scholarly journals Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 477-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Bolle
Keyword(s):  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
General Rules ◽  
The Us ◽  
Sequential Voting ◽  
Us Senate

In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting against the ‘true majority’ . If voting is sequential as in the roll call votes of the US Senate then, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the ‘true majority’ prevails. It is shown that the result for sequential voting holds also with different weights of voters (shareholders), with multiple necessary majorities (European Union decision-making), or even more general rules. Simultaneous voting in the general model has more differentiated results.

scholarly journals Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Bolle ◽  
Philipp E. Otto
Keyword(s):  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Sequential Voting ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria

AbstractWhen including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium strategy guaranteeing true majority results. Simultaneous voting suffers from a plethora of equilibria, often contradicting true majorities. Experimental results, however, show severe deviations from the equilibrium strategy in sequential voting with not significantly more true majority results than in simultaneous voting. Social considerations under sequential voting—based on emotional reactions toward the behaviors of the previous players—seem to distort subgame perfect equilibria.

scholarly journals Estimating Spatial Preferences from Votes and Text

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
In Song Kim ◽  
John Londregan ◽  
Marc Ratkovic
Keyword(s):  
Factor Model ◽  
Choice Model ◽  
Vote Choice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Gaussian Copula ◽  
Leadership Roles ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Senate ◽  
Reliable Preference

We introduce a model that extends the standard vote choice model to encompass text. In our model, votes and speech are generated from a common set of underlying preference parameters. We estimate the parameters with a sparse Gaussian copula factor model that estimates the number of latent dimensions, is robust to outliers, and accounts for zero inflation in the data. To illustrate its workings, we apply our estimator to roll call votes and floor speech from recent sessions of the US Senate. We uncover two stable dimensions: one ideological and the other reflecting to Senators’ leadership roles. We then show how the method can leverage common speech in order to impute missing data, recovering reliable preference estimates for rank-and-file Senators given only leadership votes.

DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE

2000 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 83-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
JÖRG OECHSSLER ◽  
KARL H. SCHLAG
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Evolutionary Analysis ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Learning Dynamics ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
Almost All ◽  
First Mover

Bagwell (1995) considered a simple Stackelberg-type game in which one player benefits from the other's ability to observe his move, assuming they play the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. He showed that introducing noise in the observability of the move eliminates that equilibrium, and thus the advantage. Van Damme and Hurkens (1997) objected that the noisy game also has a mixed strategy equilibrium close to the pure strategy one Bagwell had eliminated. However, we analyse the noisy game with a wide variety of evolutionary and learning dynamics, and find that almost all admit the no-first-mover-advantage equilibrium as a possible outcome, and often they select it uniquely.

scholarly journals Backward Induction in the Wild? Evidence from Sequential Voting in the US Senate

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (7) ◽  
pp. 1971-2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg L. Spenkuch ◽  
B. Pablo Montagnes ◽  
Daniel B. Magleby
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Alphabetical Order ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
The Us ◽  
In The Wild ◽  
Sequential Voting ◽  
Us Senate

In the US Senate, roll calls are held in alphabetical order. We document that senators early in the order are less likely to vote with the majority of their own party than those whose last name places them at the end of the alphabet. To speak to the mechanism behind this result, we develop a simple model of sequential voting, in which forward-looking senators rely on backward induction in order to free ride on their colleagues. Estimating our model structurally, we find that this form of strategic behavior is an important part of equilibrium play. We also consider, but ultimately dismiss, alternative explanations related to learning about common values and vote buying. (JEL D72, D82, D83)

The Party or the Purse? Unequal Representation in the US Senate

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 917-940 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEFFREY R. LAX ◽  
JUSTIN H. PHILLIPS ◽  
ADAM ZELIZER
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Lower Income ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Us Senate ◽  
Do So

Recent work on US policymaking argues that responsiveness to public opinion is distorted by money, in that the preferences of the rich matter much more than those of lower-income Americans. A second distortion—partisan biases in responsiveness—has been less well studied and is often ignored or downplayed in the literature on affluent influence. We are the first to evaluate, in tandem, these two potential distortions in representation. We do so using 49 Senate roll-call votes from 2001 to 2015. We find that affluent influence is overstated and itself contingent on partisanship—party trumps the purse when senators have to take sides. The poor get what they want more often from Democrats. The rich get what they want more often from Republicans, but only if Republican constituents side with the rich. Thus, partisanship induces, shapes, and constrains affluent influence.

FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES

Fractals ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (04) ◽  
pp. 1450016 ◽  
Author(s):  
KIMMO BERG ◽  
MITRI KITTI
Keyword(s):  
Hausdorff Dimension ◽  
Fractal Geometry ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Iterated Function Systems ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Iterated Function ◽  
Graph Presentation ◽  
Perfect Monitoring

This paper examines the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs in discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. It is shown that the equilibrium payoffs can be identified as sub-self-affine sets or graph-directed iterated function systems. We propose a method to estimate the Hausdorff dimension of the equilibrium payoffs and relate it to the equilibrium paths and their graph presentation.

Long-Term Consequences of Election Results

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Fowler ◽  
Andrew B. Hall
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
The Us ◽  
Long Term Consequences ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Us Senate ◽  
Over Time

Voters in US elections receive markedly different representation depending on which candidate they elect, and because of incumbent advantages, the effects of this choice persist for many years. What are the long-term consequences of these two phenomena? Combining electoral and legislative roll-call data in a dynamic regression discontinuity design, this study assesses the long-term consequences of election results for representation. Across the US House, the US Senate and state legislatures, the effects of ‘coin-flip’ elections persist for at least a decade in all settings, and for as long as three decades in some. Further results suggest that elected officials do not adapt their roll-call voting to their districts’ preferences over time, and that voters do not systematically respond by replacing incumbents.

GRG: KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY USING INFORMATION GENERALIZATION, INFORMATION REDUCTION, AND RULE GENERATION

1996 ◽  
Vol 05 (01n02) ◽  
pp. 99-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
NING SHAN ◽  
HOWARD J. HAMILTON ◽  
NICK CERCONE
Keyword(s):  
Information System ◽  
Knowledge Discovery ◽  
Relational Databases ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Reduction Technique ◽  
Second Step ◽  
Rule Generation ◽  
Information Reduction ◽  
General Rules ◽  
Minimal Subset

We present the three-step GRG approach for learning decision rules from large relational databases. In the first step, an attribute-oriented concept tree ascen sion technique is applied to generalize an information system. This step loses some information but substantially improves the efficiency of the following steps. In the second step, a reduction technique is applied to generate a minimalized information system called a reduct which contains a minimal subset of the generalized attributes and the smallest number of distinct tuples for those attributes. Finally, a set of maximally general rules are derived directly from the reduct. These rules can be used to interpret and understand the active mechanisms underlying the database.

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