EU Laws on Privacy in Genomic Databases and Biobanking

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Townend

Both the European Union and the Council of Europe have a bearing on privacy in genomic databases and biobanking. In terms of legislation, the processing of personal data as it relates to the right to privacy is currently largely regulated in Europe by Directive 95/46/EC, which requires that processing be “fair and lawful” and follow a set of principles, meaning that the data be processed only for stated purposes, be sufficient for the purposes of the processing, be kept only for so long as is necessary to achieve those purposes, and be kept securely and only in an identifiable state for such time as is necessary for the processing. The European privacy regime does not require the de-identification (anonymization) of personal data used in genomic databases or biobanks, and alongside this practice informed consent as well as governance and oversight mechanisms provide for the protection of genomic data.

2021 ◽  
pp. 99-109
Author(s):  
MARIJANA MLADENOV ◽  
JELENA STOJŠIĆ DABETIĆ

Should we consider the right to be forgotten as a threat to free speech or the mechanism of the right to privacy? This most controversial element of the right to privacy and personal data protection caused the global debate on privacy and freedom of speech. Despite the fact that the right to be forgotten is codified in Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation and that fundamental postulates of this right were defined in Google v. Spain, there still remain unresolved issues. In order to gain a clear idea of the content of the right to be forgotten, as the principle of data protection in accordance with the latest European perspective, the subject matter of the paper refers to analyses of the developments of this right in the light of relevant regulations, as well as of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The article firstly provides an overview of the concept of the right to be forgotten, from the very early proposals that gave rise to it, to the latest ones contained in recent regulations. Furthermore, the special attention is devoted to the new standards of the concept of the right to be forgotten from the aspect of recent rulings of the CJEU, GC et al v. CNIL and CNIL v. Google. Within the concluding remarks, the authors highlight the need for theoretical innovation and an adequate legal framework of the right to be forgotten in order to fit this right within the sociotechnical legal culture. The goal of the article is to provide insight regarding the implementation of the right to be forgotten in the European Union and to identify the main challenges with respect to the issue.


2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Orla Lynskey

AbstractArticle 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out a right to data protection which sits alongside, and in addition to, the established right to privacy in the Charter. The Charter's inclusion of an independent right to data protection differentiates it from other international human rights documents which treat data protection as a subset of the right to privacy. Its introduction and its relationship with the established right to privacy merit an explanation. This paper explores the relationship between the rights to data protection and privacy. It demonstrates that, to date, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has consistently conflated the two rights. However, based on a comparison between the scope of the two rights as well as the protection they offer to individuals whose personal data are processed, it claims that the two rights are distinct. It argues that the right to data protection provides individuals with more rights over more types of data than the right to privacy. It suggests that the enhanced control over personal data provided by the right to data protection serves two purposes: first, it proactively promotes individual personality rights which are threatened by personal data processing and, second, it reduces the power and information asymmetries between individuals and those who process their data. For these reasons, this paper suggests that there ought to be explicit judicial recognition of the distinction between the two rights.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-283
Author(s):  
Hanna RUTKIEWICZ

Rozwijające się przez stulecia koncepcje wolności i godności człowieka wpłynęły na ujmowanie pojęcia prywatności, a także kształt jej formalnoprawnej ochrony. W opracowaniu podjęto analizę wpływu przepisów wspólnotowych służących przeciwdziałaniu terroryzmowi, funkcjonujących w Unii Europejskiej, na sferę prywatną jednostki, skupiając się przede wszystkim na problematyce ochrony danych osobowych. W tym kontekście jednym z zadań, zarówno prawodawstwa, jak i polityki wspólnotowej, stało się obecnie złagodzenie antynomii dostrzegalnej pomiędzy potrzebami w zakresie zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa i ochrony społeczeństwa przed terroryzmem z jednej strony a zabezpieczeniem jednostki i społeczności przed coraz częstszymi naruszeniami prywatności związanymi z wykonywaniem regulacji antyterrorystycznych z drugiej strony.


Author(s):  
M. S. Krylova

The paper considers the peculiarities of the legal protection of personal data of minors in the field of electronic communications in the European Union. The reasons for the expediency of introducing differentiated rules for minors in the context of the realization of the right to protection of personal data are substantiated. In addition, the article analyzes the provisions of Regulation (EC) 2016/679 on the protection of individuals in the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data which entered into force in May 2018. The author reflects its innovations regarding the conditions for applying to the minors the concept of informed consent for processing and measures to verify the age of data, including the provision of services in electronic communications.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 1509-1514
Author(s):  
Biljana Karovska-Andonovska ◽  
Zoran Jovanovski

The reforms in the communications monitoring system as part of the wider reform of the security services in the Republic of Macedonia, resulted with creation of a package of several laws whose adoption was supposed to provide the legislative basis for a system that would really work in accordance with the goals for which it was established. The communications monitoring system should provide a balanced protection of the right to security, on the one hand, and the right to privacy, on the other. Only on that way a priori primacy of the right to security over the right to privacy will it be disabled. Hence, the reforms in communications monitoring system are a precondition for the effective protection, primarily for the right to privacy and the secrecy of communications, but also for the right to personal data protection, the inviolability of the home as well as for the right to presumption of innocence. It is a complex and delicate matter where opening of a real debate through which the present deficiencies will be perceived in order to create an appropriate legal solutions was very important. However, the new Law on Interception of Communications as the most important in this area, retained a certain part of the provisions that were debatable in the previous legal solutions. The provisions regarding the model for interception of communications, which stipulates the establishment of a separate agency that mediates between the operators and the authorized bodies for interception of communications, were questionable as well. Also, new measures for monitoring communications in the interest of security and defense, as well as the provisions which regulate the disposition and delivery of metadata for security and defense, are also debatable. On the other side, the reform laws made an evident progress in a positive sense through the provisions for oversight and control over the interception of communications. With these changes, certain debatable elements have been overcome, especially those that have hindered it so far, and in some cases completely paralyzed the oversight and control over the monitoring of communications. In this paper we analyzed the debatable elements in the reform package of laws on interception of communications as well as some positive aspects contained in the provisions of the reform laws.


Author(s):  
Agnese Reine-Vītiņa

Mūsdienās tiesības uz privāto dzīvi nepieciešamas ikvienā demokrātiskā sabiedrībā, un šo tiesību iekļaušana konstitūcijā juridiski garantē fiziskas personas rīcības brīvību un vienlaikus arī citu – valsts pamatlikumā noteikto – cilvēka tiesību īstenošanu [5]. Personas datu aizsardzības institūts tika izveidots, izpratnes par tiesību uz personas privātās dzīves neaizskaramību saturu paplašinot 20. gadsimta 70. gados, kad vairāku Eiropas valstu valdības uzsāka informācijas apstrādes projektus, piemēram, tautas skaitīšanu u. c. Informācijas tehnoloģiju attīstība ļāva arvien vairāk informācijas par personām glabāt un apstrādāt elektroniski. Viena no tiesību problēmām bija informācijas vākšana par fizisku personu un tiesību uz privātās dzīves neaizskaramību ievērošana. Lai nodrošinātu privātās dzīves aizsardzību, atsevišķas Eiropas valstis pēc savas iniciatīvas pieņēma likumus par datu aizsardzību. Pirmie likumi par personas datu aizsardzību Eiropā tika pieņemti Vācijas Federatīvajā Republikā, tad Zviedrijā (1973), Norvēģijā (1978) un citur [8, 10]. Ne visas valstis pieņēma likumus par datu aizsardzību vienlaikus, tāpēc Eiropas Padome nolēma izstrādāt konvenciju, lai unificētu datu aizsardzības noteikumus un principus. Nowadays, the right to privacy is indispensable in every democratic society and inclusion of such rights in the constitution, guarantees legally freedom of action of a natural person and, simultaneously, implementation of other human rights established in the fundamental law of the state. The institute of personal data protection was established by expanding the understanding of the content of the right to privacy in the 70’s of the 19th century, when the government of several European countries initiated information processing projects, such as population census etc. For the development of information technology, more and more information on persons was kept and processed in electronic form. One of the legal problems was gathering of information on natural persons and the right to privacy. In order to ensure the protection of privacy, separate European countries, on their own initiative, established a law on data protection. The first laws on the protection of personal data in Europe were established in the Federal Republic of Germany, then in Sweden (1973), Norway (1978) and elsewhere. Not all countries adopted laws on data protection at the same time, so the Council of Europe decided to elaborate a convention to unify data protection rules and principles.


2021 ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
GULNAZ AYDIN RZAYEVA ◽  
AYTAKIN NAZIM IBRAHIMOVA

The development of new technologies also has an impact on human rights. In the previous “epochs” of global information society, it was stated that that traditional rights can be exercised online. For instance, in 2012 (and again in 2014 and 2016), the UN Human Rights Council emphasized that ‘the same rights granted to people, so to speak, in an “offline” manner, must be protected online as well’. This, in its turn, implicitly brought to the reality that the new technetronic society did not create new rights. Though, we should take into consideration that in the digital world national legislative norms that guarantee the confidentiality of personal data often do not catch up with the technological development and, thus, can’t ensure confidentiality online. Therefore, the impact of digitalization on human rights within the frames of international and national laws should be broadly analysed and studied. The article’s objective is to analyze the impact of new technologies on human rights in the context of the right to be forgotten and right to privacy. Because the development of new technologies is more closely linked to the security of personal data. With the formation of the right to be forgotten, it is the issue of ensuring the confidentiality of certain contents of personal data as a result of the influence of the time factor. The authors conclude that, the right to be forgotten was previously defended more in the context of the right to privacy. However, they cannot be considered equal rights. The right to be forgotten stems from a person’s desire to develop and continue his or her life independently without being the object of criticism for any negative actions he or she has committed in the past. If the right to privacy contains generally confidential information, the right to be forgotten is understood as the deletion of known information at a certain time and the denial of access to third parties. Thus, the right to be forgotten is not included in the right to privacy, and can be considered an independent right. The point is that the norms of the international and national documents, which establish fundamental human rights and freedoms, do not regulate issues related to the right to be forgotten. The right to be forgotten should be limited to the deletion of information from the media and Internet information resources. This is not about the complete destruction of information available in state information systems. Another conclusion of authors is that the media and Internet information resources sometimes spread false information. In this case, there will be no content of the right to be forgotten. Because the main thing is that the information that constitutes the content of the right to be forgotten must be legal, but after some time it has lost its significance. The scope of information included in the content of the right to be forgotten should not only be related to the conviction, but also to other special personal data (for example, the fact of divorce).


Author(s):  
William Bülow ◽  
Misse Wester

As information technology is becoming an integral part of modern society, there is a growing concern that too much data containing personal information is stored by different actors in society and that this could potentially be harmful for the individual. The aim of this contribution is to show how the extended use of ICT can affect the individual’s right to privacy and how the public perceives risks to privacy. Three points are raised in this chapter: first, if privacy is important from a philosophical perspective, how is this demonstrated by empirical evidence? Do individuals trust the different actors that control their personal information, and is there a consensus that privacy can and should be compromised in order to reach another value? Second, if compromises in privacy are warranted by increased safety, is this increased security supported by empirical evidence? Third, the authors will argue that privacy can indeed be a means to increase the safety of citizens and that the moral burden of ensuring and protecting privacy is a matter for policy makers, not individuals. In conclusion, the authors suggest that more nuanced discussion on the concepts of privacy and safety should be acknowledged and the importance of privacy must be seen as an important objective in the development and structure of ICT uses.


2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Mindaugas Bilius

ABSTRACT Private detectives have been providing their services in Lithuania for about a decade; however, only now has the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania started to discuss whether it is expedient and necessary to regulate the activities of private detectives by means of a separate law. One of the goals of a separate legal regulation of private detective activities is the protection of human rights, particularly the right to privacy. This article examines the provisions of national and international legislative acts related to the private life of a person, and assesses the opportunities of a private detective to provide private detective services without prejudice to the provisions of applicable legislative acts. The article concludes that a private detective is not an authorized (public) authority and there is no possibility to assess in each case whether the interests of a person using the services of private detectives are more important than those of other persons, which would allow for violating their rights to private life. The limits of an individual’s right to privacy can only be narrowed by a particular person, giving consent to making public the details of his/her private life. It is the only opportunity for a private detective to gather information related to the private life of a citizen. Currently applicable legislative acts in Lithuania do not provide for opportunities for private subjects to collect personal data without that person’s consent. This right is granted only to public authorities and with the court’s permission


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