Colloquium 2 Commentary on Barney

Author(s):  
Katja Maria Vogt

Rachel Barney proposes that Plato’s theory of the tripartite soul is plausibly compared to scientific theories today. I depart from Barney by proposing that the tripartite soul is a model and that its status is hypothetical. And I raise four questions: (1) What follows from the Plato-science comparison, as Barney conceives of it? (2) Which questions emerge if science is looked at in the sophisticated mode that Barney employs in her discussion of Plato? (3) Current science invokes a multitude of subsystems relevant to motivation. Why compare it with tripartition? Stoic psychology may share more fundamental ideas with current science, including the premise that all goings-on in the soul are physiological movements. (4) If tripartition is a model, why would one expect it to account for all dimensions of epistemic activity?


DIALOGO ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-43
Author(s):  
Srinivas Arka

Western and Eastern philosophical cultures have different perspectives on inquiring about the nature of reality. These influences have shaped the approach to what qualifies as science in the West and Spiritual Inquiry in the East. These perspectives are intimately related to the topic of the reliability of scientific theories and spiritual inquiry and the ultimate purpose of both approaches. This paper mainly examines whether there is something to be gained from an Eastern way of thought and presents its benefits given that our current science has largely been influenced by Western thought. However, any evaluation of both perspectives must also contemplate how future science may be advanced by incorporating these complementary approaches.


Author(s):  
Stathis Psillos

In his intervention to the ‘bankruptcy of science debate’, which raged in Paris in the turn of the twentieth century, Leo Tolstoy was one of the first to use the past record of science as a weapon against current science. It is not inductive. It does not conclude that all current scientific theories will be abandoned; nor that most of them will be abandoned; not even that it is more likely than not that all or most of them will be abandoned. Its conclusion is modest: some of presently accepted theories will have the fate of those past theories that once dominated the scene but subsequently were abandoned.


2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 3-12
Author(s):  
Lorne Direnfeld ◽  
David B. Torrey ◽  
Jim Black ◽  
LuAnn Haley ◽  
Christopher R. Brigham

Abstract When an individual falls due to a nonwork-related episode of dizziness, hits their head and sustains injury, do workers’ compensation laws consider such injuries to be compensable? Bearing in mind that each state makes its own laws, the answer depends on what caused the loss of consciousness, and the second asks specifically what happened in the fall that caused the injury? The first question speaks to medical causation, which applies scientific analysis to determine the cause of the problem. The second question addresses legal causation: Under what factual circumstances are injuries of this type potentially covered under the law? Much nuance attends this analysis. The authors discuss idiopathic falls, which in this context means “unique to the individual” as opposed to “of unknown cause,” which is the familiar medical terminology. The article presents three detailed case studies that describe falls that had their genesis in episodes of loss of consciousness, followed by analyses by lawyer or judge authors who address the issue of compensability, including three scenarios from Arizona, California, and Pennsylvania. A medical (scientific) analysis must be thorough and must determine the facts regarding the fall and what occurred: Was the fall due to a fit (eg, a seizure with loss of consciousness attributable to anormal brain electrical activity) or a faint (eg, loss of consciousness attributable to a decrease in blood flow to the brain? The evaluator should be able to fully explain the basis for the conclusions, including references to current science.


1978 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 473-473
Author(s):  
DAVID L. KRANTZ
Keyword(s):  

Paragraph ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Williams

This article charts differences between Gilles Deleuze's and Gaston Bachelard's philosophies of science in order to reflect on different readings of the role of science in Deleuze's philosophy, in particular in relation to Manuel DeLanda's interpretation of Deleuze's work. The questions considered are: Why do Gilles Deleuze and Gaston Bachelard develop radically different philosophical dialectics in relation to science? What is the significance of this difference for current approaches to Deleuze and science, most notably as developed by Manuel DeLanda? It is argued that, despite its great explanatory power, DeLanda's association of Deleuze with a particular set of contemporary scientific theories does not allow for the ontological openness and for the metaphysical sources of Deleuze's work. The argument turns on whether terms such as ‘intensity’ can be given predominantly scientific definitions or whether metaphysical definitions are more consistent with a sceptical relation of philosophy to contemporary science.


The concept of a law of nature, while familiar, is deeply puzzling. Theorists such as Descartes think a divine being governs the universe according to the laws which follow from that being’s own nature. Newton detaches the concept from theology and is agnostic about the ontology underlying the laws of nature. Some later philosophers treat laws as summaries of events or tools for understanding and explanation, or identify the laws with principles and equations fundamental to scientific theories. In the first part of this volume, essays from leading historians of philosophy identify central questions: are laws independent of the things they govern, or do they emanate from the powers of bodies? Are the laws responsible for the patterns we see in nature, or should they be collapsed into those patterns? In the second part, contributors at the forefront of current debate evaluate the role of laws in contemporary Best System, perspectival, Kantian, and powers- or mechanisms-based approaches. These essays take up pressing questions about whether the laws of nature can be consistent with contingency, whether laws are based on the invariants of scientific theories, and how to deal with exceptions to laws. These twelve essays, published here for the first time, will be required reading for anyone interested in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the histories of these disciplines.


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