scholarly journals Who, the people? Rethinking constituent power as praxis

2021 ◽  
pp. 019145372110175
Author(s):  
Maxim van Asseldonk
Keyword(s):  
Collective Responsibility ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
The People ◽  
Democratic Authority ◽  
Just Decisions ◽  
Modern Thinking

Modern thinking about democracy is largely governed by the concept of constituent power. Some versions of the concept of constituent power, however, remain haunted by the spectre of totalitarianism. In this article, I outline an alternative view of the identity of the people whose constituent power generates democratic authority. Broadly speaking, constituent power signifies the idea that all political authority, including that of the constitution, must find its source in some idea of ‘the people’, whose authority is never exhausted by constituted power. The deficiency I seek to address is that of asking who the people is to whom any claim of authority refers, while avoiding the pitfalls of totalitarianism. I show the most famous totalitarian view of constituent power – advanced by Carl Schmitt – to be not only politically unsavoury but also ontologically unjustified. To outline my alternative view, I draw on Jacques Derrida’s concept of just decisions to argue that the undecidable inaugurates collective responsibility by demanding a response. This suggests a view of ‘the people’ as a doing rather than a being. I conclude by showing how this avoids totalitarian views of popular sovereignty by demonstrating its congruency with Claude Lefort’s democratic theory as opposed to totalitarianism.

Constituent Power and Constitutive Exceptions: Carl Schmitt, Populism and the Consummation of Secularisation

2020 ◽  
pp. 199-214
Author(s):  
Jon Wittrock
Keyword(s):  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
The People ◽  
Cultural Markers

This chapter considers the role of the people in Carl Schmitt’s theorizing on democracy, and invokes the concept of constitutive boundaries as a way of understanding how communities are reproduced by way of territorial borders as well as criteria for membership and cultural markers, e.g. symbols, rituals, and holidays. The chapter suggests that the latter constitute instances of a larger logical space of constitutive exceptions, that, Schmitt implies, reproduce existing orders, but also threaten to replace them with new ones; thus, such exceptions may be surrounded by protective boundaries of the sacred, concretely as well as abstractly. Ultimately, we may visualize an entire topology of the exceptional, which is subject to fierce contestation, since it points to the possibility of new orders beyond existing ones, which may be interpreted in terms of different trajectories of highly ambiguous processes of secularization.

The Power of the People

2020 ◽  
pp. 166-182
Author(s):  
Ari Hirvonen ◽  
Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Contemporary Theory ◽  
Modern Democracy ◽  
Theoretical Idea ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Alain Badiou ◽  
Jacques Ranciere ◽  
The People ◽  
Jacques Rancière

In this chapter Hirvonen and Lindroos-Hovinheimo argue that the revolutionary power of constituent power and popular sovereignty are relevant conditions of radical emancipatory and egalitarian politics. How the people become the people – and what makes the people in its becoming – are relevant questions in modern democracy. The article considers the power of the people as a theoretical idea and political possibility. It brings together the older tradition of political philosophy with contemporary theory by discussing Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ideas together with those of Jacques Rancière, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Alain Badiou.

scholarly journals The Strange Fruit of the Tree of Liberty: Lynch Law and Popular Sovereignty in the United States

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 819-834
Author(s):  
Michael Gorup
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
African Americans ◽  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Modern Democracy ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
The People ◽  
The Right

Lynch mobs regularly called on the language of popular sovereignty in their efforts to authorize lynchings, arguing that, as representatives of the people, they retained the right to wield public violence against persons they deemed beyond the protections of due process. Despite political theorists’ renewed interest in popular sovereignty, scholars have not accounted for this sordid history in their genealogies of modern democracy and popular constituent power. I remedy this omission, arguing that spectacle lynchings—ones that occurred in front of large crowds, sometimes numbering in the thousands—operated as public rituals of racialized people-making. In the wake of Reconstruction, when the boundaries of the polity were deeply contested, spectacle lynchings played a constitutive role in affirming and circulating the notion that the sovereign people were white, and that African Americans were their social subordinates.

scholarly journals Rousseau, theorist of constituent power

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Colon-Rios
Keyword(s):  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
The People ◽  
Careful Exploration ◽  
The One

© The Author 2016. Rousseau has always had an uncertain relationship with the theory of constituent power. On the one hand, his distrust of political representation and support for popular sovereignty seem consistent with the idea of the people as a legally unlimited constitution-maker. On the other hand, if, from those views about representation and sovereignty, it follows that Rousseau is a proponent of direct democracy, then there seems to be no place in his thought for a theory that presupposes, above all, a separation between those who exercise a delegated authority (eg legislators) and those who possess an original constitution-making power (the people). In a legal order in which all laws must be directly made by the people, such a separation is absent: the constituent and the legislative body are one and the same. It is therefore not surprising that Rousseau's name is largely absent from contemporary literature on constituent power. In this article, however, I will show that once Rousseau's particular conception of law, as well as his distinction between sovereignty and government, are properly understood, one finds in his work not only the first major formulation of the theory of constituent power, but also a careful exploration of its implications for actual constitutional practice.

scholarly journals The Principle of Constituency of Peoples: An Obstacle to the Achievement of Popular Sovereignty in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3(16)) ◽  
pp. 323-350
Author(s):  
Dženeta Omerdić
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Bosnia And Herzegovina ◽  
State Government ◽  
State Level ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
The People ◽  
Democratic Authority ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Dayton Agreement

Before the socio-political communities are posted, a very demanding task of defining the subject on whose name will behalf political power is implemented over a given state territory. However, the question about the subject of sovereignty should in no case be misunderstood as an issue of simply theoretical approach. The level of a state’s democracy, as well as its ability to realize internal and external sovereignty, depends entirely on fact: does the power belong to the People and whether it derives from the People. In other words, the issue of popular sovereignty is a substantial, constitutive element of modern democratic states. When we speak about contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, the functionality of the entire state government is often hindered by the complex decision-making processes at all state levels which lead to obstruction of the entire decision-making process. Such a dysfunctional decision-making process on the state level poses a threat and disables the Bosnian plural society to respond to the modern challenges of a democratic functioning state. The legal nature of Bosnian society is determined by the existence of constituent people who have “usurped” the entire decision-making process. There is still no end in sight to the struggle that leads to an oligarchy of the ruling elites; furthermore, there is still no appropriate socio-political mechanism that will enhance the accountability of the representatives to their voters; it is still inconceivable that decisions of state authorities are effectively and consistently implemented throughout the national territory. In other words, there is still no appropriate mechanism that will enhance the principle of popular sovereignty. It is necessary to “offer” Bosnia and Herzegovina’s pluralism and its political tradition a form of democratic authority which in no way should be a cliché. Furthermore, it may not be one of the “copy-paste” models of democratic authority. Currently, citizens of B&H are completely suspended (de facto, there are only citizens of entities). In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs are suspended, while in the Republika Srpska, Bosniacs and Croats cannot equally participate in the decision-making process. An unfinished process of implementation of the Dayton Agreement and, in particular, Annex 4 (the Constitution of B&H), whose provisions permit discrimination against the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the impossibility of the realization of the principle of equality in the exercise of universal suffrage), as well as the non-application of the Decision of the European Court of Human Rights contributes and is conducive to further segmentation of Bosnian society.

The essence of democracy

1915 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilhelm Hasbach
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Social Democracy ◽  
The State ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Active Citizenship ◽  
Political Democracy ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
The People ◽  
European Science

Mr. W. J. Shepard, in a review of my work, Die moderne Demokratie, remarks that I have forgotten its spirit in the study of its forms. “It is not the vitalizing spirit,” he writes, “the impelling motive force, the broadly based popular sentiment of democracy that is of interest, but only the forms and mechanism ‥‥ of democratic-republican states.” Now I have in the fifth chapter of the second book presented the theory of political democracy, in the sixth that of social democracy, and in the seventh that of democratic socialism; and in the first of these three chapters I have discussed popular sovereignty and active citizenship, the supremacy of the majority in a democracy, the unlimited constituent power of the people (pouvoir constituant), in which European science has conceived the essence of this form of the state to reside in contradistinction to other forms. But Mr. Shepard has a different conception of its nature. He has raised an interesting question in this connection which I should like to discuss in the following pages.Brief though his statement on this point is, no one can doubt that he considers the supremacy of public opinion as the essence of democracy, since he writes: “No discussion of the nature, elements and effects of public opinion, no appreciation of the spirit of democracy is to be found in the covers of this volume.” As a matter of fact I have treated of this subject in the above-mentioned first division of the fifth chapter, which is devoted to the discussion of popular sovereignty, though certainly in the brief compass which appeared to me sufficient for the understanding of the nature of democracy.

scholarly journals Rousseau, theorist of constituent power

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Colon-Rios
Keyword(s):  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
The People ◽  
Careful Exploration ◽  
The One

© The Author 2016. Rousseau has always had an uncertain relationship with the theory of constituent power. On the one hand, his distrust of political representation and support for popular sovereignty seem consistent with the idea of the people as a legally unlimited constitution-maker. On the other hand, if, from those views about representation and sovereignty, it follows that Rousseau is a proponent of direct democracy, then there seems to be no place in his thought for a theory that presupposes, above all, a separation between those who exercise a delegated authority (eg legislators) and those who possess an original constitution-making power (the people). In a legal order in which all laws must be directly made by the people, such a separation is absent: the constituent and the legislative body are one and the same. It is therefore not surprising that Rousseau's name is largely absent from contemporary literature on constituent power. In this article, however, I will show that once Rousseau's particular conception of law, as well as his distinction between sovereignty and government, are properly understood, one finds in his work not only the first major formulation of the theory of constituent power, but also a careful exploration of its implications for actual constitutional practice.

Editors’ Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Matilda Arvidsson ◽  
Leila Brännström ◽  
Panu Minkkinen
Keyword(s):  
Political Authority ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
The People ◽  
Constitutional Thought

The notion ‘constituent power’ is an answer to the question about the origins of the constitution and the legal order. Within democratic-constitutional thought, it expresses the conviction that power is ultimately vested in an entity known as ‘the people’ which is the fundamental source of all political authority. Accordingly, a constitution is deemed legitimate only if ‘the people’ has both created it and continues to endorse it....

Beyond the People

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoran Oklopcic
Keyword(s):  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The People ◽  
Sovereign Equality ◽  
Collective Self ◽  
The One ◽  
Canonical Texts ◽  
Point Of Departure

Who is ‘the people’? How does it exercise its power? When is the people entitled to exercise its rights? From where does that people derive its authority? What is the meaning of its self-government in a democratic constitutional order? For the most part, scholars approach these questions from their disciplinary perspectives, with the help of canonical texts, and in the context of ongoing theoretical debates. Beyond the People is a systematic and comprehensive, yet less disciplinarily disciplined study that confronts the same questions, texts, and debates in a new way. Its point of departure is simple and intuitive. A sovereign people is the work of a theoretical imagination, always shaped by the assumptions, aspirations, and anticipations of a particular theorist-imaginer. To look beyond the people is to confront them directly, by exploring the ways in which theorists script, stage, choreograph, record, and otherwise evoke the scenes, actors, actions, and events that permit us to speak intelligibly—and often enthusiastically—about the ideals of popular sovereignty, self-determination, constituent power, ultimate authority, sovereign equality, and collective self-government. What awaits beyond these ideals is a new set of images, and a different way to understand the perennial Who? What? Where? When? and How? questions—not as the suggestions about how best to understand these concepts, but rather as the oblique and increasingly costly ways of not asking the one we probably should: What, more specifically, do we need them for?

Three arenas of struggle: A contextual approach to the constituent power of ‘the people’

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZORAN OKLOPCIC
Keyword(s):  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Contextual Approach ◽  
Political Struggle ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Moral Hazards ◽  
The People ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
The Will

AbstractAgainst recent contributions to the debate about the constituent power of the people, the article proposes to reorient the debate by analytically distinguishing three dominant arenas of political struggle – democratic, social and national – in which the vocabulary of ‘the people’ and its constituent power is invoked. The invocation of the ‘will of the people’ and its constituent power in these arenas is associated with different assumptions, risks and implicit ideational trade-offs that must be laid bare. A contextual approach to constituent power counsels caution in dignifying pro-democratic constitutional transformations with the name of ‘the people’. It invites those who theorize constituent power with social struggles in mind to rebalance their attention to constituent power – and devote more attention to imaginaries and strategies that minimize moral hazards implicit in the vocabulary of peoplehood and to maximize the likelihood of the new order’s survival. Finally, a contextual approach rejects the role for constituent power in national struggles, arguing that constitutional theory is incapable of arbitrating between competing assertions of popular sovereignty. In the final part of the paper, I defend the contextual approach against the theoretical interventions currently on offer, and gesture towards its potential in crafting aprovincializedconstitutional theory.

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