National Parliaments in Subsidiarity Review: From Guardians to Partners

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-299
Author(s):  
Oxana Pimenova
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Process ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Green Card ◽  
Better Regulation ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Subsidiarity Principle ◽  
Working Together ◽  
Political Value ◽  
Law Making ◽  
The Eu

Abstract With a clear emphasis on substantive political value that national legislatures are able to bring to the EU legislative process, this paper attempts to overcome skepticism about deepening national parliaments’ direct involvement in the decision-making process at the European level. The role of national parliaments in advancing their subsidiarity concerns within European law-making may be strengthened through a more intensive political dialogue with the Commission, when the former acts not just as the ‘guardians’ of the subsidiarity principle (in the framework of the existing yellow and orange card schemes) but also as active contributors to the law-making process encouraging the Commission to leverage the so-called green card procedure. Complemented by the yellow and orange card provisions, it forms a three-element subsidiarity review mechanism perfectly capable of dealing with subsidiarity concerns of national parliaments at various stages of the EU law-making process, thus transforming the chambers from wardens into partners working together with the Commission to reshape EU legislative proposals for the sake of better regulation.

scholarly journals Discussing Subsidiarity in Terms of Justification

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 53-70
Author(s):  
Oxana Pimenova
Keyword(s):  
Research Question ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Practical Implementation ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Main Research ◽  
Regulation Policy ◽  
Subsidiarity Principle ◽  
Institutional Dimension ◽  
The Eu

This article attempts to study the inter-institutional dimension of the practical implementation of the subsidiarity principle in the EU legislative process. The main research question is whether the subsidiarity principle could be a real communicative tool in the EU’s multi-level regulation policy used to seek consensus between EU institutions and national parliaments on the justification of an appropriate level for EU actions (subsidiarity justification). The short answer is ‘yes’. Through the content analysis of the published documents and with the help of the theory of deliberation, the author argues for a subsidiarity justification procedure occurring at the beginning of each instance of the EU legislative process to provide an inter-institutional setting to move away from confirming (one-way) to deliberative (two-way) reasoning over the issue of potential subsidiarity violation in the EU legislative process.

From Veto Players to Agenda-Setters?

2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 294-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Fasone ◽  
Diane Fromage
Keyword(s):  
Warning System ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Political Dialogue ◽  
Green Card ◽  
Agenda Setter ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
The Eu

National parliaments (NPs) had long been excluded from the European integration process and were in many Member States at best kept informed and rarely involved in daily EU affairs. With the Lisbon Treaty and its introduction of the Early Warning System (EWS), as well as the Political Dialogue initiated by former Commission President Barroso, NPs have now become full actors in the EU. Through the Political Dialogue, they can express their opinion on the Commission Annual Work Programme and influence the Commission's agenda. Now, through control of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity, and provided that their reasoned opinions attain the defined thresholds, they can potentially strike down an existing proposal. However the EWS leads to NPs still being constrained to a limited, reactive role: as ‘quasi veto-players' and not one of ‘agenda-setter’. Recent developments in favour of the introduction of a ‘green card’ would change this situation profoundly as NPs would eventually be able to prompt the Commission to make legislative proposals on their behalf. This article sheds light on the evolving role of NPs in EU policymaking from the Lisbon Treaty onwards, from veto players to proactive institutions committed to the good functioning of the EU.

scholarly journals The Subsidiarity Principle and National Parliaments Role: From Formal Need to Real Use of Powers

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 24
Author(s):  
Ani Matei ◽  
Adrian Stelian Dumitru
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Guiding Principle ◽  
Subsidiarity Principle ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Correct Application ◽  
The Eu

Subsidiarity constitutes a guiding principle of the EU exercising power and the idea of involving national parliaments in the EU legislative procedure was seen as the best solution to increase democracy and transparency of the EU decision-making process at the European Convention established in 2001. Such a mechanism enables national parliaments to ensure the correct application of the principle of subsidiarity by the institutions taking part in the legislative process. This article examines how this principle is implemented by the national parliaments and EU responsible institutions. What is the novelty derived from the Treaty of Lisbon? Do national parliaments participate actively in the implementation of subsidiarity? If yes, what are the tools at their disposal? To answer all of these questions we try to shape a framework for understanding the phenomenon.

scholarly journals (Never)mind the Evidence

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-224
Author(s):  
Goranka Lalić Novak ◽  
Teo Giljević ◽  
Romea Manojlović Toman
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Better Regulation ◽  
Public Consultations ◽  
Migration Law ◽  
Law Making ◽  
The Eu

The aim of the paper is to analyse the extent to which the recent Croatian regulation on migration (legislation and policy documents) is grounded on evidence and builds on empirical data drawn from the processes and draft legislation, public consultations, impact assessment, parliamentary discussions, parliamentary questions of members of Parliament, and evaluation reports. In this way, the paper also provides a deeper insight into the development of migration regulation, from agenda-setting to the adoption of regulation. Research has enabled the authors to discuss the possibilities to improve migration law-making by means of evidence-based law-making techniques and other better regulation instruments. Several conclusions have been made: that evidence-based law-making is useful in complex issues such as migration; that evidence should be primarily used in the legislative process at the EU level in the areas that fall under the EU competences; that evidence is most beneficial in the early, preparatory phases of law-making; that it is necessary to connect the assessment of the relevance and adequacy of empirical data used and their linkage to the effectiveness of migration legislation. The use of better regulation instruments in developing migration regulation might contribute to more transparency and accountability, as well as to the reduction of arbitrary use of power by public authorities, and thus foster the standards and principles of the rule of law.

10. EU Legislation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ed Beale ◽  
Libby Kurien ◽  
Eve Samson
Keyword(s):  
Direct Access ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Eu Legislation ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines the ways in which the UK Parliament formally constrains the government and engages with European Union (EU) institutions. The House of Lords and the House of Commons both have processes to ensure that legislation proposed at the EU level has been properly reviewed before it takes effect in UK law. The ‘scrutiny reserve’, which stipulates that ministers should not agree to proposals under scrutiny, is used to elicit information about the government's negotiating position. Parliament also has a role in examining EU legislation and providing direct access to European institutions. The chapter first provides an overview of the EU legislative process, focusing on three principal EU institutions: member states, the European Parliament (EP), and the European Commission. It also considers the formal role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process, the UK Parliament's scrutiny of the EU legislation and its effectiveness, and parliamentary scrutiny after Brexit.

National Parliaments and the European Union

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrin Auel
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Effective Means ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Direct Role ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Eu ◽  
The Way

The role and position of national parliaments in European Union (EU) affairs have undergone a long, slow, and sometimes rocky, but overall rather remarkable, development. Long regarded as the victims of the integration process, they have continuously strengthened their institutional prerogatives and have become more actively involved in EU affairs. Since the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments even have a formal and direct role in the European legislative process, namely, as guardians of the EU’s subsidiarity principle via the so-called early warning system. To what extent institutional provisions at the national or the European level provide national parliaments with effective means of influencing EU politics is still a largely open question. On the one hand, national parliaments still differ with regard to their institutional prerogatives and actual engagement in EU politics. On the other hand, the complex decision-making system of the EU, with its multitude of actors involved, makes it difficult to trace outcomes back to the influence of specific actors. Yet it is precisely this opacity of the EU policymaking process that has led to an emphasis on the parliamentary communication function and the way national parliaments can contribute to the democratic legitimacy of the EU by making EU political decisions and processes more accessible and transparent for the citizens. This deliberative aspect is also often emphasized in approaches to the role of national parliaments in the EU that challenge the territorially defined, standard account of parliamentary representation. Taking the multilevel character of the EU as well as the high degree of political and economic interdependence between the member states into account, parliamentary representation is conceptualized as extending beyond the nation-state and as shared across the EU, with a strong emphasis on the links between parliaments through inter-parliamentary cooperation and communication as well as on the representation of other member states’ citizens interests and concerns in parliamentary debates. Empirical research is still scarce, but existing studies provide evidence for the development of an increasingly dense web of formal and informal interactions between parliaments and for changes in the way national parliamentarians represent citizens in EU affairs.

scholarly journals In the Shadow of Public Opinion: The European Parliament, Civil Society Organizations, and the Politicization of Trilogues

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 316-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Greenwood ◽  
Christilla Roederer-Rynning
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Civil Society Organizations ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Ideal Types ◽  
Informal Institution ◽  
Preliminary Examination ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Law Making ◽  
The Eu

This article examines the relations between the European Parliament (EP) and civil society organizations (CSOs) in the EU’s legislative process. It focuses specifically on legislative trilogues, an informal institution bringing together the representatives of the EP, Council, and Commission in a secluded setting to conclude legislative agreements. Trilogues have become the modus operandi and an absolutely pivotal part of the EU law-making process: they are where the deals are made. While secluded decision-making offers plenty of opportunities for EU institutions to depoliticize law-making, we argue that trilogues have become politicized, partly from the relationship between the EP and CSOs. We flesh out this argument on the basis of insights from the politicization and the historical institutionalist literatures, advance two ideal types of trilogue politics, and explore these types on the basis of a preliminary examination of a comprehensive interview material.

The Commission’s Power to Withdraw Legislative Proposals and its ‘Parliamentarisation’, Between Technical and Political Grounds

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Lupo
Keyword(s):  
Early Warning ◽  
Early Warning System ◽  
Warning System ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Rules Of Procedure ◽  
Legislative Initiative ◽  
Law Making

European Commission – Monopoly on legislative initiative – Power to withdraw legislative proposals, as recognised and limited by the Court of Justice – Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making – European Parliament Rules of Procedure – Interinstitutional programming procedures – Technical and political usages of the withdrawal – Question of confidence in national parliamentary systems – National Parliaments and Early Warning System – Parliamentarisation of the decision to withdraw – Principle of institutional balance

scholarly journals Return to De Capitani: The EU Legislative Process between Transparency and Effectiveness

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 296-299
Author(s):  
Emanuele Rebasti
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Process ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Law Making ◽  
The Eu

<p>Three years after the judgment of the General Court in the <em>De Capitani</em> case, we assess whether the findings of the Court have settled for good the debate between transparency and effectiveness in EU law-making or rather opened new reflections on legislative transparency in the EU.</p>

The Law-making Procedure

2021 ◽  
pp. 70-150
Author(s):  
Caroline Heber
Keyword(s):  
General Question ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
European Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Institutions ◽  
Subsidiarity Principle ◽  
The Law ◽  
Competence Framework ◽  
Law Making

This chapter is dedicated to the law-making process, which is predominantly procedural. The first part (subsections B and C) of this chapter reveals the involvement of the European institutions, namely the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council and their respective, distinct roles within the legislative process. The second part (subsection D) analyses the requirement protecting the uniformity of European law, namely the last resort nature of enhanced cooperation. The third part (subsection E) explores ways for non-participating Member States to enter into enhanced cooperation, and ways in which participating Member States may leave the group. The last part (subsections F and G) of this chapter is dedicated to a more general question, the question of legislative power. Since the constitutional framework of enhanced cooperation only sets out the authorisation process for a group of Member States to use both the European institutions and the power of the European Union, the question of which laws can be enacted under the enhanced cooperation procedure, in particular with respect to the scope and content, depends on the ordinary competence framework. This part of the study provides an analysis of both the European internal market competence and the subsidiarity principle, and subsequently reveals what the Member States can accomplish in European taxation.

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