Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: A Coup-Proofing Paradox

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Powell
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Considerable Increase ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Survival Strategies ◽  
Leader Survival ◽  
Coup Risk

It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite their states being plagued with rebellion. Scholarship has argued the practice of coup-proofing is potentially responsible for this trend. However, though regular armed forces are often allowed to whither when coup-proofing, states often retain substantial capabilities in the form of well-armed and well-trained coup-proofing units. This article argues that coup-proofing is more likely to contribute to rebellion when leaders are hesitant to deploy their coup-proofing units: when coup risk is high. Using a global sample of authoritarian regimes for the years 1971–2011, tests indicate that heavily coup-proofed regimes do in fact see a considerable increase in civil war likelihood when the risk of a coup is high but see no change in conflict propensity when coup risk is low.

Metamorphoses of memory of the the Russian-Serbian Brotherhood of War in Modern Serbia

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-156
Author(s):  
A. Yu. Timofeev
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Party System ◽  
Historical Memory ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Second World War ◽  
World War ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Second World

The article considers the perception of World War II in modern Serbian society. Despite the stability of Serbian-Russian shared historical memory, the attitudes of both countries towards World wars differ. There is a huge contrast in the perception of the First and Second World War in Russian and Serbian societies. For the Serbs the events of World War II are obscured by the memories of the Civil War, which broke out in the country immediately after the occupation in 1941 and continued several years after 1945. Over 70% of Yugoslavs killed during the Second World War were slaughtered by the citizens of former Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The terror unleashed by Tito in the first postwar decade in 1944-1954 was proportionally bloodier than Stalin repressions in the postwar USSR. The number of emigrants from Yugoslavia after the establishment of the Tito's dictatorship was proportionally equal to the number of refugees from Russia after the Civil War (1,5-2% of prewar population). In the post-war years, open manipulations with the obvious facts of World War II took place in Tito's Yugoslavia. In the 1990s the memories repressed during the communist years were set free and publicly debated. After the fall of the one-party system the memory of World War II was devalued. The memory of the Russian-Serbian military fraternity forged during the World War II began to revive in Serbia due to the foreign policy changes in 2008. In October 2008 the President of Russia paid a visit to Serbia which began the process of (re) construction of World War II in Serbian historical memory. According to the public opinion surveys, a positive attitude towards Russia and Russians in Serbia strengthens the memories on general resistance to Nazism with memories of fratricide during the civil conflict events of 1941-1945 still dominating in Serbian society.

Problems of Interactions of the White Army Commanders with Separatist Governments of South Russia in A. I. Denikin’s ‘Defamation of the White Movement’

2018 ◽  
pp. 1149-1162
Author(s):  
Konstantin N. Kurkov ◽  
◽  
Alexander V. Melnichuk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Russian Empire ◽  
The South ◽  
National Interests ◽  
German Occupation ◽  
Imperial Germany ◽  
Occupied Territories ◽  
Sensitive Issues ◽  
Regional Interests

The article studies some of the more complicated and sensitive issues of the Civil War in the South of Russia – relations of the Armed Forces of South Russia with the Krai governments of the Don and the Kuban and separatist movements as an important factor in the Whites’ defeat in the South of Russia. Both issues are covered in ‘Defamation of the White Movement,’ one of the last works of General A. I. Denikin. Its manuscript has been introduced into scientific use by the authors. Commanders and military authorities of the Volunteer Army with A. I. Denikin at its head were not tied down by regional interests and could pursue national interests in their policy in order to restore an all-Russian unity destroyed by the revolution. Regional concerns of the Don, Kuban, Little Russian, Caucasian independentists were in direct conflict with the national tasks that the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of South Russia strove to solve. Unlike the Don Ataman P. N. Krasnov, who was forced to cooperate with the occupation authorities of Imperial Germany, whose troops had occupied the territory of the Great Don Army for the most of 1918, and unlike other regional administrators in the German-occupied territories, the Whites did not cooperate with the occupiers and at times counteracted their anti-Russian policy. Denikin's propaganda successfully used this fact to fall back on traditional patriotic sentiments and to eat away at the Kremlin regime’s support. Centrifugal tendencies in the South of Russia did not allow the Volunteers to consolidate anti-Bolshevik forces and made an armed resistance to the Bolsheviks impossible. Hence A. I. Denikin’s uncompromising stand on separatist aspirations of independentists. In his view, it was the separatists’ activities in different regions of the former Russian Empire that hindered the successful offensive of the armed forces of South Russia, for instance, on the Moscow direction. Internal dissent was exacerbated by intervention of foreign forces – German occupation forces, the Allied Intervention, and active Bolshevik influence on the outskirts of the former Empire. The article compares Denikin’s text with testimonies of contemporaries and writings of historians. Thus, the authors have been able to show that his slender work reliably and accurately recreates the complex and dramatic situation, which led to the defeat of the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Civil War.

“In Fact, We Do Not Have a Regular Army Yet…” A Letter of the Commander of Kiev Region Armed Forces General A.M. Dragomirov to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia General A.I. Denikin. 12 (25) December 1919

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 245-264
Author(s):  
Andrey Ganin
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Stanford University ◽  
The South ◽  
Moral Improvement ◽  
Policy And Strategy ◽  
Red Army ◽  
Regular Army ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Commander In Chief

The document published is a letter from the commander of the Kiev Region General Abram M. Dragomirov to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia General Anton I. Denikin of December, 1919. The source covers the events of the Civil War in Ukraine and the views of the leadership of the White Movement in the South of Russia on a number of issues of policy and strategy in Ukraine. The letter was found in the Hoover Archives of Stanford University in the USA in the collection of Lieutenant General Pavel A. Kusonsky. The document refers to the period when the white armies of the South of Russia after the bright success of the summer-autumn “March on Moscow” in 1919 were stopped by the Red Army and were forced to retreat. On the pages of the letter, Dragomirov describes in detail the depressing picture of the collapse of the white camp in the South of Russia and talks about how to improve the situation. Dragomirov saw the reasons for the failure of the White Movement such as, first of all, the lack of regular troops, the weakness of the officers, the lack of discipline and, as a consequence, the looting and pogroms. In this regard, Dragomirov was particularly concerned about the issue of moral improvement of the army. Part of the letter is devoted to the issues of the civil administration in the territories occupied by the White Army. Dragomirov offers both rational and frankly utopian measures. However, the thoughts of one of the closest Denikin’s companions about the reasons what had happened are interesting for understanding the essence of the Civil War and the worldview of the leadership of the anti-Bolshevik Camp.

Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 686-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
BENJAMIN A.T. GRAHAM ◽  
MICHAEL K. MILLER ◽  
KAARE W. STRØM
Keyword(s):  
Minority Group ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Emerging Democracies ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Ethnic Quotas ◽  
Democratic Survival ◽  
Constitutional Protections

Democracy is often fragile, especially in states recovering from civil conflict. To protect emerging democracies, many scholars and practitioners recommend political powersharing institutions, which aim to safeguard minority group interests. Yet there is little empirical research on whether powersharing promotes democratic survival, and some concern that it limits electoral accountability. To fill this gap, we differentiate between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining powersharing institutions and analyze their effects on democratic survival from 1975 to 2015 using a global dataset. We find sharp distinctions across types of powersharing and political context. Inclusive powersharing, such as ethnic quotas, promotes democratic survival only in post-conflict settings. In contrast, dispersive institutions such as federalism tend to destabilize post-conflict democracies. Only constraining powersharing consistently facilitates democratic survival regardless of recent conflict. Institution-builders and international organizations should therefore prioritize institutions that constrain leaders, including independent judiciaries, civilian control of the armed forces, and constitutional protections of individual and group rights.

scholarly journals L’encaix de la narrativa sense ficció de Víctor Labrado en el paradigma de la novel·la històrica valenciana

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 329
Author(s):  
Dari Escandell
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
Historical Novel ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Past Century ◽  
Historical Novels ◽  
Literary Works ◽  
Past Time ◽  
Non Fiction

Resum: L’escriptor valencià Víctor Labrado (Sueca, 1956) s’ha erigit com un dels grans referents contemporanis en el camp de la novel·la de no-ficció en català, subgènere narratiu que conjumina la intenció metanovel·lesca amb fidedignes discursos testimonials. Ara bé, ¿les obres cabdals de Labrado –peculiars, idiosincràtiques i gens usuals– poden ser considerades també, sense subterfugis ni matisos, novel·la històrica? A grans trets: trames guerracivilistes empeltades d’entrevistes, dosis generoses de periodisme documental i absència gairebé absoluta de ficció. La tècnica i l’estil propi no suposen, però, cap impediment perquè molts llibres seus siguen alhora novel·la històrica, si fem cas dels topoi convinguts per la crítica especialitzada. No debades, aquests exemplars esdevenen, al capdavall, testimoni viu d’un temps passat; vivències i peripècies de gent anònima que rescaten de l’oblit, des de la particularitat més universal, la realitat valenciana d’un segle passat vilment estigmatitzat pel conflicte civil de l’any 1936 i la dictadura consegüent. ¿N’hi ha prou amb això, però, perquè aquesta etiqueta o clixé siga atribuïble també a la resta de la seua obra i trajectòria? El present article analitza a nivell tècnic, argumental i conceptual els llibres essencials de Labrado per tal de determinar quina part de la seua novel·lística sense ficció pot o no considerar-se al seu torn novel·la històrica.Paraules clau: Víctor Labrado, novel·la sense ficció, novel·la històrica, literatura catalana, valencià.Abstract: The Valencian writer Víctor Labrado (Sueca, 1956) has emerged as one of the great contemporary references in the field of the non-fiction novel in Catalan, a narrative subgenre that combines the fictional intention with real testimonial speeches. However, can Labrado’s capital books –peculiar, idiosyncratic and unusual– be considered also, without subterfuges or hints, historical novels? Broadly speaking: are his Spanish civil war plots grafted with interviews, generous doses of documentary journalism and almost absolute absence of fiction, historical novels? Its techniques and style are no impediment to say so, if we pay attention to the topoi agreed by the specialized critic. In fact, these novels become, in short, a living testimony of our past time: they rescue from oblivion the experiences and adventures of anonymous people, from the most universal particularity, and the Valencian reality of a past century stigmatized by the civil conflict of 1936 and the consequent dictatorship. Is that enough, however, to attribute this label to the rest of his literary works? This paper analyses the techniques, the plots and the concepts of Labrado’s essential books to determine what part of his nonfiction novels may or may not be considered historical.Keywords: Víctor Labrado, nonfiction novel, historical novel, Catalan literature, Valencian

scholarly journals Coup-Proofing and Civil War

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Koga Sudduth
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
The Other ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Future ◽  
Face Threats ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Political leaders face threats to their power from within and outside the regime. Leaders can be removed via a coup d’état undertaken by militaries that are part of the state apparatus. At the same time, leaders can lose power when they confront excluded opposition groups in civil wars. The difficulty for leaders, though, is that efforts to address one threat might leave them vulnerable to the other threat due to the role of the military as an institution of violence capable of exercising coercive power. On one hand, leaders need to protect their regimes from rebels by maintaining strong militaries. Yet, militaries that are strong enough to prevail against rebel forces are also strong enough to execute a coup successfully. On the other hand, leaders who cope with coup threats by weakening their militaries’ capabilities to organize a coup also diminish the very capabilities that they need to defeat their rebel challengers. This unfortunate trade-off between protection by the military and protection from the military has been the long-standing theme in studies of civil-military relations and coup-proofing. Though most research on this subject has focused primarily on rulers’ maneuvers to balance the threats posed by the military and the threats coming from foreign adversaries, more recent scholarship has begun to explore how leaders’ efforts to cope with coup threats will influence the regime’s abilities to address the domestic threats coming from rebel groups, and vice versa. This new wave of research focuses on two related vectors. First, scholars address whether leaders who pursue coup-proofing strategies that weaken their militaries’ capabilities also increase the regime’s vulnerability to rebel threats and the future probability of civil war. Second, scholars examine how the magnitude of threats posed by rebel groups will determine leaders’ strategies toward the militaries, and how these strategies affect both the militaries’ influence over government policy and the future probability of coup onsets. These lines of research contribute to the conflict literature by examining the causal mechanisms through which civil conflict influences coup propensity and vice versa. The literatures on civil war and coups have developed independently without much consideration of each other, and systematic analyses of the linkage between them have only just began.

The case for courts

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 774-786 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline M Sievert
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Propensity Score ◽  
Propensity Score Matching ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Judicial Reform ◽  
Complex Relationship ◽  
Policy Positions

Authoritarian regimes are not known for adopting independent courts, yet the frequency of states empowering their judiciaries has steadily increased. In 1961 only 9% of autocracies had a partially or fully independent court, but by 1987 more than one-third of authoritarian states had reformed their judiciaries. Initiating judicial reform is risky for a regime that seeks to maintain its authority over its populace, including risks to their preferred policy positions and judgments that run contrary to the preferences of the regime. Given these risks, why do authoritarian leaders often relinquish authority to independent courts? This article argues regime leaders will choose to empower at least nominally independent courts in order to resolve information problems that lead to bargaining failures and civil war. This project uses propensity score matching to account for the complex relationship between institutional arrangement and civil war, and finds that states that adopt an independent court reduce their risk of civil war between 54% and 75% when compared to states that are equally likely to have adopted an independent court, but did not. These results suggest that leaders seeking to reduce uncertainty when bargaining with potential oppositions groups have strong incentives to implement independent judiciaries, and improve our understanding of how and why authoritarian leaders choose to delegate authority to independent judicial institutions.

Personalist dictators and the choice of military intervention in civil conflicts

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Adriana M. Boersner H.
Keyword(s):  
Personality Traits ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
World Politics ◽  
University Of Missouri ◽  
Civil Conflicts ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Hugo Chavez ◽  
The Military

[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] Are all personalist dictators equally prone to intervene in civil conflicts? The current bulk of work on authoritarianism and international relations shows that personalist autocrats are more prone to be hawkish in foreign policy when compared, for example, to military dictators. What is missing, however, is a better understanding as to whether different personalist dictators behave similarly to one another in world politics. In this study, I argue that not all personalist dictators behave in the same way on military intervention due to the interaction between their personality traits and the military capabilities available to them. Drawing on an original dataset on personalist dictators' personality traits, I employ leadership trait analysis - using 386,510 words of text and 1,580 documents from twenty dictators in the period between 1990 and 2009. I find that personality traits do indeed matter for leaders' choices to intervene militarily abroad. Specifically, I show that dictators' level of sensitivity to advice and information (conceptual complexity) in interaction with military capabilities is a significant factor shaping whether they send weapons or deploy troops into a civil conflict abroad. I illustrate my findings and the mechanisms with one case study: Hugo Chavez and his decision to support the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -FARC).

The Legacy of Displacement during La Violencia and the Origins of the Contemporary War in Colombia

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abbey Steele
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
The Political ◽  
Historical Overview ◽  
Internally Displaced

Chapter two presents a historical overview of the Colombian civil war. The current civil war’s roots extend back to La Violencia, the previous civil conflict in the mid-20th century, in which millions of Colombians were internally displaced. The chapter traces the legacy of civilian displacement for both the development of political loyalties, and the emergence of the contemporary insurgencies. The political loyalties formed during this period in some communities have effects on the trajectory of the civil war violence decades later.

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