Political corruption in Zimbabwe: News media, audiences and deliberative democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 174165902110224
Author(s):  
Mthokozisi Phathisani Ndhlovu ◽  
Phillip Santos

Even though corruption by politicians and in politics is widespread worldwide, it is more pronounced in developing countries, such as Zimbabwe, where members of the political elite overtly abuse power for personal accumulation of wealth. Ideally, the news media, as watchdogs, are expected to investigate and report such abuses of power. However, previous studies in Zimbabwe highlight the news media’s polarised and normative inefficacies. Informed by the theoretical notion of deliberative democracy developed via Habermas and Dahlgren’s work and Hall’s Encoding, Decoding Model, this article uses qualitative content analysis to examine how online readers of Zimbabwe’s two leading daily publications, The Herald and NewsDay, interpreted and evaluated allegations of corruption leveled against ministers and deputy ministers during the height of factionalism in the ruling party (ZANU PF). The article argues that interaction between mainstream media and their audiences online shows the latter’s resourcefulness and, at least, discursive agency in their engagement with narratives about political corruption, itself an imperative premise for future political action.

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melis G. Laebens ◽  
Aykut Öztürk

Although theories of partisanship were developed for the democratic context, partisanship can be important in electoral autocracies as well. We use survey data to analyze partisanship in an electoral autocracy, Turkey, and find that partisanship is pervasive, strong, and consequential. Using the Partisan Identity Scale to measure partisanship, we show that, like in democracies, partisanship strength is associated with political attitudes and action. Unlike in democracies, however, the ruling party’s superior ability to mobilize supporters through clientelistic linkages makes the association between partisanship and political action weaker for ruling party partisans. We find that partisan identities are tightly connected to the perception that other parties may threaten one’s well-being, and that such fears are widespread on both sides of the political divide. We interpret our findings in light of the autocratization process Turkey went through. Our contribution highlights the potential of integrating regime dynamics in studies of partisanship.


2013 ◽  
pp. 976-992
Author(s):  
Melissa Wall ◽  
Treepon Kirdnark

Since the turn of the century, Thailand, dubbed as the “Land of Smiles,” has been racked by internal political instability, turmoil, and violence. This study assesses how an ongoing political crisis in Thailand is deconstructed via blogs. A qualitative content analysis of 45 blogs (838 posts) about Thailand indicates that during a peak period of massive anti-government protests in the spring of 2010, blog posts about the crisis tended to fall under three categories: (a) creating a partisan view of the political conflict, which largely mirrored the dominant discourses already present in mainstream media; (b) presenting a dispassionate account that often provided a synthesis of different viewpoints; or (c) offering improvised accounts of what expatriate-tourist bloggers perceived to be important yet having little context to explain. It is argued that although blogging potentially offers new spaces for representing political perspectives in and about Thailand, these perspectives do not always enhance the public’s understanding of the political processes and in some cases fan the flames of inflammatory rhetoric.


Author(s):  
Melissa Wall ◽  
Treepon Kirdnark

Since the turn of the century, Thailand, dubbed as the “Land of Smiles,” has been racked by internal political instability, turmoil, and violence. This study assesses how an ongoing political crisis in Thailand is deconstructed via blogs. A qualitative content analysis of 45 blogs (838 posts) about Thailand indicates that during a peak period of massive anti-government protests in the spring of 2010, blog posts about the crisis tended to fall under three categories: (a) creating a partisan view of the political conflict, which largely mirrored the dominant discourses already present in mainstream media; (b) presenting a dispassionate account that often provided a synthesis of different viewpoints; or (c) offering improvised accounts of what expatriate-tourist bloggers perceived to be important yet having little context to explain. It is argued that although blogging potentially offers new spaces for representing political perspectives in and about Thailand, these perspectives do not always enhance the public’s understanding of the political processes and in some cases fan the flames of inflammatory rhetoric.


Author(s):  
Lucas Graves ◽  
Chris Wells

Theories of democracy in communication studies have emphasized the importance of citizens encountering quality political information and incorporating that information into their views. These emphases on exposure tend to take the truth of the information being consumed for granted. Today, the problem of truth has become more visible, inviting reconsideration of how we expect truth to operate in democratic society. In this chapter, we suggest the need to consider not only the availability of information but also the conditions under which leaders and other communicators are held accountable for the veracity of their claims—a process we call factual accountability. We argue that members of the political elite, news media, and citizens each have roles to play in establishing factual accountability, but trends in each of these realms pose challenges to a truth-driven information order. We conclude with suggestions for reconstructing factual accountability as a basis for public conversation.


Significance Opposition victories, especially those that remove long-standing authoritarian regimes, have been associated with democratic strengthening, with transfers of power shown to boost public support for democracy and demonstrate that the political elite is willing to share power, bolstering democratic norms and values. Impacts Evidence of further opposition victories will encourage authoritarian leaders to deploy more intense pre-election repression. Ruling parties at risk of losing polls may try to exploit the pandemic to postpone elections, especially in more authoritarian settings. While transfers of power have often strengthened democracy, they largely disrupt rather than bring an end to political corruption networks.


1973 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Furedi

The absence of popular participation in the political process of post-independent Kenya should be seen as the outcome of a political tension, which has its roots in the colonial period. The growth of Nairobi, a colonial urban centre par excellence, provided unequal opportunities for its African population. The majority of the Nairobi Africans came to constitute the African crowd—domestic servants, the majority of workers in private and public employment, and petty traders. This group should be distinguished from the Nairobi African middle class which formed the ‘political élite’. The African middle class possessed a fairly high level of education and had remunerative positions with government or were wealthy traders. By the mid-'forties, this group had become well integrated within the colonial system.The different, and often contradictory, interests of these two groups of people was strikingly manifested on the level of political action. The ‘popular movements’ of the African crowd were direct and often extra-constitutional. Their organizations, e.g. the 40 Group, were characteristically militant, and were often based on mass support. The ‘élite politics’ of the African middle class were strictly constitutional and moderate. Their goal—to consolidate their position within the colonial system—had obviously only limited appeal. The conflict between these two social groups was resolved by the elimination of the African crowd as a political force.


Subject Tanzania election outlook. Significance Tanzania faces a prolonged period of electioneering as the political elite prepares for the October 2020 general election. Even for a country in which the ruling party has successfully won every election it has contested, the jostling for power in this election cycle will be heavily inward-looking. Factionalism, posturing and settling of scores within the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party will take centre stage. Impacts Pre-selection campaigns are self-funded; this will increase corruption risks as candidates look to secure and spend campaign funds. The government has already limited civil service decision-making power; with ministers distracted, decisions will slow further. The president may leverage internal competition over cabinet posts to further centralise his control of the party.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Bourrie

Background  Mainstream news media play an important role in the political system. For instance, they can use their authoritative voices to give legitimacy to regimes. In contrast, the fringe press is easily identified by its often outrageous partisanship. Fringe media such as Julius Streicher’s Der Stürmer and Rwanda’s Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines usually have no credibility with non-partisan audiences.Analysis  Mainstream media, because of their own credibility, can give credibility to criminal states. Analysis of the historical record shows that mainstream media escape prosecution in the rare cases where they are called to account for underpinning state criminality. Conclusions and implications  This article discusses the prosecution of the fringe partisan press for acting as propagandists for criminal states, while more “credible” mainstream journalists escape prosecution. Contexte  Les médias d’information grand public jouent un rôle important dans les systèmes politiques. Par exemple, ils peuvent utiliser leur autorité pour légitimer certains gouvernements. À l’inverse, on reconnaît facilement les médias marginaux à leur partisanerie parfois outrancière. Normalement, des médias marginaux comme Der Stürmer de Julius Streicher et Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines au Rwanda n’ont aucune crédibilité auprès de publics non-partisans.Analyse  Les médias grand public, à cause de leur propre crédibilité, peuvent prêter une certaine crédibilité aux états criminels. Par surcroît, une analyse historique montre que ces médias, dans les quelques cas où on leur demande de rendre compte de leurs actions, sont rarement poursuivis en justice pour leur appui d’un état criminel.Conclusions et implications  Cet article discute de poursuites judiciaires envers la presse marginale ayant fait de la propagande pour un état criminel, dans des circonstances où l’on épargnerait normalement les journalistes traditionnels dits « crédibles. »


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-291
Author(s):  
Gayathry Venkiteswaran

Abstract This paper focuses on the political changes that have taken place in Malaysia leading to and resulting from the 14th general elections in May 2018. The political change offered an opportunity for changes and reforms in the media sector, especially in light of the promises made by the new government to free up the laws and rules on censorship and access to information. To date, the implementation of reforms has met hurdles, U-turns and the realities of structural and political barriers that see continuity of policies, rather than outright transformation. Reflecting on the experiences of media reforms and assistance, this paper argues that initiatives focused at media work and laws are expected to have limited results given the partisan and conservative nature of the mainstream media. It will also be difficult for Malaysia’s news media to regain public confidence after years of declining trust, especially as the media community has yet to come together reclaim and defend its rights.


2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Markovska ◽  
Nya Adams

Purpose – This paper aims to discuss political corruption in Nigeria and to assess the limitation of the immunity clause of the Nigerian constitution. This is particularly important in light of the recent developments to criminalise money-laundering in the country. Design/methodology/approach – This paper evaluates the legal anti-money laundering framework in Nigeria, in particular, the impact of the immunity clause of Nigerian constitution. Findings – Endemic corruption of the political elite leads to the abuse of the constitutional immunity clause, and significantly impairs the activities of the anti-money laundering agencies. Research limitations/implications – This paper draws on the experience of Nigeria, and is specifically looking at one obstacle on the way to fight money laundering and corruption. It is important to conduct further comparative analysis. Originality/value – This paper discusses political, economic and legal developments in Nigeria to show how the immunity clause prevents the successful prosecution of corrupt Nigerian politicians, and discusses measures taken to prevent corruption in the country.


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