scholarly journals With a Little Help from the Opposition? Relaxing Term Limits in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2017

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 49-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrián Lucardi ◽  
María Gabriela Almaraz
Keyword(s):  
Term Limits ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Constitutional Reforms ◽  
Divide And Rule ◽  
Incumbent Party

How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally, or (b) the opposition is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects; moreover, (c) this second effect should be stronger when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform because this precludes the executive from playing a “divide-and-rule” strategy. We examine these claims with data from the Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2017. In line with expectations, the results show that the probability of initiating a reform is highest when the executive's party controls a supermajority of seats, but falls sharply when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform and this party expects to do well in the next executive election.

Render unto Caesar Just a Little Bit Longer: The Relationship between Constitutional Reforms and Executive Survival

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Tofigh Maboudi ◽  
Ghazal P. Nadi ◽  
Todd A. Eisenstadt
Keyword(s):  
Term Limits ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Third ◽  
Constitutional Reforms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract Since the third wave of democracy, term limits have become a popular fixture of most constitutions intended to constrain the executive. Yet, recent constitutional reforms around the world show that presidents seeking re-election sometimes overturn the entire constitutional order to extend their power. What is the impact of these constitutional manipulations on the longevity of the executive in office? Using survival analysis of all political leaders and national constitutions from 1875 to 2015, this article demonstrates, for the first time, that when ‘authoritarian-aspiring’ presidents remove constitutional term limits, they increase their stay in office by more than 40%. Our findings contrast with a widely held position in the comparative authoritarian literature suggesting that dictators survive longer under institutional constraints. On the contrary, we argue that by removing constitutional barriers, rulers consolidate more power at the expense of their most ambitious allies and can stay in power longer.

Executive Department

2020 ◽  
pp. 91-104
Author(s):  
Richard B. Collins ◽  
Dale A. Oesterle ◽  
Lawrence Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Special Power ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
General Section

This chapter looks at Article IV of the Colorado Constitution, which defines the executive department. By providing for the separate election of the secretary of state, treasurer, and attorney general, Section 1 seems to divide executive branch authority. In practice, this tension has mattered only when the attorney general and governor belonged to different political parties, and the attorney general asserted a legal position opposed by the governor. Section 1 imposes term limits on the state’s elective executives. Section 11 gives the governor the usual veto power followed by Section 12, giving the special power of the line-item veto over appropriations bills. Section 13 has complex provisions for succession if the governor’s office becomes vacant during a term.

Legislative Department

2020 ◽  
pp. 105-170
Author(s):  
Richard B. Collins ◽  
Dale A. Oesterle ◽  
Lawrence Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Term Limits ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Legislative Power

This chapter explains Article V of the Colorado Constitution, which structures the legislative department. Original Section 1 vested all of the state’s legislative power in the general assembly. The rest of Section 1—added in 1910 and after—established, defined, and modified powers of citizens’ initiative and veto referendum. Section 3 defines the terms of senators and representatives and imposes term limits. Section 32 defines appropriations bills subject to the governor’s line-item veto, and Section 21 protects that veto power. Sections 20, 22a, and 22b require committee consideration of all bills but also prevent committees and caucus positions from killing bills. Sections 44–48.4 define and empower commissions to redistrict congressional and legislative seats.

Electoral support and militants’ targeting strategies

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332110477
Author(s):  
Deniz Aksoy ◽  
David Carlson
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Incumbent Party ◽  
Electoral Performance ◽  
The Impact

Militant groups that are in armed conflict with a government often coexist with political parties that have ethnic or ideological connections to them. In this article, we explore the extent to which electoral support received by militant associated opposition parties and nationally incumbent political parties influences subnational variation in militant attacks. We argue, and empirically demonstrate, that militants strategically target localities where the levels of electoral support for the opposition party and the nationally incumbent party are close in an effort to negatively influence the electoral performance of the incumbent party. To illustrate this dynamic we examine subnational data from 1995 to 2015 Turkish legislative elections and attacks organized by the Kurdish militants within the same time period. We also examine the impact of June 2015 legislative elections on militant attacks until the snap elections in November 2015. Our empirical examination shows that militants target localities where electoral support for the governing party and Kurdish opposition party is close. Moreover, increase in violence negatively influences the electoral performance of the governing party. However, it does not consistently have a significant influence on the opposition. The findings illustrate that militants strategically choose the location of their attacks based on electoral dynamics, and attacks can pose an electoral challenge to the governing party.

scholarly journals Consolidating the Putin Regime: The 2020 Referendum on Russia’s Constitutional Amendments

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-376
Author(s):  
Derek S. Hutcheson ◽  
Ian McAllister
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Important Change ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Constitutional Reforms ◽  
Vladimir Putin

Abstract In July 2020, Russian voters gave strong support to a package of constitutional reforms that reconfigured the Russian political system and enshrined social guarantees and conservative identity values, consolidating the regime that has been built over a 20-year period. This was achieved through an alteration that ‘zeroed’ presidential terms that commenced before the constitutional change, potentially allowing President Vladimir Putin to overcome term limits and continue in office beyond 2024. The article explains how such a far-reaching and important change was successfully endorsed by the Russian electorate. The analysis shows that the main explanation rests with variations in voting patterns across the regions, a pattern that has been evident in previous Russian elections and resulted in strong pro-Putin support. The article also evaluates questions raised about the legitimacy of the result, and its long-term significance for the Russian political system.

Presidential Term Limits in Bolivia

2019 ◽  
pp. 535-554
Author(s):  
David Doyle
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Legal Issue ◽  
Long Line ◽  
Constitutional Reforms ◽  
Political Battle

The current 2009 Constitution of Bolivia specifies that the president may serve for a maximum of two consecutive five-year terms. This constitution however, is the latest in a long line of constitutional reforms, which have seen term limits repeatedly altered. Across seventeen different constitutions since 1826, Bolivia has overseen twelve reforms to term limits. As argued in this chapter, constitutionalism and term limits in Bolivia, partly due to the period of near constant constitutional reform in the latter half of the nineteenth century, were part of the wider political battle waged by rival caudillos in their pursuit of the presidential prize. Term limits became an instrumental concern, not a normative legal issue, and this legacy has important implications for the debate over term limits in Bolivia today. As such, support for, or opposition to, any reform of term limits tends to be shaped by partisan concerns above all else.

Voting and Vetoing

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-823 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyal Winter
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Quantitative Results ◽  
Noncooperative Bargaining

The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.

Mauritania anti-slavery campaign will be reinvigorated

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Term Limits ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Sensitive Issue ◽  
The Status ◽  
National Forum ◽  
Release From Prison

Subject The outlook for the anti-slavery campaign Significance Opposition party Rally of Democratic Forces (RFD) on July 18 condemned the imprisonment of seven activists of the anti-slavery 'February 25 Movement' who had been protesting against the jailing of another activist. Anti-slavery campaigning and protests have increased since the surprise release from prison of abolitionist leader Biram Ould Dah Ould Abeid (Biram Dah Abeid) in May. The authorities have responded with arrests. The status of black citizens is a sensitive issue in Mauritania with implications for the country's development and stability. Impacts Dah Abeid would need to attract support from the mainstream hardline opposition party, National Forum for Democracy and Unity (FNDU). Further arrests could signal a sustained crackdown or even a future move to prevent Dah Abeid challenging for the presidency. Abdelaziz's senate abolition and scrapping of presidential term limits are intended to clear the path for a third term for him.

scholarly journals Violence and Votes in Nigeria: The Dominance of Incumbents in the Use of Violence to Rig Elections

2014 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakeem Onapajo
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
The Other ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Critical Question ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Electoral Violence ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Incumbent Party

Which party uses violence to influence election outcomes? There are two existing perspectives that have offered responses to this critical question. One is a more popular position indicating that the incumbent party, more than the opposition party, makes use of violence with the aim of rigging elections; the other is a more radical perspective that suggests that electoral violence is more associated with the weakest party than with the incumbent. This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate and to advance the argument suggesting the dominance of the incumbent in the use of violence to rig elections. With evidence sourced from well-trusted reports from independent election monitors, this paper shows with case studies from Nigeria at different electoral periods that, in terms of influencing election outcomes, the incumbent has been more associated with violence during elections than the opposition. It is further argued in the paper that the existing nature of executive power in Nigeria provides a plausible explanation for the incumbent's violence during elections.

The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARKO KLAŠNJA ◽  
ROCÍO TITIUNIK
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Additional Data ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Incumbent Party ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Empirical Implications

We study how representation works in a context where accountability to voters is restricted because of term limits and accountability to parties is limited because of party weakness. Analyzing all Brazilian mayoral elections between 1996 and 2012 using a regression discontinuity design, we show that becoming the incumbent party results in large subsequent electoral losses. We theorize that the presence of term limits, combined with political parties to which politicians are only weakly attached, affects the incentives and behavior of individual politicians in such a way that their parties’ suffer systematic losses. A descriptive analysis of an original dataset on the career paths of Brazilian mayors suggests that our assumptions are an accurate description of Brazil’s political context, and we find support for three central empirical implications of our theoretical explanation. Moreover, based on an analysis of additional data from Mexico, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, and Colombia, we show that the negative effects found in Brazil also exist in other democracies.

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