The Limits of Online Consensus Effects: A Social Affirmation Theory of How Aggregate Online Rating Scores Influence Trust in Factual Corrections

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 771-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel L. Neo

Research on bandwagon effects suggests that people will yield to aggregate online rating scores even when forming evaluations of contentious content. However, such findings derive mainly from studying partisan news selection behaviors, and therefore, are incomplete. How do people use ratings to evaluate whether factual corrections on contentious issues are trustworthy? Through what I term the social affirmation heuristic, I hypothesize, people will first assess rating scores for compatibility with their own beliefs; and then they will invest trust only in ratings of factual messages that affirm their beliefs, while distrusting ratings that disaffirm them. I further predict that distrusted ratings will elicit boomerang effects, causing evaluations of message trustworthiness to conflict with rating scores. I use an online experiment ( n = 157) and a nationally representative survey experiment ( N = 500) to test these ideas. All hypotheses received clear support. Implications of the findings are discussed.

Author(s):  
Jason Schnittker

This article explores the psychological costs of incarceration, with a particular focus on how psychological factors are related to the social and economic difficulties of reentry. Using descriptive information from a nationally representative survey, this study reveals considerable anxiety, fear, and uncertainty among former inmates. The evidence also reveals that psychiatric disorders are, in some cases, even more disabling among former inmates than among others. The article situates this evidence within the larger debate on the social consequences of incarceration and discusses its implications. Psychological factors are certainly not the only barriers former inmates will face, but they are neglected in the literature and play an important role in how former inmates respond to other difficulties. They are also at the center of a persistent dilemma: former inmates must establish social connections upon release, but they must do so while harboring the stigma of a criminal record. Furthermore, former inmates who have a psychiatric disorder may be particularly disadvantaged because they experience two stigmas simultaneously.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-147
Author(s):  
Alexander W. Severson

AbstractIdeologically impure candidates—RINOs and DINOs—risk losing the endorsement of their fellow copartisans. However, which copartisans? In this article, I assess how party affiliation and the strength of partisan affiliation condition the evaluation of ideologically impure, non-prototypical candidates. Using a nationally representative survey experiment, I present evidence that while partisans negatively evaluate non-prototypical copartisans, there is not a consistent relationship between strength of identification and the degree of punitiveness. Moreover, candidate non-prototypicality causes convergence in candidate support between Republicans and Democrats. My results provide evidence that nominal partisan affiliation is by itself insufficient to save an ideologically non-prototypical candidate from the rebuke of fellow copartisans and thus that the “in-name-only” charge holds some weight.


2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292090499
Author(s):  
Roman Hlatky

Why do voters in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) vote for Euroskeptic political parties? Existing explanations of Euroskepticism suggest that those benefiting economically due to the European Union (EU) are less likely to be Euroskeptic. These approaches fail to take into account the social purpose of EU economic transfers. I argue that the minority advancement realized through EU funding drives voters toward Euroskeptic electoral options. I provide evidence of this relationship through two methods: a large-N statistical analysis and a survey experiment. The large-N analysis employs time-series, regional data from ten CEE member states. The survey experiment tests the hypothesis with a nationally representative sample of the Slovak population. Results from both methods corroborate the hypothesized relationship. Importantly, results suggest that reactionary voters may undermine the long-term institutional goals of the EU due to the short-term consequences of EU policies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 237802312110529
Author(s):  
Samuel L. Perry ◽  
Kenneth E. Frantz ◽  
Joshua B. Grubbs

Although decades old, the terms “anti-racism/antiracism” and “anti-racist/antiracist” have grown in usage by scholars, authors, and activists to convey the necessity of active opposition to racial injustice. But as the terms have become more mainstream, researchers have yet to examine the social and ideological correlates of actually describing oneself as “anti-racist.” Drawing on nationally representative survey data fielded at the height of national interest in “antiracist/anti-racist” language, the authors find that Blacks and Hispanics are significantly less likely than whites to describe themselves as “anti-racist,” and only the “very liberal” are more likely than other political orientations to identify with the label. Considering ideological correlates, progressive racial ideology is the strongest predictor of identifying as “anti-racist.” However, the second strongest correlate is describing oneself as “color-blind.” Analyses of quadratic terms suggests that this correlation is curvilinear for nonwhites but more linear for whites. Although originally conveying more radical and subversive ideals, those currently most likely to self-describe as “anti-racist” are white progressives with what we call “generically liberal” racial views.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Landry ◽  
Jonathan Schooler ◽  
Robb Willer ◽  
Paul Seli

Dehumanization, the belief that other people are less than fully human, dampens empathy, increases animosity, and catalyzes conflict between groups. Research has revealed that a troubling number of American partisans blatantly dehumanize members of the other party. Nonetheless, this research has also found that partisans substantially overestimate the extent to which members of the rival party dehumanize them. Here, we predict that partisans’ perceptions of being dehumanized by rival partisans (or meta-dehumanization) leads them to respond with reciprocal dehumanization. By implication, partisans’ own dehumanization of rival partisans could be reduced by correcting their exaggerated meta-dehumanization. We test this hypothesis in a pre-registered, nationally-representative survey experiment of Democrats and Republicans (N = 2,127). We find that a brief, informational intervention correcting partisans’ exaggerated perceptions of how much rival partisans dehumanize them reduced levels of partisan dehumanization by 45%, and this effect persisted in a follow-up survey conducted approximately one week later. We also investigated the effects of our intervention on additional outcomes, finding that it reduced desire for social distance from, and negative affect toward, rival partisans, and that these effects also persisted a week later. Together, these results suggest that correcting inaccurate perceptions of the extent of partisan dehumanization can be a tool for durably mitigating partisan enmity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 205316801879435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haifeng Huang ◽  
Xinsheng Liu

How is citizens’ factual historical knowledge related to their national identity? With original data from a nationally representative survey experiment in China, we find that significantly more Chinese citizens overestimate rather than underestimate China’s objective historical achievements, and those who overestimate the achievements of ancient Chinese civilization have higher levels of national identity. To an even greater degree, citizens who underestimate Chinese historical achievements have lower levels of national identity. We also find that correcting misinformation can potentially affect individuals’ national identity, although the effects did not reach statistical significance, likely because the survey experiment was under-powered for interaction effects, and because our information treatment was brief and on a very limited number of questions. These findings shed light on the subtle relationships between historical knowledge, propaganda, and national identity, and suggest avenues for future research.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byungkyu Lee ◽  
Peter Bearman

AbstractThis study documents historical trends of size and political diversity in Americans’ discussion networks, which are often seen as important barometers of social and political health. Contrasting findings from data drawn out of a nationally representative survey experiment of 1,055 Americans during the contentious 2016 U.S. presidential election to data arising from 11 national data sets covering nearly three decades, we find that Americans’ core networks are significantly smaller and more politically homogeneous than at any other period. Several methodological artifacts seem unlikely to account for the effect. We show that in this period, more than before, “important matters” were often framed as political matters, and that this association probably accounts for the smaller networks.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 837-855 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDRA A. SIEGEL ◽  
VIVIENNE BADAAN

We use an experiment across the Arab Twittersphere and a nationally representative survey experiment in Lebanon to evaluate what types of counter-speech interventions are most effective in reducing sectarian hate speech online. We explore whether and to what extent messages priming common national identity or common religious identity, with and without elite endorsements, decrease the use of hostile anti-outgroup language. We find that elite-endorsed messages that prime common religious identity are the most consistently effective in reducing the spread of sectarian hate speech. Our results provide suggestive evidence that religious elites may play an important role as social referents—alerting individuals to social norms of acceptable behavior. By randomly assigning counter-speech treatments to actual producers of online hate speech and experimentally evaluating the effectiveness of these messages on a representative sample of citizens that might be incidentally exposed to such language, this work offers insights for researchers and policymakers on avenues for combating harmful rhetoric on and offline.


Author(s):  
Thomas Gift ◽  
Carlos X. Lastra-Anadón

Abstract Foreign students are one of the most significant immigrant categories in many North American and Western European countries. Yet, as their numbers have swelled, many governments have experienced increasing pressures to cap their entry. This is true despite the sizable benefits that foreign students bring to host countries, and despite standard political economy concerns about immigrants—that they take away jobs or abuse public entitlements—not applying to foreign students. We field a nationally-representative survey experiment in the UK, one of the top destinations for foreign students, to examine potential activators of public support for capping the number of foreign students. Results show that support for caps is most activated when citizens are primed to think about foreign students competing with domestic students for scarce admissions slots at universities.


2021 ◽  
pp. 146144482110341
Author(s):  
Mikhaila N. Calice ◽  
Luye Bao ◽  
Isabelle Freiling ◽  
Emily Howell ◽  
Michael A. Xenos ◽  
...  

The use of artificial intelligence-based algorithms for the curation of news content by social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter has upended the gatekeeping role long held by traditional news outlets. This has caused some US policymakers to argue that platforms are skewing news diets against them, and such claims are beginning to take hold among some voters. In a nationally representative survey experiment, we explore whether traditional models of media bias perceptions extend to beliefs about algorithmic news bias. We find that partisan cues effectively shape individuals’ attitudes about algorithmic news bias but have asymmetrical effects. Specifically, whereas in-group directional partisan cues stimulate bias perceptions for members of both parties, Democrats, but not Republicans, also respond to out-group cues. We conclude with a discussion about the implications for the formation of attitudes about new technologies and the potential for polarization.


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