Voting after the change: A natural experiment on the effect of electoral reform on party system fragmentation

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-286
Author(s):  
Pedro Riera

This article analyses the causal effect of the 1993 electoral reform in New Zealand on party system fragmentation using the ‘synthetic’ control method. Previous studies using cross-national evidence suggest that electoral reforms change the number of parties. However, they do not take into account possible endogeneity problems and usually focus on their short-term effects. Since the electoral system in use in this country before the change was first past the post (FPTP), I can create a ‘synthetic’ control democracy that had the same institutional framework but did not modify the rules of the game. The results indicate that the electoral reform produced the expected effects on party system size at the electoral level, but that these effects tended to disappear in the long run. In contrast, electoral system effects at the legislative level were larger and stickier over time.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Mahmoud Mahgoub

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of using proportional representation system on the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system within the period from 1997 to 2017, in which Algeria has experienced five legislative elections regularly every five years by testing a hypothesis about adopting the proportional representation system on the basis of the closed list during the foregoing legislative elections has obviously influenced the exacerbation of the Algerian party system’s fragmentation, compared to other factors. Design/methodology/approach The essence of the theoretical framework of this study is to address the effect of the electoral system as an independent variable on the party system as a dependent variable. The starting point for that framework is to reassess the “Duverger’s law,” which appeared since the early 1950s and has influenced the foregoing relationship, and then to review the literature on a new phase that tried to provide a more accurate mechanism for determining the number of parties and their relative weight, whether in terms of electoral votes or parliamentary seats. This means that researchers began to use a measure called the effective number of parties (ENP) for Laakso and Taagepera since 1979. The study elaborates the general concepts of the electoral system and the party system. It used Laakso, Taagepera index of the “ENP” to measure the phenomenon of fragmentation party during the five legislative elections from 1997 to 2017 in Algeria. Findings The results of the study reveal that the proportional representation electoral system – beside other factors – had clear impacts on the fragmentation of the Algerian party system by all standards, whether on the level of the apparent rise in the number of the parties represented in the Algerian parliament from 10 parties in 1997 election to 36 parties in 2017 election or according to the index of Laakso and Taagepera (ENP). The average number of effective number of electoral parties in the five elections was around 7.66, and the average number of effective number of parliamentary parties in the five elections was around 4.39, which puts Algeria in an advanced degree of the fragmentation of the party system. Originality/value This study about the phenomenon of the fragmentation of the party system, which is one of the new subjects in the field of comparative politics – globally and in the Arab world. Hence, the value of this study aims to shed light on this mysterious area of science, the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system during the period from 1997 to 2017.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48
Author(s):  
Ekaterina R. Rashkova ◽  
Yen-Pin Su

AbstractStudies of party system size have looked at institutional and sociological factors in their attempt to explain what determines the number of parties. While some recent studies contend that party laws, beyond the district magnitude, have a significant impact on, among others, new party entry, we know very little about whether certain rules matter more in some societies than they do in others. In this paper, we study the extent to which various party finance rules affect party system size and differentiate the effect between new and established democracies. Specifically, we focus on direct and indirect public subsidization and limits on private donation and campaign expenditure. We hypothesize that compared to established countries, new democracies tend to have a larger party system size when the political finance rules create more equal conditions for electoral competition. Using data from 43 Europe democracies, the empirical analyses support our hypothesis.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 744-760 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER KAM ◽  
ANTHONY M. BERTELLI ◽  
ALEXANDER HELD

Electoral accountability requires that voters have the ability to constrain the incumbent government’s policy-making power. We express the necessary conditions for this claim as an accountability identity in which the electoral system and the party system interact to shape the accountability of parliamentary governments. Data from 400 parliamentary elections between 1948 and 2012 show that electoral accountability is contingent on the party system’s bipolarity, for example, with parties arrayed in two distinct blocs. Proportional electoral systems achieve accountability as well as majoritarian ones when bipolarity is strong but not when it is weak. This is because bipolarity decreases the number of connected coalitions that incumbent parties can join to preserve their policy-making power. Our results underscore the limitations that party systems place on electoral reform and the benefits that bipolarity offers for clarifying voters’ choices and intensifying electoral competition.


2003 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Santiso ◽  
Augustin Loada

The parliamentary elections of May 2002 in Burkina Faso saw the ruling party loose its exclusionary grip on power. For the first time since the restoration of democracy in 1991, the parliamentary opposition now represents a sizeable group. While it retains the majority, the ruling party has to share legislative power with the opposition. These elections marginally alter the structure of power in a deeply presidential system of government. Several institutional and electoral reforms have played a critical role in strengthening the mechanisms of ‘vertical accountability’ and representative democracy. By assessing recent electoral reforms in Burkina Faso, the article underlines the importance of the electoral system in multiparty elections and thus contributes to our understanding of the effects of changes in electoral rules on the distribution of political outcomes. In particular, it underscores the contribution that institutional engineering and electoral reform can make to further democratisation in a semi-authoritarian context. While many challenges to democratic governance and the rule of law remain, the new political landscape holds the promise of changes in the style of government and the emergence of more consensual modes of governance.


Author(s):  
Daniel Bochsler

Most research on electoral systems deals with the effects of institutions on political representation. However, political parties design the electoral systems, and thereby navigate between self-interest and multiple, often nonreconcilable normative ideals. This chapter reviews the growing literature on the choice of electoral systems from different perspectives. Structural theories explain that the choice of electoral systems is closely linked to the history of suffrage extensions, cultural heterogeneity and the organization of the economy. Agency-based theories highlight how parliamentary majorities strategically pass electoral reforms in order to consolidate their power in the long run—for instance, in order to avoid future losses in elections. However, often lawmakers fail to predict their electoral fortunes and therefore pass reforms that turn out not to be in their favor, or they even contribute to undermining their own reforms later with strategic maneuvers. Finally, the chapter analyzes the choice of electoral system in the context of transitions toward democracies and in former colonies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-32
Author(s):  
Darren C Choi

A persistent yet understudied aspect of Alberta’s “quasi-party system” is the role of the electoral system. While many authors have rightly pointed out that a majoritarian single-member plurality system has helped Alberta’s ruling parties produce disproportionate majorities, the province has not always operated under this electoral arrangement. From 1926 until 1955, Alberta had a “hybrid” system, consisting of the Single Transferable Vote in multi-member constituencies in Edmonton and Calgary and the Alternative Vote in single-member constituencies in the rest of Alberta. This unusual attempt at electoral reform played an important role in the dominance of the United Farmers of Alberta and the early Social Credit Party (until 1955). AV acted as an essentially majoritarian system in rural Alberta, producing statistically indistinguishable results from FPTP. This contrasts the Albertan case with other attempts at implementing the Alternative Vote. On the other hand, STV benefited the UFA and Social Credit in two distinct ways. STV increasing proportionality in Edmonton and Calgary, as it has in many other jurisdictions. However, due the hybrid system, the urban opposition in Edmonton and Calgary to the UFA was fragmented by a proportional system like STV. Social Credit, with its larger urban base, used STV to maximize its urban vote through a process of voter transfers. Finally, rural malapportionment is a key feature in both the hybrid system and the subsequent return to single-member plurality. Rural seats, operating under both AV and FPTP, have been the electoral bedrock for Alberta’s long lived political dynasties. The unique case of Alberta’s hybrid electoral system serves as an important potential case study in debates surrounding electoral reform in Canada and around the world.   Please be aware that a revision to this article was submitted on April 30, 2021. Therefore, there may be some differences between the online version of this submission and the print version.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Huan-Ming Zhang ◽  
Rui-Qi Ma ◽  
Meng-Xiang Deng ◽  
Xian-Bei Liu

This article aims at the evaluation and improvement of the development of higher education. First of all, according to the theory and hypothesis, the comprehensive evaluation index system of higher education development level is established. The TOPSIS and the combination weighting method based on goal programming are used to measure the scores of higher education development levels of 19 major countries in the world in the recent 20 years, and the horizontal and vertical comparative analysis is carried out. Then, according to the practical feasibility, Turkey is selected as the target country to propose a higher education development and improvement policy by 2030, and the causal effect of our proposed policy is estimated using the synthetic control method. This study can provide a reference for other countries in the world to improve their higher education level.


Author(s):  
Kristof Jacobs

The Netherlands has one of the most proportional electoral systems in the world. This chapter details the origins, functioning, and effects of the Dutch electoral system. After providing the historical background of the electoral system, the chapter discusses the allocation of seats both to parties and to candidates and gives practical examples. Afterward, the chapter outlines the effects of the electoral system on the party system, the parties themselves, the composition of the parliament, and the government formation. Lastly, the chapter covers historical and more recent electoral reform debates. It turns out that in the Netherlands, electoral reform is a Sisyphean task: because of the low electoral threshold, electoral reform is always on the table, but given the broad coalitions and rigid constitution, reform attempts typically fail, and the reform discussions have to start all over again.


2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Centellas

This research note considers the effects of electoral system reform in Bolivia. In 1995, Bolivia moved from a list-proportional to a mixed-member proportional electoral system. The intervening years saw growing regional polarization of politics and a collapse of the existing party system. Using statistical analysis of disaggregated electoral data (at department, municipality, and district level), this paper tests whether electoral system reforms may have contributed to the current political crisis. Research findings show that regional cleavages existed prior to electoral system reform, but suggest that reforms aggravated their effects. Such evidence gives reason to question the recent popularity of mixed-member proportionality.


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