It’s their fault: Partisan attribution bias and its association with voting intentions

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022199008
Author(s):  
Ethan Zell ◽  
Christopher A. Stockus ◽  
Michael J. Bernstein
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Positive Outcomes ◽  
Opposing Party ◽  
Registered Voters ◽  
Attribution Bias ◽  
Democrats And Republicans ◽  
Voting Intentions

This research examined how people explain major outcomes of political consequence (e.g., economic growth, rising inequality). We argue that people attribute positive outcomes more and negative outcomes less to their own political party than to an opposing party. We conducted two studies, one before the 2016 U.S. presidential election ( N = 244) and another before the 2020 election ( N = 249 registered voters), that examined attributions across a wide array of outcomes. As predicted, a robust partisan attribution bias emerged in both studies. Although the bias was largely equivalent among Democrats and Republicans, it was magnified among those with more extreme political ideology. Further, the bias predicted unique variance in voting intentions and significantly mediated the link between political ideology and voting. In sum, these data suggest that partisan allegiances systemically bias attributions in a group-favoring direction. We discuss implications of these findings for emerging research on political social cognition.

scholarly journals Political Ideology, Trust, and Cooperation

2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 797-818 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Joshua M. Tybur ◽  
Junhui Wu ◽  
Christian Antonellis ◽  
Paul A. M. Van Lange
Keyword(s):  
Political Party ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Group Versus ◽  
Party Affiliation ◽  
Two Samples ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Us Presidential Election ◽  
Political Party Affiliation

Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more likely to pursue selfish outcomes, and liberals more likely to pursue egalitarian outcomes. In study 1, we examine how political ideology and political party affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat) predict cooperation with a partner who self-identifies as Republican or Democrat in two samples before ( n = 362) and after ( n = 366) the 2012 US presidential election. Liberals show slightly more concern for their partners’ outcomes compared to conservatives (study 1), and in study 2 this relation is supported by a meta-analysis ( r = .15). However, in study 1, political ideology did not relate to cooperation in general. Both Republicans and Democrats extend more cooperation to their in-group relative to the out-group, and this is explained by expectations of cooperation from in-group versus out-group members. We discuss the relation between political ideology and cooperation within and between groups.

scholarly journals Keep America Christian (and White): Christian Nationalism, Fear of Ethnoracial Outsiders, and Intention to Vote for Donald Trump in the 2020 Presidential Election

2020 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 272-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph O Baker ◽  
Samuel L Perry ◽  
Andrew L Whitehead
Keyword(s):  
African American ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Cultural Framework ◽  
Order Of Magnitude ◽  
Christian Nationalism

Abstract Some of the strongest predictors of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election were Christian nationalism and antipathy toward Muslims and immigrants. We examine the interrelated influence of these three factors on Americans’ intentions to vote for Trump in 2020. Consistent with previous research, Christian nationalism and Islamophobia remained strong and significant predictors of intention to vote for Trump; however, the effect of xenophobia was stronger. Further, xenophobia and Islamophobia significantly and substantially mediated the effects of Christian nationalism. Consequently, though Christian nationalism remains theoretically and empirically distinct as a cultural framework, its influence on intending to vote for Trump in 2020 is intimately connected to fears about ethnoracial outsiders. In the penultimate year before Trump’s reelection campaign, the strongest predictors of supporting Trump, in order of magnitude, were political party, xenophobia, identifying as African American (negative), political ideology, Christian nationalism, and Islamophobia.

scholarly journals Sexual Disgust Trumps Pathogen Disgust in Predicting Voter Behavior During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 147470491876417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Billingsley ◽  
Debra Lieberman ◽  
Joshua M. Tybur
Keyword(s):  
Political Party ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Political Orientation ◽  
Voter Behavior ◽  
Party Affiliation ◽  
Disgust Sensitivity ◽  
Sexual Disgust ◽  
Political Party Affiliation

Why is disgust sensitivity associated with socially conservative political views? Is it because socially conservative ideologies mitigate the risks of infectious disease, whether by promoting out-group avoidance or by reinforcing norms that sustain antipathogenic practices? Or might it be because socially conservative ideologies promote moral standards that advance a long-term, as opposed to a short-term, sexual strategy? Recent attempts to test these two explanations have yielded differing results and conflicting interpretations. Here, we contribute to the literature by examining the relationship between disgust sensitivity and political orientation, political party affiliation, and an often overlooked outcome—actual voter behavior. We focus on voter behavior and affiliation for the 2016 U.S. presidential election to determine whether pathogen or sexual disgust better predicts socially conservative ideology. Although many prominent aspects of Donald Trump’s campaign—particularly his anti-foreign message—align with the pathogen-avoidance model of conservatism, we found that pathogen-related disgust sensitivity exerted no influence on political ideology, political party affiliation, or voter behavior, after controlling for sexual disgust sensitivity. In contrast, sexual disgust sensitivity was associated with increased odds of voting for Donald Trump versus each other major presidential candidate, as well as with increased odds of affiliating with the Republican versus the Democratic or Libertarian parties. In fact, for every unit increase in sexual disgust sensitivity, the odds of a participant voting for Trump versus Clinton increased by approximately 30%. It seems, then, that sexual disgust trumps pathogen disgust in predicting socially conservative voting behavior.

scholarly journals Winning on Social Media: Candidate Social-Mediated Communication and Voting During the 2016 US Presidential Election

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 205630511982613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Macafee ◽  
Bryan McLaughlin ◽  
Nathian Shae Rodriguez
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Mediation Effect ◽  
Mediated Communication ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
Opposing Party ◽  
Us Presidential Election ◽  
Use Of Social Media ◽  
Voting Intentions

The 2016 US Presidential Election provided an opportunity to examine how political candidates’ use of social media can affect voting intentions. This study considers how political candidates can use social media to increase potential supporters’ perceptions that they will win the election, providing them extra motivation to go out and vote. Results from a two-wave survey provide evidence that following the in-group candidate (Trump or Clinton) relates to voting intentions through the increased belief that the candidate would win. However, this mediation effect occurs for only supporters of Trump or Clinton, but not for partisans of the opposing party.

scholarly journals Exaggerated Meta-Perceptions Predict Intergroup Hostility Between American Political Partisans

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha Moore-Berg ◽  
Lee-Or Ankori Karlinsky ◽  
Boaz Hameiri ◽  
Emile Bruneau
Keyword(s):  
Social Distance ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Representative Sample ◽  
Negativity Bias ◽  
Convenience Sample ◽  
Demographic Subgroups ◽  
Democrats And Republicans ◽  
Democratic Norms ◽  
Over Time

People’s actions towards a competitive outgroup can be motivated not only by their perceptions of the outgroup, but also by how they think the outgroup perceives the ingroup (i.e., meta-perceptions). Here we examine the prevalence, accuracy, and consequences of meta-perceptions among American political partisans. Using a representative sample (N = 1056) and a longitudinal convenience sample (N = 2707), we find that Democrats and Republicans equally dislike and dehumanize each other, but think that the levels of prejudice and dehumanization held by the outgroup party are approximately twice as strong as actually reported by a representative sample of Democrats and Republicans. Overestimations of negative meta-perceptions were consistent across samples, over time and between demographic subgroups, but were modulated by political ideology: more strongly liberal Democrats and more strongly conservative Republicans were particularly prone to exaggerate meta-perceptions. Finally, we show that meta-prejudice and meta-dehumanization are independently associated with desire for social distance from members of the outgroup party and support for policies that harm the country and flout democratic norms to favor the ingroup political party. This research demonstrates that partisan meta-perceptions are subject to a strong negativity bias, with Democrats and Republicans agreeing that the shadow of partisanship is much larger than it actually is, which fosters mutual intergroup hostility.

scholarly journals Keep America Christian (and White): Christian Nationalism, Fear of Ethnoracial Outsiders, and Intention to Vote for Donald Trump in the 2020 Presidential Election

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Baker ◽  
Samuel Perry ◽  
Andrew L Whitehead
Keyword(s):  
African American ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Cultural Framework ◽  
Order Of Magnitude ◽  
Christian Nationalism

Some of the strongest predictors of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election were Christian nationalism and antipathy toward Muslims and immigrants. We examine the interrelated influence of these three factors on Americans’ intentions to vote for Trump in 2020. Consistent with previous research, Christian nationalism and Islamophobia remained strong and significant predictors of intention to vote for Trump; however, the effect of xenophobia was stronger. Further, xenophobia and Islamophobia significantly and substantially mediated the effects of Christian nationalism. Consequently, though Christian nationalism remains theoretically and empirically distinct as a cultural framework, its influence on intending to vote for Trump in 2020 is intimately connected to fears about ethnoracial outsiders. In the penultimate year before Trump’s reelection campaign, the strongest predictors of supporting Trump, in order of magnitude, were: political party, xenophobia, identifying as African American (negative), political ideology, Christian nationalism, and Islamophobia.

scholarly journals Exaggerated meta-perceptions predict intergroup hostility between American political partisans

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (26) ◽  
pp. 14864-14872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha L. Moore-Berg ◽  
Lee-Or Ankori-Karlinsky ◽  
Boaz Hameiri ◽  
Emile Bruneau
Keyword(s):  
Social Distance ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Representative Sample ◽  
Negativity Bias ◽  
Convenience Sample ◽  
Demographic Subgroups ◽  
Democrats And Republicans ◽  
Democratic Norms ◽  
Over Time

People’s actions toward a competitive outgroup can be motivated not only by their perceptions of the outgroup, but also by how they think the outgroup perceives the ingroup (i.e., meta-perceptions). Here, we examine the prevalence, accuracy, and consequences of meta-perceptions among American political partisans. Using a representative sample (n= 1,056) and a longitudinal convenience sample (n= 2,707), we find that Democrats and Republicans equally dislike and dehumanize each other but think that the levels of prejudice and dehumanization held by the outgroup party are approximately twice as strong as actually reported by a representative sample of Democrats and Republicans. Overestimations of negative meta-perceptions were consistent across samples over time and between demographic subgroups but were modulated by political ideology: More strongly liberal Democrats and more strongly conservative Republicans were particularly prone to exaggerate meta-perceptions. Finally, we show that meta-prejudice and meta-dehumanization are independently associated with the desire for social distance from members of the outgroup party and support for policies that harm the country and flout democratic norms to favor the ingroup political party. This research demonstrates that partisan meta-perceptions are subject to a strong negativity bias with Democrats and Republicans agreeing that the shadow of partisanship is much larger than it actually is, which fosters mutual intergroup hostility.

scholarly journals Metadehumanization Erodes Democratic Norms During the 2020 Presidential Election

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Landry
Keyword(s):  
Social Identity ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
Identity Maintenance ◽  
Opposing Party ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Corrosive Effect ◽  
Democratic Norms

The present research identifies social psychological factors threatening American democracy. Namely, we identify metadehumanization, the perception that another group dehumanizes your own group, as a robust predictor of Americans’ support for anti-democratic norms. Both immediately before and after the 2020 US Presidential Election, American political partisans perceived that their political opponents dehumanized them more than was actually the case. Partisans’ exaggerated metadehumanization inspired reciprocal dehumanization of the other side, which in turn predicted their support for using anti-democratic means to hurt the opposing party. Along with extending past work demonstrating metadehumanization’s corrosive effect on democratic integrity, the present research also contributes novel insights into our understanding of this process. We found the most politically engaged partisans held the most exaggerated, and therefore most inaccurate, levels of metadehumanization. Moreover, despite the socially progressive and egalitarian outlook traditionally associated with liberalism, we found that the most liberal Democrats actually expressed the greatest dehumanization Republicans. This suggests that political ideology can at times be as much an expression of social identity as a reflection of deliberative policy considerations, and demonstrates the need to develop more constructive outlets for social identity maintenance.

Election Poster Persuasion

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malte Schott ◽  
Jule Wolf
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Policy Evaluation ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Need For Cognition ◽  
Evaluation Study ◽  
Additional Measure ◽  
Political Preferences ◽  
Policy Statements ◽  
Voting Intentions

Abstract. We examined the effect of presenting unknown policy statements on German parties’ election posters. Study 1 showed that participants inferred the quality of a presented policy from knowledge about the respective political party. Study 2 showed that participants’ own political preferences influenced valence estimates: policy statements presented on campaign posters of liked political parties were rated significantly more positive than those presented on posters of disliked political parties. Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 with an additional measure of participants’ need for cognition. Need for cognition scores were unrelated to the valence transfer from political parties to policy evaluation. Study 4 replicated the findings of Studies 2 and 3 with an additional measure of participants’ voting intentions. Voting intentions were a significant predictor for valence transfer. Participants credited both their individually liked and disliked political parties for supporting the two unknown policies. However, the credit attributed to the liked party was significantly higher than to the disliked one. Study 5 replicated the findings of Studies 2, 3, and 4. Additionally, participants evaluated political clubs that were associated with the same policies previously presented on election posters. Here, a second-degree transfer emerged: from party valence to policy evaluation and from policy evaluation to club evaluation. Implications of the presented studies for policy communications and election campaigning are discussed.

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