Change and the Perceptual Object

Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Ann-Sophie Barwich

How much does stimulus input shape perception? The common-sense view is that our perceptions are representations of objects and their features and that the stimulus structures the perceptual object. The problem for this view concerns perceptual biases as responsible for distortions and the subjectivity of perceptual experience. These biases are increasingly studied as constitutive factors of brain processes in recent neuroscience. In neural network models the brain is said to cope with the plethora of sensory information by predicting stimulus regularities on the basis of previous experiences. Drawing on this development, this chapter analyses perceptions as processes. Looking at olfaction as a model system, it argues for the need to abandon a stimulus-centred perspective, where smells are thought of as stable percepts, computationally linked to external objects such as odorous molecules. Perception here is presented as a measure of changing signal ratios in an environment informed by expectancy effects from top-down processes.


2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Bendixen ◽  
Gábor P. Háden ◽  
Renáta Németh ◽  
Dávid Farkas ◽  
Miklós Török ◽  
...  

Separating concurrent sounds is fundamental for a veridical perception of one's auditory surroundings. Sound components that are harmonically related and start at the same time are usually grouped into a common perceptual object, whereas components that are not in harmonic relation or have different onset times are more likely to be perceived in terms of separate objects. Here we tested whether neonates are able to pick up the cues supporting this sound organization principle. We presented newborn infants with a series of complex tones with their harmonics in tune (creating the percept of a unitary sound object) and with manipulated variants, which gave the impression of two concurrently active sound sources. The manipulated variant had either one mistuned partial (single-cue condition) or the onset of this mistuned partial was also delayed (double-cue condition). Tuned and manipulated sounds were presented in random order with equal probabilities. Recording the neonates' electroencephalographic responses allowed us to evaluate their processing of the sounds. Results show that, in both conditions, mistuned sounds elicited a negative displacement of the event-related potential (ERP) relative to tuned sounds from 360 to 400 ms after sound onset. The mistuning-related ERP component resembles the object-related negativity (ORN) component in adults, which is associated with concurrent sound segregation. Delayed onset additionally led to a negative displacement from 160 to 200 ms, which was probably more related to the physical parameters of the sounds than to their perceptual segregation. The elicitation of an ORN-like response in newborn infants suggests that neonates possess the basic capabilities of segregating concurrent sounds by detecting inharmonic relations between the co-occurring sounds.


1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hasan Gürkan Tekman

If one dimension of sound is manipulated in a way that suggests a particular rhythmic organization, does perception of other dimensions change in ways that are consistent with the same rhythmic organization? When subjects were asked to judge or adjust intensities of tones, rhythmic manipulations of pitch structure changed the perception of intensity. When subjects were asked to judge timing, rhythmic manipulations of intensity had a similar effect. Timing manipulations did not have an effect on judgments of pitch. The results indicate that temporal structure as a whole is more accessible than the individual physical manipulations that give rise to that structure. It may be concluded that the temporal structure itself, rather than pitches, intensities, and durations in isolation, is a perceptual object.


1979 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 366-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elaine R. Silliman

Effects on spatial term comprehension as the result of transformations in the stimulus dimensions of six pictures containing the same three figures were explored using Piaget’s concept of spatial perspective. A Modified Test of Pictorial Space (MTPS), adapted from Hudson’s (1960) studies on non-Western pictorial perception strategies, was administered to 200 children, aged 6 yrs 5 mos to 11 yrs 3 mos. The purpose of the investigation was to gather data on (1) pictorial interpretation as a function of variations in perceptual depth cue complexity and transformations in conceptual perspective and (2) order of acquisition in the comprehension of two sets of spatial terms referring to perceptual object knowledge and more advanced conceptual knowledge of object relations. Significant age and IQ, but not sex, interactions were found for MTPS performance. Data analyses also supported predicted orders of acquisition and indicated that transformation of conceptual perspective better differentiated among the age span than did either perceptual depth cue complexity or comprehension of spatial terms. Findings are discussed in terms of their methodological and substantive implications for constructing and interpreting pictorially-based language comprehension tasks.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Sandved-Smith ◽  
Casper Hesp ◽  
Jérémie Mattout ◽  
Karl Friston ◽  
Antoine Lutz ◽  
...  

Abstract Meta-awareness refers to the capacity to explicitly notice the current content of consciousness and has been identified as a key component for the successful control of cognitive states, such as the deliberate direction of attention. This paper proposes a formal model of meta-awareness and attentional control using hierarchical active inference. To do so, we cast mental action as policy selection over higher-level cognitive states and add a further hierarchical level to model meta-awareness states that modulate the expected confidence (precision) in the mapping between observations and hidden cognitive states. We simulate the example of mind-wandering and its regulation during a task involving sustained selective attention on a perceptual object. This provides a computational case study for an inferential architecture that is apt to enable the emergence of these central components of human phenomenology, namely, the ability to access and control cognitive states. We propose that this approach can be generalized to other cognitive states, and hence, this paper provides the first steps towards the development of a computational phenomenology of mental action and more broadly of our ability to monitor and control our own cognitive states. Future steps of this work will focus on fitting the model with qualitative, behavioural, and neural data.


2005 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 275-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven L. Franconeri ◽  
Andrew Hollingworth ◽  
Daniel J. Simons

The visual system relies on several heuristics to direct attention to important locations and objects. One of these mechanisms directs attention to sudden changes in the environment. Although a substantial body of research suggests that this capture of attention occurs only for the abrupt appearance of a new perceptual object, more recent evidence shows that some luminance-based transients (e.g., motion and looming) and some types of brightness change also capture attention. These findings show that new objects are not necessary for attention capture. The present study tested whether they are even sufficient. That is, does a new object attract attention because the visual system is sensitive to new objects or because it is sensitive to the transients that new objects create? In two experiments using a visual search task, new objects did not capture attention unless they created a strong local luminance transient.


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