Social Turbulence and the Safety of the Soul: Complementary and Alternative Medicine’s Response to the Mind-Body Problem

2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Zuess
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
The Body ◽  
Coping Mechanism ◽  
Major Theme ◽  
Social Functions ◽  
Complete Control ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Social Upheaval ◽  
Psychological Coping ◽  
Complementary And Alternative

The ability of the mind and spirit to influence the body’s processes is a major theme in complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) literature. Some CAM authors have taken this idea to the extreme, claiming that the mind has complete control over the body. In this article, the origins and functions of the concept of the mind’s preeminence over the body are examined from historical, psychological, and sociological perspectives. Historically, this concept became especially emphasized during times of widespread social upheaval, possibly because dissociation from the body is an effective psychological coping mechanism. Important social functions are also served by the identification with an immaterial self, which may explain this concept’s prominence in CAM. Habitual dissociation from the body, however, is unhealthy. The implications for medicine of a more balanced view of the mind-body relationship are explored.

From Coder to Creator

2009 ◽  
pp. 635-650
Author(s):  
Andreas Matthias
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Processing Speed ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
Complete Control ◽  
Responsibility Ascription ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Effective Supervision

Creation of autonomously acting, learning artifacts has reached a point where humans cannot any more be justly held responsible for the actions of certain types of machines. Such machines learn during operation, thus continuously changing their original behaviour in uncontrollable (by the initial manufacturer) ways. They act without effective supervision and have an epistemic advantage over humans, in that their extended sensory apparatus, their superior processing speed and perfect memory render it impossible for humans to supervise the machine’s decisions in real-time. We survey the techniques of artificial intelligence engineering, showing that there has been a shift in the role of the programmer of such machines from a coder (who has complete control over the program in the machine) to a mere creator of software organisms which evolve and develop by themselves. We then discuss the problem of responsibility ascription to such machines, trying to avoid the metaphysical pitfalls of the mind-body problem. We propose five criteria for purely legal responsibility, which are in accordance both with the findings of contemporary analytic philosophy and with legal practise. We suggest that Stahl’s (2006) concept of “quasi-responsibility” might also be a way to handle the responsibility gap.

scholarly journals Angel in “the Cartesian theatre” – Aquinas and the mind-body problem

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 66-79
Author(s):  
Tomasz Stępień
Keyword(s):  
Human Body ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Human Action ◽  
The Body ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

One of the solutions of the mind-body problem, which returns to the philosophical discussion on consciousness is the “soul hyphotesis”. Existence of the soul can clear the “explanatory gap”, but it brings yet another problems in explanation of how consciousness works. The magiority of those issues exist because of very specific understanding of the mind-body relations in Cartesian way as two separated substances. Some of the schoars propose to overlap the Cartesian approach by returning to the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas. This article shows that in the writings of Aquinas we can find exact analogy of the Cartesian view of the body-soul relations in the description of how immaterial angel assums the body. For Aquinas angel exist and acts in assumed human body in the very same way as Descartes describes the soul acting in human body, and angel’s mode of perception is similar to what is usually called as “the Cartesian theatre”. For Aquinas angel in assumed body cannot perfom any human action, it only pretends to perform it, because it operates bodily organs as the form, which is not united with this specific body. St Thomas explanation of the relation of body and soul in human being relies on the claim of unity of body and soul, which together are one substance. Such approach was even called biological, because of the stress on the role which body plays in human actions. Therefore Aquinas proposition could be perceived the way of overcoming the dualism and removing some of the dilemas which are linked with “soul hypothesis” understood in traditional way.

scholarly journals THE SEARCH FOR THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN EXISTENCE IN R. GOLDSTEIN’S NOVEL ‘THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM’

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 107-116
Author(s):  
Alla K. Nikulina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Comparative Method ◽  
The Body ◽  
Central Character ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Cognitive Principles ◽  
Philosophical Texts ◽  
The Mind

The research examines the main problems raised in Goldstein’s philosophical novel. The paper aims to reveal how the creation of the characters and the development of the plot in accordance with the philosophical theories of Descartes, Malebranche and Spinoza allow the writer to explore the metaphysical and ethical consequences of following their philosophical ideas in everyday life. Applying the comparative method of analysis to the novel and the classical philosophical texts, the author of the study interprets the text of the novel, rich in symbols and intentionally foregrounded details, and discloses the artistic means used for creating the opposition of the material and the spiritual. Primarily, the confrontation becomes apparent in the image of the central character and her persistent inner conflicts between the rational and the emotional, the publicly displayed and the internal, the objective and the subjective. The main character’s failure to achieve life harmony by a mechanical combination of heterogeneous principles is viewed as a crucial detail, with the help of which the writer strives to emphasize the inconsistency of the dualistic worldview in general. One of the possible ways to overcome philosophical dualism is found in Malebranche’s philosophy, in which the gap between the material and the spiritual is bridged by their unification in the idea of the primary rational source; however, the concept does not look impeccable, with too much emphasis given to the mind at the expense of the body. The main opportunity to achieve harmony and moral progress is finally associated with Spinoza’s philosophical guidelines, which not only assert the importance of the rational cognitive principles and common sense but also demonstrate practical ways to combine freedom and care for another person, emotions and reason.

Finite Subjects in the Ethics

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Body ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Finite Minds

This chapter suggests a new interpretation of Spinoza’s concept of mind claiming that the goal of the equation of the human mind with the idea of the body is not to solve the mind-body problem, but rather to show how we can, within the framework of Spinoza’s rationalism, conceive of finite minds as irreducibly distinguishable individuals. To support this view, the chapter discusses the passage from E2p11 to E2p13 against the background of three preliminaries, i.e. the notion of a union between mind and body as it appears in Thomas Aquinas’ refutation of Averroism, Spinoza’s views on knowledge of actually existing things in E2p8c, and the phenomenological character of E2a2-4. It argues that while this view on the human mind does not undermine radical rationalism, it does require its amendment by some irreducibly empirical concessions.

Why the Modern Intellectual Cannot Attain the Truth?

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aadil Farook
Keyword(s):  
Integrated Circuits ◽  
Computer Technology ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
The Body ◽  
Western Philosophy ◽  
Western Thought ◽  
Modern Period ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

AbstractThe body-soul duality has confused some of the most sophisticated minds since antiquity. The spiritual masters of all traditions claim that the soul, too, has organs. Let us look at what Western philosophy calls the mind-body problem. Neuroscientists claim the mind-brain duality is true; the mind is to the soul what the brain is to the body. The mind is a “spiritual” brain distinct from the biological brain. To understand how they interact, we will look at computer technology as an analogy. Intelligence itself is part of the software, but it cannot perform its function without its information processor, i.e. the hardware. The intelligence is the software whereas the brain is the hardware. Furthermore, in both cases, the former is non-material whereas the latter is material.Perhaps the two most fascinating scientific discoveries in the last few years are the following. First, the biological heart, which was viewed for centuries as being nothing more than a pump, is actually a great deal more - it is an intelligent organ. Secondly, there is a duality in the heart as well: in addition to the biological heart, there is also a spiritual heart. But the mystery goes much deeper than that and, if it had been understood properly in the modern period, would not have given birth to so many “isms.” The history of Western thought is full of false prophets who claim to lead humankind out of darkness. Is it not amazing how some of the most educated and intelligent people can become completely foolish when it comes to religion? People who can design highly complex integrated circuits can still fail to understand the simple teachings of religious scriptures.This article deals with the major philosophical and spiritual implications of the new insights brought to us by science on a much larger scale than anticipated by those who explored them.

scholarly journals Historical epistemology of the body-mind interaction in psychiatry

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-13
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Structural Changes ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
The Body ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain

This paper deals with the history of the relationship between the mind-body dualism and the epistemology of madness. Earlier versions of such dualism posed little problem in regard to the manner of their communication. The Cartesian view that mind and body did, in fact, name different substances introduced a problem of incommunicability that is yet to be resolved. Earlier views that madness may be related to changes in the brain began gaining empirical support during the 17th century. Writers on madness chose to resolve the mind-body problem differently Some stated that such communication was not needed; others, that mind was a redundant concept, as madness could be fully explained by structural changes in the brain; and yet others described psychological spaces for madness to inhabit as a symbolic conflict. The epistemology of the neurosciences bypasses the conundrum, as it processes all together the variables representing the brain, subjectivity, and behavior and bridges the “philosophical” gap by means of correlational structures.

Almog's Descartes

Philosophy ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-431
Author(s):  
Fred Ablondi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
The Body ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Antoine Arnauld

The answer which Joseph Almog gives to the question which serves as the title of his recent book What Am I? (subtitled: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem) is based upon his interpretation of (1) and objection to Descartes' argument for the distinction of the mind and the body raised by Antoine Arnauld, as well as Descartes' response to it, and (2) Descartes' letters of 9 February 1645 to Denis Mesland. I will argue that both of these interpretations are incorrect, and as such do not support the conclusions which Almog claims to draw from them. The answer, then to the question of what I am which Almog provides is, I believe, not one Descartes would have held, nor one which his writings support.

The Body as a ‘Legitimate Naturalization of Consciousness’

2013 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 43-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudolf Bernet
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
The Body ◽  
Pure Consciousness ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Phenomenology Of The Body ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Bodily Sensations ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind

AbstractHusserl's phenomenology of the body constantly faces issues of demarcation: between phenomenology and ontology, soul and spirit, consciousness and brain, conditionality and causality. It also shows that Husserl was eager to cross the borders of transcendental phenomenology when the phenomena under investigation made it necessary. Considering the details of his description of bodily sensations and bodily behaviour from a Merleau-Pontian perspective allows one also to realise how Husserl (unlike Heidegger) fruitfully explores a phenomenological field located between a science of pure consciousness and the natural sciences. A phenomenological discussion of naturalism thus cannot limit itself to the task of discrimination, it must attempt to integrate what an eidetic analysis has separated: inside and outside, here and there, first-person and third-person perspective, motivation and causality. Husserl's phenomenology of the body thus shows that dualism is at best a methodological but never an ontological option for the mind-body problem.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document