Judicial Method and the Interpretation of Papua New Guineas Constitution

1980 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-166
Author(s):  
Peter J. Bayne
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Papua New Guinea ◽  
Social Philosophy ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
Fundamental Significance ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Judicial Method

In the latter half of 1979 the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea delivered judgment in two cases in which it was called upon to decide a number of issues of fundamental significance to the interpretation of that country's Constitution. In the course of this litigation, several of the Justices of the Court became embroiled in confrontation with the Government. The potential for such conflict had been foreseen by the makers of the Constitution, who took the view that conflict would be ameliorated if the Court adopted an autochthonous interpretation based on the social philosophy of the Constitution and on its legislative history. This article surveys the legal issues raised in these cases and evaluates the modes of interpretation employed by the Court by contrasting an “absolutist” with a “purposive” mode, with the latter expressing the intention of the Constitution's makers. It concludes that for the most part the Court adopted the absolutist mode, and that thereby the autochthonous nature of the Constitution has been undermined.

DEKADENSI PEMILIHAN HAKIM AGUNG OLEH DPR RI

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Institutional Status ◽  
The Government

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.

Summary of Results

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Trademark Law ◽  
Intellectual Property Law ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Networked Economy

The persuasive force of the accepted account’s property logic has driven antitrust and intellectual property law jurisprudence for at least the past three decades. It has been through the theory of trademark ownership and the commercial strategy of branding that these laws led the courts to comprehend markets as fundamentally bifurcated—as operating according to discrete types of interbrand and intrabrand competition—a division that had an effect far beyond the confines of trademark law and resonates today in the way government agencies and courts evaluate the emerging challenges of the networked economy along the previously introduced distinction between intertype and intratype competition. While the government in its appeal to the Supreme Court in ...

Averting Diversity: A Review of Nominations and Appointments to the Philippine Supreme Court (1988-2008)

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dante B. Gatmaytan ◽  
Cielo Magno
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Geographical Origin ◽  
Personal Characteristics ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Professional Experience ◽  
Academic Background ◽  
The Supreme Court

AbstractThis paper is an empirical study on the nominations and appointments of Supreme Court Justices during a twenty-year period from 1988, when the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) was created in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, to 2008. The study examines the profile of individuals nominated by the JBC including their gender, age, geographical origin, academic background, and professional experience. It also explores whether the appointing Presidents display any preferences based on personal characteristics relating the effects of these preferences to the diversity on the Supreme Court. The study indicates that nominees and appointees all hail from the same background. As a result, membership of the Supreme Court is sorely unrepresentative of Philippine society. This study sets the stage for future research that will determine how this lack of diversity on the Supreme Court can affect the resolution of legal issues.

scholarly journals The Constitution as a Code of Honor

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Faith Commitment ◽  
The Government

This article argues that the Senate’s refusal to consider the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court should be deemed unconstitutional. The Senate’s stonewalling disrespected the institutional needs of the judiciary, violated the constitutional norm of forbearance in the exercise of power, and assumed a Senate role in the appointments process that was never intended. Although no court would ever enjoin a recalcitrant President to make a nomination or an obstructionist Senate to meet with, deliberate over, or vote on a presidential nominee to the Supreme Court or anything else, the President’s and the Senators’ oaths to “support the Constitution” should be understood as entailing a good faith commitment to enabling the government to function.

scholarly journals Fascism-lite in America (or The Social Ideal of Donald Trump)

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan McGaughey
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Media Coverage ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Campaigns ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Citizens United ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Supreme Court

Abstract What explains the election of the 45th President of the United States? Many commentators have said that Trump is a fascist. This builds on grave concerns, since Citizens United, that democracy is being corrupted. This article suggests the long term cause, and the shape of ideology is more complex. In 1971, an extraordinary memorandum of Lewis Powell for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urged that ‘[b]usiness interests’ should ‘press vigorously in all political arenas for support’. Richard Nixon appointed Powell to the Supreme Court, and a few years later, despite powerful dissent, a majority in Buckley v. Valeo held that candidates may spend unlimited funds on their own political campaigns, a decision of which Donald Trump, and others, have taken full advantage. Citizens United compounded the problems, but Buckley v. Valeo was the ‘Trump for President’ case. This provided a platform from which Trump could propel himself into extensive media coverage. The 2016 election was inseparable from the social ideal pursued by a majority of the Supreme Court since 1976. No modern judiciary had engaged in a more sustained assault on democracy and human rights. Properly understood, ‘fascism’ is a contrasting, hybrid political ideology. It mixes liberalism’s dislike of state intervention, social conservatism’s embrace of welfare provision for insiders (not ‘outsiders’), and collectivism’s view that associations are key actors in a class conflict. Although out of control, Trump is closely linked to neo-conservative politics. It is too hostile to insider welfare to be called ‘fascist’. Its political ideology is weaker. If we had to give it a name, the social ideal of Donald Trump is ‘fascism-lite’.

scholarly journals PENGAKUAN TERHADAP PIHAK NON-ADVOKAT DALAM PEMBERIAN BANTUAN HUKUM (Politik Hukum Bantuan Hukum Dalam Peraturan Perundang-Undangan Di Indonesia)

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 399
Author(s):  
Akmal Adicahya
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
State Law ◽  
Legal Aid ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Right ◽  
Law Student

Access to justice is everyone rights that have to be fulfilled by the government. The regulation number 16 year 2011 of legal aid is an instrument held by the government to guarantee the right. The regulation allowed the participation of non-advocates to provide the legal aid. Through this policy, government emphasizes that:1) Indonesia is a state law which legal aid is an obliged instrument; 2) the prohibition of non-advocate to participate in legal aid is not relevant due to inadequate amount of advocate and citizen seek for justice (justiciabelen), and the advocate is not widely extended throughout Indonesia; 3) Non-Advocates, especially lecturer and law student are widely spread; 4) there are no procedural law which prohibits non-advocate to provide a legal aid. Those conditions are enough argument for government to strengthen the participation of non-advocates in providing legal aid. Especially for The Supreme Court to revise The Book II of Guidance for Implementing Court’s Job and Administration.Keywords: legal aid, non-advocate, justice

Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court

2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (04) ◽  
pp. 854-884 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Theoretical Discussion ◽  
Hybrid Regimes ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comprehensive Intervention ◽  
The Government

This article offers a theoretical discussion about courts in “hybrid regimes” that evolve from formerly democratic countries. The evolution toward authoritarianism typically allows governments more latitude to reduce judicial independence and judicial power. Yet, several reasons, including legitimacy costs, a tradition of using courts for judicial adjudication and social control, and even the use of courts for quenching dissent may discourage rulers from shutting down the judicial contestation arena and encourage them instead to appeal to less overbearing measures. This usually leads to a decline of the judiciary's proclivity to challenge the government, especially in salient cases. To illustrate these dynamics, I discuss the rise and fall of judicial power in Venezuela under Chávez's rule, focusing on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. Formerly the most powerful institution in the country's history, the Chamber briefly emerged as an influential actor at the beginning of the regime, but a comprehensive intervention of the judiciary in 2004 further politicized the court and effectively reduced its policy-making role.

¿Gracia vs. Justicia? El control contencioso-administrativo del indulto a partir de la Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 20 de noviembre de 2013

2014 ◽  
pp. 2935-2984
Author(s):  
Miren Jasone URKOLA IRIARTE
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Government Action ◽  
The Third ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Administrative Jurisdiction

LABURPENA: Auzitegi Gorenari indultu partzialaren gaian Gobernuak garatutako jardunaren izaera juridikoa zehazteko aukera eman dio bere Hirugarren Salaren Osokoak 2013ko azaroaren 20an adostutako Epaiak. Izaera juridiko hori oinarritzat harturik, administrazio-auzien jurisdikzioak gara dezakeen kontrola aztertuko du ondoren: bereziki, elementu arautuen teknikaren bidez gauza dezakeena [LJren 2(a) art.]. Eremu honetan, Indultu Legeari buruz Auzitegi berak egin izan duen interpretazioa iragazi, eta joera berria ezarriko du, gai berean jarraian argitaratutako epaietan berretsia dirudiena. RESUMEN: La Sentencia del Pleno de la Sala Tercera del Tribunal Supremo de 20 de noviembre de 2013 ofrece al Tribunal Supremo la oportunidad de precisar la naturaleza jurídica de la actuación del Gobierno en materia de indulto, para analizar posteriormente la extensión del control practicable en sede contencioso-administrativa, de modo especial, a través de la técnica de los elementos reglados [art. 2(a) LJ], un ámbito en el que tamiza la lectura de la Ley de Indulto que venía realizando el propio órgano judicial. Marca, así, una nueva tendencia que parece confirmada en sentencias posteriores. ABSTRACT: The judgment by the Third Section plenary of the of the Supreme Court from November 20th of 2013 gives the Supreme Court the chance to establish the legal nature of the Government action regarding the pardon, in order to analyze subsequently the extension of the control to be carried out by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, specially by means of the technic of the regulated elements [art. 2(a) LJ], a field where it weights up the reading of the Act of Pardon that used to do the same judicial body. It marks therefore a new tendency that seems to be confirmed in later judgments.

Knowing Habeas Corpus When You See It

2018 ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Government ◽  
Enemy Combatant

Viewing habeas corpus through a legal lens frequently misleads. The common law “rule” against controverting the return to writs of habeas corpus was commonly evaded through devices permitting judicial examination of the underlying facts and law. In many cases concluding “writ denied,” the prisoner in fact obtained “habeas corpus without the writ.” Failure to understand this explains why the Fourth Circuit performed so badly in rejecting the challenge of Yaser Hamdi to his detention as an enemy combatant. The Supreme Court very properly reversed that decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), resulting in the prisoner’s speedy release when the government was confronted with having to actually prove in court the claims it had made on paper.

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