Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Postcommunist Systems

2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry D. Clark ◽  
Jill N. Wittrock
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Majority Control ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Duverger's Law ◽  
Electoral Law ◽  
Mixed Systems

Efforts to test Duverger’s law in the new democracies of postcommunist Europe have had mixed results. Research argues that mixed systems have an effect on the number of effective parties that is distinct from that of single-mandate district and proportional representation systems. Less attention has been given to the effect of other institutions on the party system, particularly strong presidents. Analyzing election results in postcommunist Europe, the authors find support for Duverger’s law after controlling for the strength of the executive. They argue that strong presidents substantially reduce the incentive for parties to seize control of the legislative agenda. Hence, the restraint that electoral systems exercise on the proliferation of parties and independent candidates is weakened. The authors find that a further consequence of strong presidents is that the incentive for majority control of committees and the legislative agenda is weakened.

15. Institutional Design in New Democracies

2018 ◽  
pp. 228-238
Author(s):  
Matthijs Bogaards
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Ethnic Conflicts ◽  
Consociational Democracy ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
Established Democracies ◽  
Electoral Law

This chapter focuses on electoral systems and institutional design in new democracies. It first compares Maurice Duverger’s electoral laws with those of Giovanni Sartori before discussing the main insights from the literature on electoral systems in established democracies as well as evidence from new democracies. It then considers the impact of the electoral law on the type of party system and its role as intermediary between society and government in plural societies. It also examines the party system as an independent variable, along with dependent variables such as the number of political parties, social cleavages, and presidentialism. Finally, it discusses consociational democracy and how electoral system design can be used in managing ethnic conflicts.

Effects of the Mixed Parallel Electoral System in Lithuania: The Worst of All Worlds?

2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mažvydas Jastramskis
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Political Effects ◽  
High Volatility ◽  
Pessimistic Scenario ◽  
Election Results ◽  
New Democracy ◽  
Mixed Systems

Abstract This article analyses the political effects of the mixed parallel electoral system in Lithuania. According to the ‘best of both worlds’ logic, mixed systems could combine advantages from both the majoritarian and proportional formulas. However, counterarguments were also presented in the literature, pointing to the possibility of the ‘worst of both worlds’. According to presented analysis of Lithuanian parliamentary elections between 1992 and 2016, the pessimistic scenario is expected when a mixed parallel electoral system is used in a new democracy with a weakly institutionalised party system and high volatility. Lithuania’s mixed parallel system produces relatively disproportional election results. However, it also facilitates the fragmentation of party system. Moreover, the effects in a concrete election are hardly predictable, especially the seat bonus of election winner. Evidence in the article points to a conclusion that mixed parallel electoral systems could contribute to the ‘worst of all worlds’ and new democracies should avoid them.

15. Electoral Systems and Institutional Design in New Democracies

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthijs Bogaards
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Ethnic Conflicts ◽  
Consociational Democracy ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
Established Democracies ◽  
Electoral Law

This chapter focuses on electoral systems and institutional design in new democracies. It first compares Maurice Duverger’s electoral laws with those of Giovanni Sartori before discussing the main insights from the literature on electoral systems in established democracies as well as evidence from new democracies. It then considers the impact of the electoral law on the type of party system and its role as intermediary between society and government in plural societies. It also examines the party system as independent variable, along with dependent variables such as the number of political parties, social cleavages and presidentialism. Finally, it discusses consociational democracy and how electoral system design can be used in managing ethnic conflicts.

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

Impact of Candidate Selection Systems on Election Results: Evidence from Taiwan before and after the Change in Electoral Systems

2013 ◽  
Vol 213 ◽  
pp. 152-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dafydd Fell
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Campaign Strategies ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Extensive Coverage ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Election Results

AbstractA central challenge for scholars of party politics is to explain parties' electoral success or failure. Campaign strategies, candidate personalities, electoral systems, parties' issue emphasis and policy positions all receive extensive coverage in the literature. One variable that has been neglected is the role of nomination systems in election results. This is surprising considering how politicians often blame candidate selection failures for disappointing electoral outcomes and then reform nomination mechanisms in the hope of improving future election prospects. In this study I examine the relationship between nomination systems and electoral results in Taiwan before and after the change in electoral systems. I show that candidate selection methods have played an important role in shaping Taiwan's party system under the old and new electoral systems.

scholarly journals Electoral systems and income inequality: a tale of political equality

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izaskun Zuazu
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Instrumental Variable ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Lower Income ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Mixed Systems

AbstractThe link between democracy and within-country income inequality remains an unresolved quest in the literature of political economy. To look into this debate, I propose exploring the implications of electoral systems, rather than political regimes, on income inequality. I surmise that proportional representation systems should be associated with lower income inequality than majoritarian or mixed systems. Further, I conjecture that the relationship between electoral systems and income inequality hinges on the de facto distribution of real political power, namely political equality. I use data on 85 countries covering the period 1960–2016 and specify models able to capture the persistence and mean reversion of income inequality. The estimates fail to significantly associate democracy with income inequality, and find other political institutions to significantly shape income inequality. The paper finds a robust association between more proportional systems and lower income inequality. However, this association depends on political equality. Changes towards proportional representation systems seem to lower income inequality at low and medium levels of political equality. Strikingly, instrumental variable estimates show that changes in electoral systems in political equal societies increases income inequality.

Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (9) ◽  
pp. 1027-1053 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen E. Cox ◽  
Leonard J. Schoppa
Keyword(s):  
Centrifugal Force ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
District Level ◽  
The Past ◽  
Electoral Strategies ◽  
Elite Level ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Mixed Systems

The past decade has witnessed a surprising growth in the popularity of mixed-member electoral systems. Under these systems, voters choose representatives simultaneously under both proportional representation (PR) and single-member district plurality (SMDP) rules. It is widely accepted that SMDP rules tend to winnow competition down toward two large parties, and evidence from mixed systems suggests that this Duvergerian “gravity” reduces the number of parties surviving SMDP competition under mixed systems as well. Nevertheless, we argue, simultaneous balloting under PR rules softens this winnowing effect, operating as a “centrifugal force” that prevents Duvergerian gravity from reducing competition to the degree it does under pure SMDP systems. Thus, these newsystems produce effects unanticipated by their designers. To test for the presence of this centrifugal force, we examine elite-level electoral strategies in Germany, Japan, and Italy and compare district-level SMDP election results from pure systems with those of mixed-member systems.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 650-672
Author(s):  
Michael Marsh
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
National Parliament ◽  
Republic Of Ireland ◽  
The Public ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
The Republic

The Republic of Ireland is unusual in using the single transferable vote to elect its national parliament. The system allows voters to rank candidates in order of preference, and those lower preferences are used to allocate seats when a count of first preferences shows that candidates have no overall majority or, in multiseat elections, do not reach a set quota. The party system showed little fragmentation until recently, and proportionality has been only a little less than in many proportional representation systems. The public twice rejected moves to change the system and continues to express satisfaction with the control it appears to give them over their representatives, despite the criticisms expressed by many politicians and commentators.

scholarly journals Electoral Systems, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Party System Fragmentation

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lublin
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Multivariate Models ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Proper Account

Taking into proper account the geographic distribution of ethnic groups and the operation of electoral systems within individual countries reveals that the impact of ethnic diversity and electoral systems on the number of parties has been underestimated. Contrary to earlier findings, this study reveals that ethnic diversity spurs party proliferation in countries with both majoritarian and proportional electoral systems, though the effect is stronger in the latter. The insights gained here provide a theoretically derived measure of ethnic diversity that is useful for estimating its effect on specifically political phenomena and generating an improved holistic measure of the impact of electoral systems. More crucially, the results indicate that electoral system designers have a greater capacity to structure electoral outcomes. The results rely on multivariate models created using a new database with election results from 1990 through 2011 in sixty-five free democracies.

scholarly journals The Evolution of New Party Systems: Voter Learning and Electoral Systems

2021 ◽  
pp. 147892992110143
Author(s):  
Nasos Roussias
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
The Political ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
System Evolution ◽  
Over Time

How do new party systems evolve over time? This article argues that party system evolution requires the solution of coordination problems that voters face in early elections; this happens through a learning mechanism. Elections reveal information to voters, who update their beliefs about party viability and the distribution of voters’ preferences and adjust their behaviour. The institutional setting, however, strongly conditions the pace of learning. Restrictive electoral systems (single-member district) accelerate learning through the harsh penalties they impose on miscoordination, while permissive ones (proportional representation) prolong it. Testing the argument on a district-level dataset in new democracies provides ample support; voters learn to cast fewer wasted votes over time and this happens faster in single-member district systems. The findings point to a trade-off between consolidation and representation; while party system evolution is facilitated by restrictive electoral systems, the presence of distinct social groups in the political arena is better served by permissive ones.

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