism ◽  
Sceptical Paradox ◽  
Sceptical Hypothesis ◽  
Sceptical Argument

‘Is knowledge impossible?’ considers an influential argument that purports to show that we do not know much of what we take ourselves to know. If this argument works, then it licenses a radical sceptical doubt. It first looks at Descartes’s formulation of radical scepticism—Cartesian scepticism—which employs an important theoretical innovation known as a radical sceptical hypothesis. The closure principle is also discussed along with the radical sceptical paradox. If this radical sceptical argument works, then we not only lack knowledge of much of what we believe, but we do not even have any good epistemic reasons for believing what we do.

scholarly journals The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-135
Author(s):  
Genia Schönbaumsfeld
Keyword(s):  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
The Real ◽  
Radical Scepticism ◽  
Sceptical Conclusion ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure’s holding it in place, but because we’ve already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate.

scholarly journals The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox

Erkenntnis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 85 (5) ◽  
pp. 1269-1288
Author(s):  
Changsheng Lai
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Epistemic Principle ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Radical Scepticism ◽  
The One ◽  
Sceptical Conclusion ◽  
Sceptical Paradox

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution to the radical sceptical paradox. A sceptical paradox purports to indicate the inconsistency within our fundamental epistemological commitments that are all seemingly plausible. Typically, sceptics employ an intuitively appealing epistemic principle (e.g., the closure principle, the underdetermination principle) to derive the sceptical conclusion. This paper will reveal a dilemma intrinsic to the sceptical paradox, which I refer to as the self-hollowing problem of radical scepticism. That is, on the one hand, if the sceptical conclusion turns out to be true, then the epistemic principle employed by sceptics would lose its foundation of plausibility; on the other hand, if the sceptical conclusion does not follow, then the sceptical problem would not arise. In either case, the so-called sceptical paradox cannot be a genuine paradox. This new solution has three theoretical merits: it is undercutting, less theory-laden, and widely applicable.

scholarly journals Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe ◽  
Jake Monaghan
Keyword(s):  
Deductive Reasoning ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Knowledge Attribution ◽  
Epistemic Closure ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Epistemic Practices ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Performance Error ◽  
Folk Epistemology ◽  
A Performance

This chapter reports the results of four empirical studies that investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested our shared epistemic practices may only include a closure principle that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. The chapter argues that the results of these studies provide reason for thinking individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with the closure principle. When the chapter authors used research materials that overcome proposed difficulties with Turri’s original materials, they found that participants did not reject closure. Furthermore, when they presented Turri’s original materials to non-philosophers with expertise in deductive reasoning, they endorsed closure for both perceptual and inferential beliefs. These results suggest that an unrestricted closure principle provides a better model of folk patterns of knowledge attribution than a source-relative one.

Naturalizing Moral Regression

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Social Conditions ◽  
Moral Progress ◽  
Detailed Knowledge ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Group Threat ◽  
Epistemic Practices ◽  
Harsh Conditions ◽  
Development And Evolution

This chapter proposes a theory of moral regression, arguing that inclusivist gains can be eroded not only if certain harsh biological and social conditions indicative of out-group threat actually reappear but also if significant numbers of people come to believe that such harsh conditions exist even when they do not. It argues that normal cognitive biases in conjunction with defective social-epistemic practices can cause people wrongly to believe that such harsh conditions exist, thus triggering the development and evolution of exclusivist moralities and the dismantling of inclusivist ones. Armed with detailed knowledge of the biological and social environments in which progressive moralities emerge and are sustained, as well as the conditions under which they are likely to be dismantled, human beings can take significant steps toward transforming the classic liberal faith in moral progress into a practical, empirically grounded hope.

scholarly journals Epistemic practices in Bio Art

AI & Society ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzanne Anker
Keyword(s):  
Biological Sciences ◽  
Visual Arts ◽  
Artificial Life ◽  
Scientific Data ◽  
Cultural Imagination ◽  
Epistemic Practices

AbstractThis paper addresses three aspects of Bio Art: iconography, artificial life, and wetware. The development of models for innovation require hybrid practices which generate knowledge through epistemic experimental practices. The intersection of art and the biological sciences contain both scientific data as well as the visualization of its cultural imagination. In the Bio Art Lab at the School of Visual Arts, artists use the tools of science to make art.

Malaysian Technological Elite: Specifics of a Knowledge Society in a Developing Country

2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Czarina Saloma-Akpedonu
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Society ◽  
Epistemic Communities ◽  
Vision 2020 ◽  
Epistemic Practices ◽  
Technological Practice ◽  
Specialist Knowledge ◽  
Localized Knowledge ◽  
New Industry ◽  
Technology Industries ◽  
Forms Of Knowledge

AbstractThere is a lack of understanding of the forms of knowledge and expertise in so-called developing societies such as Malaysia. This paper addresses this issue by suggesting a framework—based on Schutz and Luckmann's (1973) concept of social distribution of knowledge and Knorr Cetina's (1999) notion of epistemic communities—for examining the Malaysian automotive and information technology industries. These industries are central to Malaysia's agenda of becoming a knowledge society in the context of Vision 2020. Vital to these industries is a group of Malaysian professionals who possess knowledge and expertise: the “technological elite.” is group, the technological elite, includes, but is not limited to, engineers working for Proton, as well as professionals working in the Multimedia Super Corridor. Using professional biographies and narratives, this paper illuminates the context and culture of knowledge in Malaysia. Similarities in the principles that inform epistemic practices and relations within an “old” industry (i.e., automotive) and a “new” industry (i.e., ICT) call for the recognition of epistemic work characterized by the mixing of specialist knowledge with other forms of knowledge, and of localized knowledge in nascent epistemic communities with knowledge developed from an established tradition of technological practice.

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