From Veto Players to Agenda-Setters?

National parliaments (NPs) had long been excluded from the European integration process and were in many Member States at best kept informed and rarely involved in daily EU affairs. With the Lisbon Treaty and its introduction of the Early Warning System (EWS), as well as the Political Dialogue initiated by former Commission President Barroso, NPs have now become full actors in the EU. Through the Political Dialogue, they can express their opinion on the Commission Annual Work Programme and influence the Commission's agenda. Now, through control of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity, and provided that their reasoned opinions attain the defined thresholds, they can potentially strike down an existing proposal. However the EWS leads to NPs still being constrained to a limited, reactive role: as ‘quasi veto-players' and not one of ‘agenda-setter’. Recent developments in favour of the introduction of a ‘green card’ would change this situation profoundly as NPs would eventually be able to prompt the Commission to make legislative proposals on their behalf. This article sheds light on the evolving role of NPs in EU policymaking from the Lisbon Treaty onwards, from veto players to proactive institutions committed to the good functioning of the EU.

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Actions Speak Louder Than Words? The Untapped Potential of V4 Parliaments in EU Affairs

East European Politics and Societies and Cultures ◽

10.1177/08883254211012770 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 088832542110127

Author(s):

Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka ◽

Jan Grinc

Keyword(s):

Early Warning System ◽

Warning System ◽

Veto Players ◽

The Political ◽

Political Dialogue ◽

Eu Policy ◽

Green Card ◽

Policy Ideas ◽

Policy Making Process ◽

The Eu

This article offers the first ever comparative analysis of the involvement of V4 parliaments in the sphere of European Union (EU) affairs. Its underlying research objective is to determine what conditions V4’s parliamentary participation in various EU-oriented activities such as domestic scrutiny of the government’s EU policy, the political dialogue with the Commission, the Early Warning System for subsidiarity control, and the green card initiative. Based on the actual scrutiny output, parliamentary minutes, and data from questionnaires, we address the questions: (1) To what extent domestic legislatures act as autonomous as opposed to government-supporting actors in these arenas? (2) Do they mostly act as EU veto players, or try to contribute constructively to the EU policy-making process by bringing alternative policy ideas? (3) What are their motivations for engaging in direct dialogue with EU institutions in addition to domestic scrutiny? and (4) How MPs envisage their own EU-oriented roles? While the article reveals that V4 parliaments mostly act as gatekeepers in the sphere of EU affairs, it also casts a new light on the previous literature findings related to the EU-oriented performance of the Czech and Polish lower chambers. We conclude that, generally, V4 parliaments refrain from fully exploiting their relatively strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs—a fact that can be partly explained by the composition of their ruling majorities.

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National Parliaments in Subsidiarity Review: From Guardians to Partners

Statute Law Review ◽

10.1093/slr/hmy001 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 40 (3) ◽

pp. 287-299

Author(s):

Oxana Pimenova

Keyword(s):

Legislative Process ◽

National Parliaments ◽

Green Card ◽

Better Regulation ◽

Legislative Proposals ◽

Subsidiarity Principle ◽

Working Together ◽

Political Value ◽

Law Making ◽

The Eu

Abstract With a clear emphasis on substantive political value that national legislatures are able to bring to the EU legislative process, this paper attempts to overcome skepticism about deepening national parliaments’ direct involvement in the decision-making process at the European level. The role of national parliaments in advancing their subsidiarity concerns within European law-making may be strengthened through a more intensive political dialogue with the Commission, when the former acts not just as the ‘guardians’ of the subsidiarity principle (in the framework of the existing yellow and orange card schemes) but also as active contributors to the law-making process encouraging the Commission to leverage the so-called green card procedure. Complemented by the yellow and orange card provisions, it forms a three-element subsidiarity review mechanism perfectly capable of dealing with subsidiarity concerns of national parliaments at various stages of the EU law-making process, thus transforming the chambers from wardens into partners working together with the Commission to reshape EU legislative proposals for the sake of better regulation.

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Subsidiarity: Bridging the gap between the ideal and reality

European View ◽

10.1177/1781685819838449 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 18 (1) ◽

pp. 26-36 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Reinhold Lopatka

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

The Political ◽

Legislative Process ◽

The European Union ◽

Political Dialogue ◽

Green Card ◽

Eu Legislation ◽

Local Stakeholders ◽

The Eu ◽

The Ideal

There is no alternative to the megaproject we call the ‘European Union’. But it could be brought much closer to the citizens of Europe by putting the principles of subsidiarity into effect in more practical ways. This requires greater involvement by national, regional and local stakeholders. Subsidiarity means less Europe where EU-level action would not add value, but more Europe where we need Europe-wide efforts. The new Austrian government wants to shape the EU in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. What can be done? How can national, regional and local authorities play a greater role in the legislative process? It would help if the member states could be given more time to examine whether new proposals for EU legislation conform to the principle of subsidiarity. This would mean extending the eight-week period that is currently allotted for carrying out these examinations. Directives should be preferred over regulations, and the use of delegated acts should be restricted. A ‘Green Card’ procedure could expand the political dialogue aimed at initiating new EU legislation. And efforts to improve EU legislation linked to subsidiarity should focus on reducing overregulation and bridging the gap between the ideal and the real.

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Is the role of national parliaments being strengthened in the EU? Early warning system after the Lisbon Treaty having come into force: Przemyslaw Paradowski

European Meetings ◽

10.3726/978-3-653-03309-0/6 ◽

2016 ◽

Keyword(s):

Early Warning ◽

Early Warning System ◽

Warning System ◽

Lisbon Treaty ◽

National Parliaments ◽

The Eu

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BRIEF CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EUROPEAN LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PASSERELLE CLAUSES

Agora International Journal of Juridical Sciences ◽

10.15837/aijjs.v11i1.3013 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

pp. 7-15

Author(s):

Mihaela Pătrăuș ◽

Darius-Dennis Pătrăuș

Keyword(s):

Lisbon Treaty ◽

National Parliaments ◽

Judicial Cooperation ◽

Legislative Procedures ◽

The Family ◽

Defence Policy ◽

European Policies ◽

Legislative Procedure ◽

Ordinary Legislative Procedure ◽

The Eu

The Lisbon Treaty in order to strengthen the EU's capacity to decide, to act and to ensure the legitimacy of decisions taken at the same time, reformed the decision-making process of the EU, particularly by changing the legislative procedures in force.Among the novelties of the Lisbon Treaty, we must mention the passerelle clauses, which according to the ordinary legislative procedure will be generalized, under certain conditions, in areas which were initially outside its scope.The treaty nominates two types of passerelle clauses: the general passerelle clause which applies to all European policies and the enabling of this clause will be authorized by a decision of the European Council, acting unanimously; the passerelle clauses specific to certain European policies (MFF, Common Security and Defence Policy, judicial cooperation regarding the family rights- this specific clause is the only one explaining which national parliaments keep their right to oppose; cooperation is strengthened in the areas governed by unanimity or by a special legislative procedure, social affairs, environmental ).The flexibility introduced through a significant number of passerelle clauses in the Lisbon Treaty allows adjustment of the EU quickly and efficiently, depending on punctual developments, without neglecting the guarantees on the sovereignty of member states.

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The political system of European Union after European Parliament Election of 2019

European Historical Studies ◽

10.17721/2524-048x.2019.14.15-30 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 15-30

Author(s):

Andrii Martynov

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

European Integration ◽

Political System ◽

European Parliament ◽

The Political ◽

The European Union ◽

National Parliaments ◽

Member States ◽

Eu Member States ◽

The Eu

The politics of the European Union are different from other organizations and states due to the unique nature of the EU. The common institutions mix the intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the EU. The EU treaties declare the EU to be based on representative democracy and direct elections take place to the European Parliament. The Parliament, together with the European Council, works for the legislative arm of the EU. The Council is composed of national governments thus representing the intergovernmental nature of the European Union. The central theme of this research is the influence of the European Union Political system the Results of May 2019 European Parliament Election. The EU supranational legislature plays an important role as a producer of legal norms in the process of European integration and parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the EU executive. The European Parliament, as a representative institution of the European Union, helps to overcome the stereotypical notions of a “Brussels bureaucracy” that limits the sovereignty of EU member states. The European Parliament is a political field of interaction between European optimists and European skeptics. The new composition of the European Parliament presents political forces focused on a different vision of the strategy and tactics of the European integration process. European federalists in the “European People’s Party” and “European Socialists and Democrats” consider the strategic prospect of creating a confederate “United States of Europe”. The Brexit withdrawal from the EU could help the federalists win over European skeptics. Critics of the supranational project of European integration do not have a majority in the new composition of the European Parliament. But they are widely represented in many national parliaments of EU Member States. The conflicting interaction between European liberals and far-right populists is the political backdrop for much debate in the European Parliament. The result of this process is the medium term development vector of the European Union.

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Subsidiarity as a Subject of Battle in European Union Politics

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1055 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Kees van Kersbergen ◽

Bertjan Verbeek

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Power Relations ◽

Political Process ◽

Maastricht Treaty ◽

Lisbon Treaty ◽

The Political ◽

The European Union ◽

Member States ◽

Over Time ◽

The Eu

Since the Maastricht Treaty (1993), subsidiarity has guided the political process surrounding the distribution of competences between administrative layers in the European Union (EU). The EU’s subsidiarity regime affects the politics and governance of the EU, because the notion of subsidiarity allows for continuous negotiation over its practical use. The constant battle over subsidiarity implies that the notion changes its meaning over time and alters the power relations between different actors within the EU. Since the Lisbon Treaty (2009), subsidiarity has mainly strengthened the position of member states at the expense of the Commission.

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National Parliaments and Constitutional Transformation in the EU. C. Hefftler et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union (Palgrave 2015). D. Jančić (ed.), National Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis (Oxford University Press 2017). A. Jonsson Cornell and M. Goldoni (eds.), National and Regional Parliaments in the EU-Legislative Procedure Post Lisbon (Hart Publishing 2017). N. Lupo and C. Fasone (eds.), Interparliamentary Cooperation in the Composite European Constitution (Hart Publishing 2016).

European Constitutional Law Review ◽

10.1017/s1574019617000281 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 13 (04) ◽

pp. 817-835 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Ben Crum

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Lisbon Treaty ◽

Euro Crisis ◽

The European Union ◽

National Parliaments ◽

European Constitution ◽

Oxford University ◽

Legislative Procedure ◽

The Eu ◽

Oxford University Press

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Politische Kartelle

Review of Economics ◽

10.1515/roe-2010-0301 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 61 (3) ◽

Author(s):

Wolf Schäfer

Keyword(s):

Political Competition ◽

Lisbon Treaty ◽

The Political ◽

Private Companies ◽

Supervisory Authority ◽

Eu Governance ◽

Subsidiarity Principle ◽

Political Agents ◽

Bail Out ◽

The Eu

SummaryThe article focuses on political cartels with special reference to the EU. It is argued that political cartels are harmful principally not less than are economic cartels of private companies because both impede or do away with competition. It is often argued that political cartels - contrary to economic cartels - are beneficial because political agents principally act benevolently. But, as is known, Public Choice and empiricism evidently tell the opposite: Politicians - like private agents - are self-interested agents. This is the reason for arguing that political cartels, by analogy to economic cartels, need a supervisory authority for sanctioning strategies against political competition in the EU. These strategies are manifold of which this article focuses on two: the late “rescue screen” for Greece (and the Euro) of May 2010 and the creeping tendency towards harmonization and centralization in the EU-governance.It is argued that the rescue package is pure political cartelizing at the disadvantage of the European tax payer to whom - off from the creditor banks - the risk of ultimately paying the bill for insolvent countries is transferred. This has been done by neglecting especially article 125 of the Lisbon-Treaty which strictly outlaws to bail out encumbered countries. Contrary to the political agents’ official announcements that there was “no alternative” to their rescue package, in this article some incentivecompatible non-cartel alternatives are presented.The political cartelization implied in the creeping tendency towards harmonization and centralization in the EU is controversial to the application and enforcement of the basic principle of subsidiarity in the Lisbon-Treaty. It is argued that a supervisory authority (“Senate for Political Competition”) should be established to control political cartelization in the EU as regards their doing away with political competition by neglecting the essential subsidiarity principle.

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