scholarly journals Sexual Disgust Trumps Pathogen Disgust in Predicting Voter Behavior During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 147470491876417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Billingsley ◽  
Debra Lieberman ◽  
Joshua M. Tybur

Why is disgust sensitivity associated with socially conservative political views? Is it because socially conservative ideologies mitigate the risks of infectious disease, whether by promoting out-group avoidance or by reinforcing norms that sustain antipathogenic practices? Or might it be because socially conservative ideologies promote moral standards that advance a long-term, as opposed to a short-term, sexual strategy? Recent attempts to test these two explanations have yielded differing results and conflicting interpretations. Here, we contribute to the literature by examining the relationship between disgust sensitivity and political orientation, political party affiliation, and an often overlooked outcome—actual voter behavior. We focus on voter behavior and affiliation for the 2016 U.S. presidential election to determine whether pathogen or sexual disgust better predicts socially conservative ideology. Although many prominent aspects of Donald Trump’s campaign—particularly his anti-foreign message—align with the pathogen-avoidance model of conservatism, we found that pathogen-related disgust sensitivity exerted no influence on political ideology, political party affiliation, or voter behavior, after controlling for sexual disgust sensitivity. In contrast, sexual disgust sensitivity was associated with increased odds of voting for Donald Trump versus each other major presidential candidate, as well as with increased odds of affiliating with the Republican versus the Democratic or Libertarian parties. In fact, for every unit increase in sexual disgust sensitivity, the odds of a participant voting for Trump versus Clinton increased by approximately 30%. It seems, then, that sexual disgust trumps pathogen disgust in predicting socially conservative voting behavior.

2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 797-818 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Joshua M. Tybur ◽  
Junhui Wu ◽  
Christian Antonellis ◽  
Paul A. M. Van Lange

Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more likely to pursue selfish outcomes, and liberals more likely to pursue egalitarian outcomes. In study 1, we examine how political ideology and political party affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat) predict cooperation with a partner who self-identifies as Republican or Democrat in two samples before ( n = 362) and after ( n = 366) the 2012 US presidential election. Liberals show slightly more concern for their partners’ outcomes compared to conservatives (study 1), and in study 2 this relation is supported by a meta-analysis ( r = .15). However, in study 1, political ideology did not relate to cooperation in general. Both Republicans and Democrats extend more cooperation to their in-group relative to the out-group, and this is explained by expectations of cooperation from in-group versus out-group members. We discuss the relation between political ideology and cooperation within and between groups.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enbal Shacham ◽  
Steve Scroggins ◽  
Matthew Ellis ◽  
Germysha Little ◽  
Alexander Garza

Background: While U.S. continues to face increasing rates of COVID-19, there is concern that voting behavior during the 2020 U.S. Presidential election may contribute to additional outbreaks and infections among communities. The purpose of the current study was to assess the impact of the spread of the COVID-19 infection and mask-wearing behavior on voting behaviors and political affiliation during the 2020 national election.Methods: During a two-week period from September into October 2020, YouGov, in association with Saint Louis University, conducted an online cross-sectional survey consisting of participants that were likely to vote in Missouri in the upcoming national election (n=931). The sample was stratified into two groups: those that reported always wearing a mask or face-covering in public spaces and those that did not. Individual socio-demographics and environmental factors were compared between these groups to identify significant differences according to mask-wearing patterns. Additionally, two adjusted multivariate models were constructed to determine probability of (1) reporting always wearing a mask and (2) planning on voting in-person on election day. Indicators in each model included reported political party affiliation, and urbanicity, presence of mask mandate, and recent COVID-19 rate, respective of reported Missouri county of residence. Results: The sample consisted of 931 participants across Missouri that were likely to vote during the 2020 Presidential election. Among this sample, 38.5% resided in counties with a mask mandate at the time of the survey.Individuals who resided in either suburban or urban counties were twice as likely to report always wearing a mask compared to rural residents. In addition, while individuals from counties with a mask mandate were over twice as likely to report always wearing a mask, county COVID-19 infection rates were not found to be a significant predictor of mask-wearing. Republicans and Independents were significantly less likely to report always wearing a mask. Compared to Democrats, Republicans were 4 times, and Independents were 2 times, more likely to vote in person on election day compared to Democratic party members. These results were significant even when adjusting urbanicity, residing in a county with a mask mandate, and county COVID-19 case-rate. While urbanicity and COVID-19 infection rate were determined to not add significantly to model performance, those that lived within a county with a mask mandate were nearly 50% less likely to vote in person on election date.Discussion: Overall, this study identified significant relationships that are likely to contribute to the spread of COVID-19. Individuals who identified as Republican and Independent party members were more likely to vote in-person on election day and less likely to always wear a mask in public spaces. The interaction between political party affiliation and mask wearing highlights the concerning dichotomy within political discourse and highlights an opportunity to develop novel interventions that reduce the current political division that exists within the U.S.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1050-1056 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Laverghetta ◽  
Juliana Stewart ◽  
Lawrence Weinstein

To estimate correlations for scores on a student anti-intellectualism scale with scores on a measure of political conservatism, 235 students were given a survey containing a student anti-intellectualism scale, a political conservatism scale, and a demographics questionnaire identifying the participants' sex, college classification, ethnicity, political party affiliation, and self-described political ideology. The political conservatism scale contained two factors, Religiosity and Economic Conservatism, both of which were scored separately in addition to an overall Conservatism score. Students' Anti-intellectualism scores were correlated with Political Conservatism scores ( r = .37, p<.01), with Religiosity scores ( r = .42, p<.01), and with Economic Conservatism scores ( r = .17, p<.05). An analysis of variance indicated a significant difference in students' Anti-intellectualism scores based on college classification ( F4,233 = 2.27, p<.04). Specifically, freshman had significantly higher scores than graduate students.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-244
Author(s):  
Tina C. DeMarco ◽  
Anna-Kaisa Newheiser

How do people cope with group members who insult the in-group? The 2016 U.S. Presidential election provided an opportunity to examine this question among group members experiencing unprecedented within-group strife. Participants read an essay written by an in-group or out-group member (Study 1, university affiliation; Study 2, U.S. political party affiliation, conducted at the height of the 2016 Presidential campaign), in which the author insulted his or her in-group. Participants reported the extent to which and reasons why they wanted to confront and avoid the target. Desire to rebuke the target, but not desire to protect oneself and the in-group, mediated the relationship between exposure to in-group (vs. out-group) deviance and confrontation. Desires to rebuke and protect jointly mediated the relationship with avoidance. Whereas people may differ on how they react to in-group deviance, they are primarily motivated by wanting to reprimand deviants, with implications for coping with intragroup conflict.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022199008
Author(s):  
Ethan Zell ◽  
Christopher A. Stockus ◽  
Michael J. Bernstein

This research examined how people explain major outcomes of political consequence (e.g., economic growth, rising inequality). We argue that people attribute positive outcomes more and negative outcomes less to their own political party than to an opposing party. We conducted two studies, one before the 2016 U.S. presidential election ( N = 244) and another before the 2020 election ( N = 249 registered voters), that examined attributions across a wide array of outcomes. As predicted, a robust partisan attribution bias emerged in both studies. Although the bias was largely equivalent among Democrats and Republicans, it was magnified among those with more extreme political ideology. Further, the bias predicted unique variance in voting intentions and significantly mediated the link between political ideology and voting. In sum, these data suggest that partisan allegiances systemically bias attributions in a group-favoring direction. We discuss implications of these findings for emerging research on political social cognition.


2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (03) ◽  
pp. 723-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie E. Artis ◽  
Andrew V. Krebs

Rapid changes in family life over the last forty years have led to substantial alterations in family law policy; specifically, most states now endorse joint custody arrangements for divorcing families. However, we know little about how lower court judges have embraced or resisted this change. We conducted in‐depth interviews with judges in twenty‐five Indiana jurisdictions in 1998 and 2011. Our findings suggest that judges' views of joint custody dramatically changed. Judges in Wave II indicated a strong preference for joint custody—a theme that was relatively absent in Wave I. The observed change in judicial preferences did not seem to be related to judicial replacement, gender, age, or political party affiliation. Although our conclusions are exploratory, we speculate that shifts in judicial views may be related to changing public mores of parenthood and, relatedly, Indiana's adoption of Parenting Time Guidelines in 2001.


2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Czech ◽  
Rena Borkhataria

Species conservation via the Endangered Species Act is highly politicized, yet few data have been gathered to illustrate the relationship of political party affiliation to species conservation perspectives. We conducted a nationwide public opinion survey and found that Democrats value species conservation more highly than do Republicans, and that Democrats are also more strongly supportive of the Endangered Species Act. Republicans place higher value on property rights than do Democrats, but members of both parties value economic growth as highly as wildlife conservation. The results imply that the Democratic propensity to value species conservation reflects a biocentric perspective that does not bode well for practical conservation efforts. Species conservation will depend upon the success of academicians and progressive political leaders in educating students and members of all parties about the fundamental conflict between economic growth and wildlife conservation.


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