Flexibilities in WTO Law to Support Tobacco Control Regulation

2013 ◽  
Vol 39 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 199-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tania Voon
Keyword(s):  
Tobacco Control ◽  
Health Impact ◽  
The United States ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
International Trade Law ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Tobacco Regulation ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

Cases concerning the regulation of tobacco have long existed within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947), although often these cases have not centered on the detrimental health impact of tobacco products. With the 2012 circulation of the Report of the WTO Appellate Body in U.S.—Clove Cigarettes, the potential friction between international trade law and tobacco regulation in the context of public health has come to the fore. In that Report, the Appellate Body found in part against the United States’ flavored cigarette ban. Combined with the ongoing WTO challenges to mandatory plain tobacco packaging in Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging, governments might begin to fear that the WTO agreements represent an insurmountable barrier to ambitious tobacco control measures. However, careful examination of the Clove Cigarettes case alongside the two other recent Appellate Body Reports (U.S.—Tuna II (Mexico)5 and U.S.—COOL6) on the WTO's Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)7 demonstrates that the TBT Agreement has ample flexibility to accommodate health objectives underlying tobacco regulation.

Part II Substantive Aspects, Ch.22 National Treasures at the Intersection between Cultural Heritage and International Trade Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Voon Tania
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Cultural Property ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Illicit Trade ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
International Trade Law ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
National Treasures ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter analyses the extent to which international trade law accommodates the export and import control measures that States commonly adopt in order to prevent illicit trade in cultural property in accordance with the 1970 UNESCO Convention. It examines the exception for ‘national treasures’ found in World Trade Organization (WTO) law and other international economic agreements. The definition of cultural property in the relevant UNESCO treaty is not necessarily identical to the meaning of national treasures in WTO law. Moreover, the WTO Appellate Body has shown reluctance to apply non-WTO law in determining WTO disputes, so a conflict between UNESCO and WTO provisions or domestic regulations might not necessarily be resolved as expected. This conclusion provides one example of the limitations of the current Appellate Body approach to international law and suggests, with respect to cultural property, that closer alliance in treaty drafting may be required to enhance coherence.

Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif H. Qureshi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4

scholarly journals The Collapse of the Appellate Body as a Determining Factor of the WTO’s Future

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 238-255
Author(s):  
Hryhorii M. Kalachyhin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Regulation ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Shifting Balance ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
The U.S

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the leading institutions involved in global economic regulation. Its purposes are to ensure multilateral cooperation on the liberalization of international trade, harmonize existing standards and requirements, and peacefully resolve trade disputes between countries. Since 11 December 2019, dispute resolution has been handicapped due to the consistent blocking of the appointment of members to the WTO Appellate Body (AB) by the United States. This has reduced the multilateral trading system’s (MTS) predictability and threatens its final decay. In this article, the fundamental and formal causes of the collapse are described, and its circumvention mechanisms and effectiveness are discussed. At the same time, an assessment is given of the possibility to overcome the collapse in 2021, considering the change of the U.S. president and other events. Special attention is paid to Russia’s position and its current and potential losses. Finally, the issue of dispute resolution through regional trade agreements is proposed for discussion. The fundamental reasons for the collapse were the shifting balance of power in the world order and the WTO’s inflexibility in adjusting the rulebook and its procedures. The main reasons for the U.S.’ dissatisfaction are objective but based on formalities; the blockage of the AB is an overreaction. Moreover, the U.S.’ position on this issue has not changed with the new president. As a result, there is abuse of the current situation as WTO members file appeals “into the void.” Existing tools to circumvent the collapse are partial and not yet popular among WTO members. Russia needs to resume the AB’s work to complete previously started high-profile disputes and to defend its interests in the future.

How Should WTO Members React to Their WTO Crises?

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Selection Procedures ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
Other World ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

AbstractSince 2017, the United States (US) and other World Trade Organization (WTO) members have been violating their legal duties and democratic mandates given by national parliaments to maintain the WTO Appellate Body (AB) as legally prescribed in Article 17 of the WTO Dispute Understanding (DSU). Article 17 defines the AB as being ‘composed of seven persons’, with vacancies being ‘filled as they arise’. Sections 2 and 3 explain why none of the reasons offered by the US for its blocking of the (re)appointment of AB candidates – on grounds unrelated to the personal qualifications of the candidates – can justify the illegal disruptions of the WTO legal and dispute settlement system. EU trade diplomats must exercise leadership using the existing legal powers and duties of the WTO Ministerial Conference and General Council under Article IX WTO – if necessary, based on ‘a majority of the votes cast’ – to complete the WTO selection procedures for filling AB vacancies and protect the AB as legally defined in Article 17 DSU. Sections 4 and 5 explain why the competition, social policy, and rule-of-law principles underlying European ‘ordo-liberalism’ offer coherent strategies for overcoming the WTO governance crises by limiting hegemonic abuses of both US neo-liberalism and Chinese state-capitalism.

scholarly journals International Trade Law and Information Policy: A Recent History

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Genevieve Tung
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
International Trade Law ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Economic Partnership ◽  
Partnership Agreement ◽  
Strong Agreement

In September 2008, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced the United States’ intention to join Singapore, New Zealand, Brunei, and Chile in what was then called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, a preferential trade agreement. Since then, the agreement has grown in scope and ambition. The negotiations to create what is now known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) have expanded to include seven other nations. The USTR wants the TPP to be “an ambitious, next-generation, Asia-Pacific trade agreement that reflects U.S. economic priorities and values.” According to the USTR's webpage dedicated to the agreement, the administration is “working in close partnership with Congress and with a wide range of stakeholders, in seeking to conclude a strong agreement that addresses the issues that U.S. businesses and workers are facing in the 21st century.”

scholarly journals United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (WT/DS217/AB/R: DSR 2003:I,375)

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (S1) ◽  
pp. 52-86
Author(s):  
Henrik Horn ◽  
Petros C. Mavroidis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Hong Kong ◽  
European Community ◽  
The United States ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Byrd Amendment ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

On January 16, 2003, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) issued its report on the appeal by the United States (US) of the Panel decision in United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000. The report concerns the consistency of the United States Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (the “CDSOA,” or the so-called Byrd Amendment) with several WTO provisions. This legislation requests the federal state to distribute proceeds from antidumping and countervailing duties to all US economic operators that have supported a request previously submitted to the ratione materiae competent US authority to investigate alleged dumping or subsidization. The appeal was directed against the Panel’s finding that the Byrd legislation was inconsistent with the US obligations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement (AD), and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). A total of 11 complainants (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Community, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand), and five additional third parties (Argentina, Costa Rica, Hong Kong (China), Israel, and Norway), evidence the interest among WTO Members in the issues at stake in the dispute.

scholarly journals US Compliance with WTO Rulings on Zeroing in Anti-Dumping

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
BERNARD HOEKMAN ◽  
JASPER WAUTERS
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Effective Communication ◽  
The United States ◽  
Direct Argument ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

AbstractThis paper reviews the WTO Appellate Body Reports on United States–Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 DSU – EC) (WT/DS294/AB/RW, 14 May 2009) and United States–Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 DSU – Japan) (WT/DS322/AB/RW, 18 August 2009). The Appellate Body found that the United States had not brought its anti-dumping measures into compliance with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement as it continued to use zeroing in annual reviews of anti-dumping orders. We argue that this conclusion – based on a complicated discussion of what constitutes a ‘measure taken to comply’ – could have been reached through a much simpler and direct argument. Continued noncompliance by the United States generates costs to traders targeting the United States and the trading system more generally. We argue that from a broader WTO compliance perspective consideration should be given to stronger multilateral surveillance of anti-dumping practice by all WTO members and to more analysis and effective communication by economists regarding the costs of zeroing and anti-dumping practices more generally.

scholarly journals Next Steps Might Be Considered by Joe Biden for the Development of International Trade Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (11) ◽  
pp. 1372-1375
Author(s):  
Md. Habib Alam
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
The United States ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
International Trade Law ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Trade Deals

The United States of America is a part of the globalization of international trade law. The USA is known as a leading global trader among all nations. The President of the USA plays a vital role in the development of international trade law. On 8 November 2016, Donald Trump was elected as president of the United States of America. Donald Trump engaged in different trade deals and policies with different countries and international institutions. The trade deals and policies are withdrawal from TPP, reshaping NAFTA, reforming WTO, and imposing tariffs on foreign goods. On 8 November 2020, CNN commented, Joe Biden will be the next president of the USA. Many scholars expressed different thoughts relating to the reforming international trade law by Joe Biden. The main aim of Joe Biden will be to remove trade barriers and end artificial trade wars with different foreign nations. My research will suggest how Joe Biden may overcome these issues for the betterment of the international trade law around the world.

scholarly journals Book Review: Jens Lehne, Crisis at the WTO: Is the Blocking of Appointments to the WTO Appellate Body by the United States Legally Justified?

sui generis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Sieber-Gasser
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Legal Arguments ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The US policy of blocking new appointments to the WTO Appellate Body relied on a number of legal arguments against the body’s work and ultimately succeeded in rendering the appellate mechanism of the WTO dispute settlement system inoperable in December 2019. In his book, Jens Lehne carefully analyses the various legal arguments officially brought forward by the US until summer 2019. His analysis is proof of the vulnerability of the WTO: despite equality of WTO members enshrined in the WTO treaties, the fate of the WTO remains largely dependent on the willingness of large economies to comply with a legally binding dispute settlement system.

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