A Priori in the Philosophy of Science

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 60-74
Author(s):  
Tatiana D. Sokolova ◽  

The article is devoted to the analysis of research approaches and attitudes to the study of the a priori in the philosophy of science. In the first part, I outline the basic premises of this study: (a) scientific knowledge as the highest manifestation of rationality; (b) the normative nature of scientific knowledge. In the second part, I turn to the difference in the subject of philosophical research on the history of science – the history of science as a “history of facts” vs the history of science as a history of scientific thought. The third part discusses the main theoretical and technical difficulty associated with changing the subject of research – the possibility of a transition from historical fact to “scientific thought at the time of its birth” (in Helene Metzger terminology). The forth part is devoted to the analysis of the “model approach” (Arianna Betti, Hein van den Berg) in philosophy as a possible way to overcome this difficulty and includes both theoretical and technical aspects of the future direction of research. In conclusion, consequences are drawn about the possibility of using the “model approach” for reconstruction a priori in the history of science as “constitutive elements of scientific knowledge” (David Stump).

Author(s):  
Letícia Do Prado ◽  
Marcelo Carbone Carneiro

ResumoA análise de episódios da história da ciência pode ser usada como uma estratégia didática que promove a superação de visões descontextualizadas da ciência. Permitindo que os alunos vivenciem a construção do conhecimento científico e percebam que eles não são feitos a partir de lampejos de genialidade ou de maneira isolada. Tornando-se impossível elencar apenas um indivíduo para representar a formulação de uma lei ou teoria. Neste trabalho nosso objetivo é apresentar a contribuição de Lavoisier no episódio histórico sobre o abandono da teoria do flogisto e ascensão da teoria do calórico, salientando a importância dada a experimentação no século XVII e XVIII e buscando com isto nos livrar de narrativas anedóticas, descontextualizadas e elitistas ainda presentes no Ensino de Química que colocam este personagem como pai da química moderna.Palavras-chave: História e Filosofia da Ciência; Ensino de Química; Lavoisier.AbstractThe analysis of episodes of the history of science can be used as a didactic strategy that promotes the overcoming of decontextualized visions of science. This makes the students experience the construction of scientific knowledge and realize that they are not made from glimpses of genius or in an isolated way, being impossible to list only an individual to represent the formulation of a law or theory. In this work, our objective is to present the real contribution of Lavoisier in the historical episode about the phlogiston theory abandonment and the rise of the caloric theory. From this, it is possible to stress the importance given to experimentation during the 17th and 18th century, seeking to get rid of anecdotal, decontextualized and elitist narratives that are still present in the Teaching of Chemistry that put this personage like father of the modern chemistry.Keywords: History and Philosophy of Science; Chemistry teaching; Lavoisier.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 573-579 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Kokowski

Artykuł szkicuje tematykę i przebieg pierwszej w dziejach Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności i Instytutu Historii Nauki PAN Wideokonferencji pt. „Polskie czasopisma z historii i filozofii nauki oraz naukoznawstwa: Jak dostać się do Scopus, WoS, ICI, DOAJ oraz ERIH+? Dlaczego warto to zrobić?” (Kraków – Warszawa – Toruń, 16 kwietnia 2020, godz. 10.00–15.00). Konferencję zorganizowano z okazji 20-lecia Komisji Historii Nauki PAU i powołania Pracowni Naukoznawstwa IHN PAN, aktualnie jedynej placówki naukoznawczej w Polsce. Videoconference “The Polish journals on the history and philosophy of science and the science of science: How to get to Scopus, WoS, ICI, DOAJ and ERIH+? Why is it worth doing?” (Kraków – Warsaw – Toruń, Poland, April 16, 2020, 10.00–15.00) The article sketches the subject matter and the course of the first videoconference in the history of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Institute of the History of Science of the Polish Academy of Sciences: “The Polish journals on the history and philosophy of science and the science of science: How to get to Scopus, WoS, ICI, DOAJ and ERIH+. Why is it worth doing?” (Krakow – Warsaw – Toruń, 16 April 2020, 10.00–15.00). The conference was organized on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Commission on the History of Science at the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences, and to mark the establishment of the Laboratory for the Science of Science at the Institute for the History of Science, Polish Academy of Sciences, currently the only one (!) unit for the science of science in Poland.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Maroske ◽  
Libby Robin ◽  
Gavan McCarthy

R. W. Home was appointed the first and, up to 2016, the only Professor of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) at the University of Melbourne. A pioneering researcher in the history of Australian science, Rod believes in both the importance and universality of scientific knowledge, which has led him to focus on the international dimensions of Australian science, and on a widespread dissemination of its history. This background has shaped five major projects Rod has overseen or fostered: the Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (a monograph series), Historical Records of Australian Science (a journal), the Australian Science Archives Project (now a cultural informatics research centre), the Australian Encyclopedia of Science (a web resource), and the Correspondence of Ferdinand von Mueller Project (an archive, series of publications and a forthcoming web resource). In this review, we outline the development of these projects (all still active), and reflect on their success in collecting, producing and communicating the history of science in Australia.


1997 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-110
Author(s):  
Vincent Fella Hendricks ◽  
Stig Andur Pedersen

Within epistemology and the philosophy of science there is, in a number of cases, an a-symmetrical relation or even complementarity between innovation and justification. Innovations are not always justifiable, within the currently accepted body of scientific knowledge and readily justifiable innovations are seldom too interesting. This paper describes some such cases drawn from the history of science and attempts to classify different types of innovations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
GREGORY F. W. TODD

ABSTRACT This contribution, in two parts, addresses a long-standing problem in the history of geology: Was the geological theory of James Hutton derived inductively from observations and scientific knowledge, or was it derived a priori as a speculative system? Hutton’s own writings do little to clarify the question, and the conflict in interpretations has remained at an impasse. This contribution proposes to resolve that conflict by focusing on the two years Hutton spent as a young man studying chemistry in Paris. I argue that Hutton studied with one of the great chemistry teachers of the eighteenth century, Guillaume-François Rouelle, and that Rouelle’s teachings provided the foundations of Hutton’s geological theory. Part One of this contribution reviews Hutton’s early studies in chemistry, and presents evidence to show that Hutton continued his chemistry studies with Rouelle in Paris from 1747 to 1749. Part One describes as well the geological content of Rouelle’s lectures, as derived from notes taken by his students, with focus on Rouelle’s methodology, his ideas on the origins of coal and limestone, and his observations on erosion and river transport. This Part concludes that Rouelle should be regarded as an important figure in the history of geology, not only in the francophone tradition, but, through Hutton, in the anglophone tradition as well. A detailed analysis of the influence of Rouelle’s teachings on Hutton’s Theory of the Earth (1788), and the development of Hutton’s overall theory, is the subject of Part Two.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yige Zhang

Mozi is a great scientist in ancient China and found the Mohist School, which was the most scientific spirit of the academic group at that time. The book of Mozi not only contains a large amount of scientific knowledge, but also is a landmark in the history of science in ancient China. Based on the theoretical perspective of STS and the primary material of Mozi, through summarizing the basic characteristics of Mohist scientific thought, this essay will reveal its historical significance and modern value.


EPISTEMOLOGIA ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 103-111
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey

The paper addresses the relation between the history and philosophy of science by way of the issue of epistemic normativity. Historical evidence of change of scientific method may seem to support epistemic relativism. But this does not entail that epistemic justification varies with methods employed by scientists. An argument is required that justification depends on such methods. Following discussion of Kuhn, the paper considers treatment of epistemic normativity by Lakatos, Laudan and Worrall. Lakatos and Laudan propose that the history of science may adjudicate between theories of method. Historical episodes are selected on the basis of value judgements or pre-analytic intuitions, which are themselves problematic. Laudan proposed the naturalist view that a rule of method be evaluated empirically on the basis of reliability in conducing to cognitive aims. Against this, Worrall argued that the normative force of appeal to past reliability requires an a priori inductive principle. In my view, the problem of normativity is solved by combining a particularist focus on specific episodes in the history of science with a naturalistic account of the reliability of method.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liba Taub

Abstract In 1990, Deborah Jean Warner, a curator at the Smithsonian Institution, published her now-classic article ‘What is a scientific instrument, when did it become one, and why?’. These questions were prompted by practical curatorial considerations: what was she supposed to collect for her museum? Today, we are still considering questions of what we collect for the future, why, and how. These questions have elicited some new and perhaps surprising answers since the publication of Warner’s article, sometimes – but not only – as a reflection of changing technologies and laboratory practices, and also as a result of changes in those disciplines that study science, including history of science and philosophy of science. In focusing attention on meanings associated with scientific instrument collections, and thinking about what objects are identified as scientific instruments, I consider how definitions of instruments influence what is collected and preserved.


Author(s):  
Philip Enros

An effort to establish programs of study in the history of science took place at the University of Toronto in the 1960s. Initial discussions began in 1963. Four years later, the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology was created. By the end of 1969 the Institute was enrolling students in new MA and PhD programs. This activity involved the interaction of the newly emerging discipline of the history of science, the practices of the University, and the perspectives of Toronto’s faculty. The story of its origins adds to our understanding of how the discipline of the history of science was institutionalized in the 1960s, as well as how new programs were formed at that time at the University of Toronto.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. McAllister

Abstract This article offers a critical review of past attempts and possible methods to test philosophical models of science against evidence from history of science. Drawing on methodological debates in social science, I distinguish between quantitative and qualitative approaches. I show that both have their uses in history and philosophy of science, but that many writers in this domain have misunderstood and misapplied these approaches, and especially the method of case studies. To test scientific realism, for example, quantitative methods are more effective than case studies. I suggest that greater methodological clarity would enable the project of integrated history and philosophy of science to make renewed progress.


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