The Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: A Medico-Legal Perspective

Youth Justice ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 102-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enys Delmage

The minimum age of criminal responsibility is set in England and Wales at 10 years of age (Children and Young Persons Act 1963), whilst the effective age of most civil responsibilities is 16. Research allows us to consider the speed of development of key brain structures in terms of decision-making and this in turn aids in discussion of where the minimum age should be set. This article reviews the evolution of the minimum age of criminal responsibility and examines the setting of this age in light of both civil attainment ages and the current scientific understanding of brain development.

Youth Justice ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Goldson

This article assesses critically the means by which social (symbolic) and statutory (institutionalized) constructions of child ‘offenders’ in England and Wales intersect and underpin processes of responsibilization and adultification. It is argued that securing immunity from prosecution should be the principal driver for raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility. In this sense the analysis is less concerned with questions of capacity and mens rea and more interested in: compliance with international human rights standards; modelling a system of justice that is broadly compatible with law, policy and practice in Europe (and elsewhere); ensuring that criminal law coheres with civil law; minimizing social harm and obtaining the best outcomes for children in conflict with the law, the wider community and the general public in respect of crime prevention and community safety. Finally, the prospects for such progressive reform within a context of heightened politicization are considered.


2016 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-300
Author(s):  
Thomas Crofts

This article explores how Australian jurisdictions came to have an approach to the age of criminal responsibility similar to that which existed in England and Wales until 1998. It discusses recent debates in Australia about reforming the minimum age of criminal responsibility and the presumption of doli incapax. This shows that while there has been criticism of the presumption of doli incapax within Australia no jurisdiction has taken the English step of abolishing it. It finds that a greater challenge to the presumption of doli incapax may, however, come from calls for an increase in the minimum age of criminal responsibility to the age of 12. While several common law countries have raised the minimum age level to 12 (as called for by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child), they have also abolished the presumption of doli incapax, thus reducing protection for 12- and 13-year-olds. This article argues that unless the minimum age of criminal responsibility is raised to 14 or 16, as preferred by the UN Committee, there are good reasons to retain the presumption of doli incapax.


Youth Justice ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 147322541989378
Author(s):  
Aaron Brown ◽  
Anthony Charles

The minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales remains 10 years: something which has attracted criticism globally by policy makers and youth justice practitioners. Yet, the Westminster Government refuses to consider changes to minimum age of criminal responsibility, despite evidence supporting reform. This article, drawing on the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child’s consultation to revise General Comment No. 10 (2007) and the activities of UK devolved administrations, explores the need for minimum age of criminal responsibility reform, considering how a holistic approach focused on diversion and the provision of rights respecting appropriate interventions can create positive, even transformative outcomes for children.


Author(s):  
Hans Liljenström

AbstractWhat is the role of consciousness in volition and decision-making? Are our actions fully determined by brain activity preceding our decisions to act, or can consciousness instead affect the brain activity leading to action? This has been much debated in philosophy, but also in science since the famous experiments by Libet in the 1980s, where the current most common interpretation is that conscious free will is an illusion. It seems that the brain knows, up to several seconds in advance what “you” decide to do. These studies have, however, been criticized, and alternative interpretations of the experiments can be given, some of which are discussed in this paper. In an attempt to elucidate the processes involved in decision-making (DM), as an essential part of volition, we have developed a computational model of relevant brain structures and their neurodynamics. While DM is a complex process, we have particularly focused on the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for its emotional, and the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) for its cognitive aspects. In this paper, we present a stochastic population model representing the neural information processing of DM. Simulation results seem to confirm the notion that if decisions have to be made fast, emotional processes and aspects dominate, while rational processes are more time consuming and may result in a delayed decision. Finally, some limitations of current science and computational modeling will be discussed, hinting at a future development of science, where consciousness and free will may add to chance and necessity as explanation for what happens in the world.


Youth Justice ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 147322542110228
Author(s):  
Jo Staines ◽  
Nadia Aghtaie ◽  
Jessica Roy

Using the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) in Iran as an illustration, this article explores the continued resistance against girls’ rights in some Islamic countries. The gendered construction of childhood in Iran has resulted in a differential MACR, which for boys is notably higher than that recommended by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, yet for girls is unacceptably low. While breaches of girls’ rights in other areas are defended on the grounds of paternalistic concerns, it is argued that the MACR is a religious-politico decision that, in Iran, upholds the rights of boys but denies the rights of girls, propagating their wider subjugation.


2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2021-107571
Author(s):  
Scott Y H Kim ◽  
Nuala B Kane ◽  
Alexander Ruck Keene ◽  
Gareth S Owen

Most jurisdictions require that a mental capacity assessment be conducted using a functional model whose definition includes several abilities. In England and Wales and in increasing number of countries, the law requires a person be able to understand, to retain, to use or weigh relevant information and to communicate one’s decision. But interpreting and applying broad and vague criteria, such as the ability ‘to use or weigh’ to a diverse range of presentations is challenging. By examining actual court judgements of capacity, we previously developed a descriptive typology of justifications (rationales) used in the application of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) criteria. We here critically optimise this typology by showing how clear definitions—and thus boundaries—between the criteria can be achieved if the ‘understanding’ criterion is used narrowly and the multiple rationales that fall under the ability to ‘use or weigh’ are specifically enumerated in practice. Such a typology-aided practice, in theory, could make functional capacity assessments more transparent, accountable, reliable and valid. It may also help to create targeted supports for decision making by the vulnerable. We also discuss how the typology could evolve legally and scientifically, and how it lays the groundwork for clinical research on the abilities enumerated by the MCA.


2016 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-341
Author(s):  
Claire McDiarmid

In Scotland, the age of criminal responsibility is 8, although children cannot be prosecuted until they are 12. In England and Wales, for all purposes, the age is 10. This article argues that a further mechanism is needed to protect the young who do wrong within the criminal process and it argues for a new, bespoke defence, to be available to young people from the age of criminal responsibility until they attain the age of 18. It looks firstly at criminal capacity – what it is that needs to be understood fairly to hold anyone criminally responsible – and draws on material from developmental psychology and neuro-science, as well as looking at the child’s lived experience, to provide some evidence that the young may, without fault, lack this capacity. It then examines the use of age generally in law, and the age of criminal responsibility within this. Next, it considers existing lack of capacity defences – nonage, diminished responsibility, insanity (or mental disorder) and absence of mens rea – to consider their suitability for use by young and immature defendants. Finally, it presents a proposal for the form of the new defence, taking into account the need for balance with the public interest in conviction of the guilty. Throughout, it notes and analyses the Law Commission’s proposals in this respect.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-99
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Guo

Psychiatric evaluation is widely used in criminal cases to screen people with mental disorder because insanity can either exempt the offender from criminal responsibility or mitigate his/her criminal punishment. The operation of psychiatric evaluation in China used to carry a typical characteristic of civil law tradition, but recent reforms have strengthened the procedural safeguards for psychiatric evaluation and stressed the requirement of its presentation and examination in criminal trials. This article will explore how psychiatric evaluation is conducted, and how the expert opinion is presented and examined as evidence in criminal trials in China. Part I will give a historical overview of psychiatric evaluation in China's criminal cases. Part II will introduce the current legislation on psychiatric evaluation in China. Part III will explore problems with current legislation and practice. In this part, high-profile cases will be cited to illustrate loopholes in the psychiatric evaluation law and practical problems with the operation of evaluation. Potential solutions to these loopholes or problems will also be explored. Part IV will focus on the presentation and examination of psychiatrists’ expert opinion in criminal trials. Although expert witnesses are also required to testify before the court in China, very few of them take the stand in practice. This part will discuss why reforms kept failing and what should be done to bring expert witnesses to court. Psychiatrists are important expert witnesses; the discussion of live psychiatrists will shed light on the appearance of all the expert witnesses in Chinese criminal trials.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document