scholarly journals German board-level employee representation in multinational companies: Patterns of transnational articulation

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Rosenbohm ◽  
Thomas Haipeter
Keyword(s):  
Decisive Role ◽  
Multinational Companies ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Works Councils ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
Power Resources ◽  
Strategic Approach ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
National Power ◽  
Board Level

We investigate codetermination on German supervisory boards of multinational companies and pose two questions. First, under what conditions does board-level representation constitute a power resource for employee representatives? Second, how does board-level representation articulate with European Works Councils? We conclude that factors related to corporate structure – head office location, the level at which supervisory boards are established – play a decisive role in determining the power resources available to employee representatives. Articulation with European Works Councils depends on the adoption of a strategic approach whereby German employee representatives deploy the power resources derived from national codetermination rights at the transnational level, or use the mechanisms of transnational employee representation to compensate where such national power resources are lacking.

Works Councils:

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Gumbrell‐McCormick ◽  
Richard Hyman
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Health And Safety ◽  
Works Councils ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
Work Related ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Safety Committees ◽  
Board Level

This article focuses on works councils, adopting the definition of Rogers and Streeck. It is concerned with countries with generalized systems of representation – where participation structures exist largely independently of management wishes – and not with those where representative bodies may be established voluntarily through localized management initiatives. The article also limits attention to bodies with the capacity to discuss a broad agenda of employment- and work-related issues; this means, for example, that the statutory health and safety committees, which exist in many countries without works councils, are ignored. On this definition, works councils are almost exclusively a phenomenon of continental Western Europe, and the article discusses why this is the case. Its focus is specifically on national institutions; it does not examine the one instance of mandatory supranational structures: European Works Councils. Nor does the article consider board-level employee representation.

The Economic Consequences of One-third Co-determination in German Supervisory Boards

2011 ◽  
Vol 231 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Franziska Boneberg
Keyword(s):  
Service Sector ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Legal Form ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
Board Level

SummaryIn Germany, the establishment of supervisory boards and, therefore, the board-level employee representation are mandatory, depending on the legal form and size of a company. However, the empirical analysis reveals that the bigger part of the companies observed (Limited liability companies with 500 to 2000 employees active in the West-German service sector) does not satisfy the law. This fact has strong impact on research questions in the co-determination field: Many studies have tried to analyze the economic consequences of the German co-determination laws (all examining the 1976 Co-determination Act). However, as the regulations are compulsory, compelling results are difficult to obtain. The bigger part of the studies compares companies that fall into the scope of different co-determination laws. This implies that mainly big companies are contrasted to smaller ones. It is not difficult to see that a comparison of such kind entails further irregularities. The study presented allows better analysis. The data is taken from two sources: the commercial Hoppenstedt Database and official German statistics. Due to the special kind of data it is possible to compare companies of same size, same legal form, active in the same sector that only differ in the existence or non-existence of a supervisory board. Therefore, the study at hand provides more accurate evidence of the economic consequences of the German 2004 Co-determination Act.

Board-level employee representation in the Visegrád countries

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Zybała
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
National Level ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Class ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
Policy Paradigm ◽  
Labour Participation ◽  
Board Level ◽  
Practical Agenda ◽  
Visegrád Countries

This article addresses the complexity of trade-union approaches to board-level employee representation in the Visegrád countries, and the barriers it faces in particular national settings. Trade unionists in these countries accept the relevance of such employee representation in theory, but their practical agenda covers other issues which they perceive as more important as they struggle to survive at many levels of activity, and face growing existential uncertainty and risk. Unions also lack capacity to overcome obstacles such as reluctance on the part of the political class and managerial hostility to board-level representation; they cannot exert influence on major policy decisions at national level. They are operating in a more and more difficult environment, reflecting not merely a declining membership base, but also the recent economic crisis that failed to change the economic policy paradigm in the Visegrád countries: policies there still rely on a neoliberal approach and hence are not conducive to labour participation. What can still be seen as the predominant model is the traditional one of the market economy in which rights of ownership reign supreme.

What Russia Can Teach Us about Power and Influence in World Politics

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-167
Author(s):  
Andrei Melville ◽  
Andrei Akhremenko ◽  
Mikhail Mironyuk
Keyword(s):  
World Order ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Political Community ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
Major Power ◽  
Power Resources ◽  
Western Democracy ◽  
The World ◽  
National Power ◽  
Distribution Of Power

There is a striking opposition within the current discourse on Russia’s position in the world. On the one hand, there are well-known arguments about Russia’s “weak hand” (relatively small and stagnating economy, vulnerability to sanctions, technological backwardness, deteriorating demography, corruption, bad institutions, etc.). On the other hand, Russia is accused of “global revisionism”, attempts to reshape and undermine the liberal world order, and Western democracy itself. There seems to be a paradox: Russia with a perceived decline of major resources of national power, exercises dramatically increased international influence. This paradox of power and/or influence is further explored. This paper introduces a new complex Index of national power. On the basis of ratings of countries authors compare the dynamics of distribution of power in the world with a focus on Russia’s national power in world politics since 1995. The analysis brings evidence that the cumulative resources of Russia’s power in international affairs did not increase during the last two decades. However, Russia’s influence in world politics has significantly increased as demonstrated by assertive foreign policy in different parts of the world and its perception by the international political community and the public. Russia remains a major power in today’s world, although some of its power resources are stagnating or decreasing in comparison to the US and rising China. To compensate for weaknesses Russia is using both traditional and nontraditional capabilities of international influence.

Corporate Governance, Employee Voice and the Interests of Employees: The Broken Promise of a ‘World Leading Package of Corporate Reforms’

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Villiers
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Employee Motivation ◽  
Employee Voice ◽  
Corporate Value ◽  
Workplace Democracy ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
Union Representation ◽  
Board Level

Abstract Following a series of corporate governance scandals which involved exploitative treatment of workers, reforms were introduced to the UK’s corporate governance system in 2018, presented both as an attempt to rebuild trust and to afford a stronger voice for workers in that system. This paper explores the new landscape from a workers’ voice and protection perspective. It highlights that, while corporate governance has a role in ensuring workers’ needs are met, there is a tension between the goals of any reforms in this territory: board-level employee representation could be seen as a way of democratising the economy and valuing the part played by labour in that process, but it could also be seen as a way of increasing corporate value, economic performance or employee motivation, and disregarding the implications for labour. It is argued in this paper that worker protection requires a more genuine workplace democracy with full involvement of trade union representation. This would also help to broaden the corporate governance framework’s horizon towards a more genuine stakeholder vision beyond the existing tokenistic legal and regulatory nods in that direction.

scholarly journals Explaining cross-national variation in workplace employee representation

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Forth ◽  
Alex Bryson ◽  
Anitha George
Keyword(s):  
Trade Union ◽  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Employment Relations ◽  
Works Councils ◽  
Eu Countries ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
Legislative Support ◽  
Cross National

Debates on the desirability of workplace employee representation are rarely evidence based. We use a workplace survey covering 27 EU countries to show that its incidence is strongly and independently correlated with the degree of centralization in a country’s industrial relations regime and the extent of legislative support. Industry profits are important in explaining trade union presence but are unimportant in the case of works councils. We find support for the exit-voice model, traditionally associated with Anglophone regimes, whereby worker representation is associated with poorer perceptions of the employment relations climate and with lower voluntary quit rates.

Employee Rights and Labour Relations in Central and Eastern Europe

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 343-356
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Skorupinska
Keyword(s):  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
Central And Eastern Europe ◽  
Economic Recession ◽  
Employee Rights ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Works Councils ◽  
Labour Relations ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
New Form

Transformation of economies in Central and Eastern Europe countries has not been accompanied by sufficient guarantees for social dimension. Following that, the economic recession has particularly badly affected these countries. However, well-functioning social dialogue and regulated labour relations with well developed employee rights are the very bases of social guarantees. The analysis carried out in this paper leads to a conclusion that employee representation in workplaces in Central and Eastern Europe is still trade unions’ domain, in spite of the 2002 Directive’s implementation and (in general) dual system of worker representation in these countries. Initially, trade unions were afraid of the competition from works councils. With the passing of time, they toned down their inimical attitude towards these institutions. However, employees have not completely accepted the new form of worker participation yet and the number of works councils in these countries is still relatively small.

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