A NOTE ON INNOVATION AND JUSTIFICATION

1997 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-110
Author(s):  
Vincent Fella Hendricks ◽  
Stig Andur Pedersen

Within epistemology and the philosophy of science there is, in a number of cases, an a-symmetrical relation or even complementarity between innovation and justification. Innovations are not always justifiable, within the currently accepted body of scientific knowledge and readily justifiable innovations are seldom too interesting. This paper describes some such cases drawn from the history of science and attempts to classify different types of innovations.

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 60-74
Author(s):  
Tatiana D. Sokolova ◽  

The article is devoted to the analysis of research approaches and attitudes to the study of the a priori in the philosophy of science. In the first part, I outline the basic premises of this study: (a) scientific knowledge as the highest manifestation of rationality; (b) the normative nature of scientific knowledge. In the second part, I turn to the difference in the subject of philosophical research on the history of science – the history of science as a “history of facts” vs the history of science as a history of scientific thought. The third part discusses the main theoretical and technical difficulty associated with changing the subject of research – the possibility of a transition from historical fact to “scientific thought at the time of its birth” (in Helene Metzger terminology). The forth part is devoted to the analysis of the “model approach” (Arianna Betti, Hein van den Berg) in philosophy as a possible way to overcome this difficulty and includes both theoretical and technical aspects of the future direction of research. In conclusion, consequences are drawn about the possibility of using the “model approach” for reconstruction a priori in the history of science as “constitutive elements of scientific knowledge” (David Stump).


Author(s):  
Letícia Do Prado ◽  
Marcelo Carbone Carneiro

ResumoA análise de episódios da história da ciência pode ser usada como uma estratégia didática que promove a superação de visões descontextualizadas da ciência. Permitindo que os alunos vivenciem a construção do conhecimento científico e percebam que eles não são feitos a partir de lampejos de genialidade ou de maneira isolada. Tornando-se impossível elencar apenas um indivíduo para representar a formulação de uma lei ou teoria. Neste trabalho nosso objetivo é apresentar a contribuição de Lavoisier no episódio histórico sobre o abandono da teoria do flogisto e ascensão da teoria do calórico, salientando a importância dada a experimentação no século XVII e XVIII e buscando com isto nos livrar de narrativas anedóticas, descontextualizadas e elitistas ainda presentes no Ensino de Química que colocam este personagem como pai da química moderna.Palavras-chave: História e Filosofia da Ciência; Ensino de Química; Lavoisier.AbstractThe analysis of episodes of the history of science can be used as a didactic strategy that promotes the overcoming of decontextualized visions of science. This makes the students experience the construction of scientific knowledge and realize that they are not made from glimpses of genius or in an isolated way, being impossible to list only an individual to represent the formulation of a law or theory. In this work, our objective is to present the real contribution of Lavoisier in the historical episode about the phlogiston theory abandonment and the rise of the caloric theory. From this, it is possible to stress the importance given to experimentation during the 17th and 18th century, seeking to get rid of anecdotal, decontextualized and elitist narratives that are still present in the Teaching of Chemistry that put this personage like father of the modern chemistry.Keywords: History and Philosophy of Science; Chemistry teaching; Lavoisier.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Maroske ◽  
Libby Robin ◽  
Gavan McCarthy

R. W. Home was appointed the first and, up to 2016, the only Professor of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) at the University of Melbourne. A pioneering researcher in the history of Australian science, Rod believes in both the importance and universality of scientific knowledge, which has led him to focus on the international dimensions of Australian science, and on a widespread dissemination of its history. This background has shaped five major projects Rod has overseen or fostered: the Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (a monograph series), Historical Records of Australian Science (a journal), the Australian Science Archives Project (now a cultural informatics research centre), the Australian Encyclopedia of Science (a web resource), and the Correspondence of Ferdinand von Mueller Project (an archive, series of publications and a forthcoming web resource). In this review, we outline the development of these projects (all still active), and reflect on their success in collecting, producing and communicating the history of science in Australia.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liba Taub

Abstract In 1990, Deborah Jean Warner, a curator at the Smithsonian Institution, published her now-classic article ‘What is a scientific instrument, when did it become one, and why?’. These questions were prompted by practical curatorial considerations: what was she supposed to collect for her museum? Today, we are still considering questions of what we collect for the future, why, and how. These questions have elicited some new and perhaps surprising answers since the publication of Warner’s article, sometimes – but not only – as a reflection of changing technologies and laboratory practices, and also as a result of changes in those disciplines that study science, including history of science and philosophy of science. In focusing attention on meanings associated with scientific instrument collections, and thinking about what objects are identified as scientific instruments, I consider how definitions of instruments influence what is collected and preserved.


Author(s):  
Philip Enros

An effort to establish programs of study in the history of science took place at the University of Toronto in the 1960s. Initial discussions began in 1963. Four years later, the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology was created. By the end of 1969 the Institute was enrolling students in new MA and PhD programs. This activity involved the interaction of the newly emerging discipline of the history of science, the practices of the University, and the perspectives of Toronto’s faculty. The story of its origins adds to our understanding of how the discipline of the history of science was institutionalized in the 1960s, as well as how new programs were formed at that time at the University of Toronto.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. McAllister

Abstract This article offers a critical review of past attempts and possible methods to test philosophical models of science against evidence from history of science. Drawing on methodological debates in social science, I distinguish between quantitative and qualitative approaches. I show that both have their uses in history and philosophy of science, but that many writers in this domain have misunderstood and misapplied these approaches, and especially the method of case studies. To test scientific realism, for example, quantitative methods are more effective than case studies. I suggest that greater methodological clarity would enable the project of integrated history and philosophy of science to make renewed progress.


Author(s):  
Anouk Barberousse

How should we think of the dynamics of science? What are the relationships between an earlier theory and the theory that has superseded it? This chapter introduces the heated debates on the nature of scientific change, at the intersection of philosophy of science and history of science, and their bearing on the more general question of the rationality of the scientific enterprise. It focuses on the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of scientific change and the various versions of the incommensurability thesis one may uphold. Historicist views are balanced against nagging questions regarding scientific progress (Is there such a thing? If so, how should it be defined?), the causes of scientific change (Are they to be found within scientific method itself?), and its necessity (Is the history of scientific developments an argument in favor of realism, or could we have had entirely different sciences?).


Author(s):  
Staffan Müller-Wille

This article explores what both historians of medicine and historians of science could gain from a stronger entanglement of their respective research agendas. It first gives a cursory outline of the history of the relationship between science and medicine since the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century. Medicine can very well be seen as a domain that was highly productive of scientific knowledge, yet in ways that do not fit very well with the historiographic framework that dominated the history of science. Furthermore, the article discusses two alternative historiographical approaches that offer ways of thinking about the growth of knowledge that fit well with the cumulative and translational patterns that characterize the development of the medical sciences, and also provide an understanding of concepts such as ‘health’ and ‘life’.


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