scholarly journals The workings of the single member plurality electoral system in India and the need for reform

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-161
Author(s):  
Rekha Diwakar

India uses the single member plurality system (SMPS) to elect members of the lower house of its national (federal) parliament and the state assemblies. The electoral system has remained stable despite its inherent disproportionality, India’s highly heterogeneous population and, more recently, a fragmented party system. Using a comprehensive data set covering all national and some state assembly elections during the period 1952–2017, this article evaluates how SMPS has performed in India in comparison to its expected benefits, and whether there is a case for reform of the electoral system. The article finds that SMPS neither provides effective representation nor is likely to lead to stable single party governments in India – a situation that could be termed ‘the worst of both worlds’. It also highlights that a combination of rational-choice behaviour on the part of key actors as well as historical and institutional reasons has ensured the continuation of SMPS in India. The article concludes that it is time for India to seriously consider reforming its electoral system.

Author(s):  
Steven R. Reed

This chapter describes and analyzes the electoral systems used to elect members of the Japanese Diet since 1947. The more powerful lower house has used two different electoral systems, and the upper house has used three. The chapter focuses on each system’s effects on the quality of democracy, particularly malapportionment and alternation in power. Electoral systems powerfully influence the quality of democracy. Many of those effects can be predicted by political science theory, but others cannot. The chapter shows that the effects of the first electoral system have long-lasting effects. The institutions and practices developed as the party system develops are not easily changed by later political reforms.


Author(s):  
Agustí Bosch

This chapter examines the Spanish electoral system, meaning—first and foremost—the one used to elect the lower house (Congreso de los Diputados). After a brief description of its components, the chapter assesses how its scarce proportionality has traditionally led Spanish politics towards a two-party system. The chapter also assesses some other of its alleged outcomes (such as the malapportionment, the weight of the regional parties, or the robustness of democracy) and its prospects for the future. Finally, the chapter also examines the ‘other’ Spanish electoral systems—that is, the ones used to elect the Senate, the local councils, the regional parliaments, and the Spanish seats in the European Parliament.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 570-580
Author(s):  
Ignacio Lago ◽  
Mariano Torcal

A new theoretical development for examining the institutionalization of party systems is proposed in this article. We build on electoral coordination theories to disaggregate volatility into the vote transfers that occur between or towards parties that are in equilibrium (which we call endogenous volatility) and those that are not (exogenous volatility). The former captures accountability, and the latter reflects the number of voters who are not acting in accordance with the existing equilibrium in the party system. Exogenous volatility measures the institutionalization of party systems. We also show that endogenous volatility depends on government performance, while exogenous volatility is a function of institutional openness. The empirical evidence comes from an original data set that includes 448 electoral cycles in lower-house elections in 66 countries between 1977 and 2011.


Author(s):  
Ian McAllister ◽  
Toni Makkai

Australia is often characterized as “a democratic laboratory,” where a wide variety of electoral systems have been designed and implemented. Australia gave the world “the Australian ballot” (or secret ballot), and it is one of the few countries to operate an enforced system of compulsory voting. This chapter examines the evolution of the electoral systems in the lower House of Representatives and in the upper house, the Senate. Particular attention is given to the design of the Senate electoral system, and to the changes that were implemented at the 2016 election to eliminate the proliferation of “micro parties.” The development of compulsory voting is also outlined, and its consequences for the party system evaluated. Finally, the chapter discusses the major challenges to reform of the electoral system.


1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul V. Warwick

The results of a quantitative investigation into the factors affecting coalition government membership in West European parliamentary democracies are reported in this article. Using a new data set covering the post-war era to 1990, separate logistic regression analyses are performed to determine what influences the odds of becoming the government ‘formateur’ and the odds of becoming a coalition partner. In addition, Laver and Shepsle's portfolio allocation theory is subjected to testing. Among the independent variables considered are a party's size, its previous experience in government, its willingness to trade off policy for office, and its ideological position in the parliamentary party system. The findings point to the important roles played by the formateur's preferences and by the need to build workable coalitions, given party-system constraints. They also suggest several criteria that ought to, but often do not, guide formal theory-building.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Raabe ◽  
Eric Linhart

Electoral systems are typically faced with the problem of being asked to provide both proportional representation and party system concentration leading to accountable government. Which electoral system designs are able to successfully deliver on both these challenges and thus optimize the representativeness – accountability trade-off? This paper investigates the performance of different general electoral system designs as well as their specific technical details (such as legal threshold, tier linkages, and compensation mechanisms) based on a data set of 590 elections in 57 countries. The key results are that both proportional representation systems with moderate district magnitudes and mixed-member proportional systems are able to optimize performance. Going to the level of details confirms these results and deepens our understanding further: while different technical changes are able to improve the chances of reaching the best of both worlds, some of these (e.g. raising the legal threshold) also increase the risk of ending up with the worst.


Author(s):  
Johan Lundberg

AbstractTheories of inter-jurisdictional tax and yardstick competition assume that the tax decisions of one jurisdiction will influence the tax decisions of other jurisdictions. This paper empirically addresses the issue of horizontal dependence in local personal income tax rates across jurisdictions. Based on a large data set covering Swedish municipalities over a period of 14 years, we test for interactions across municipalities that share a common border, across municipalities within a distance of 100 km of each other, and across municipalities with similar political representation in the local council. We also test the hypothesis that the tax rate of relatively larger municipalities has a greater influence on their neighbors' tax rate compared to the influence of their smaller neighbors. Our results suggest that when lagged tax rates are controlled for, the horizontal correlation across municipalities that share a common border or are within a distance of 100 km from each other becomes insignificant. This result is of importance as it suggests that lagged tax rates should be included or at least tested for when testing for horizontal interactions or mimicking in local tax rates. However, our results support the hypothesis of horizontal interactions across municipalities that share a common border when the influence of neighboring municipalities is also weighted by their relative population size, i.e. relatively larger neighbors tend to have a greater impact on their neighbor's tax rates than their relatively smaller neighbors. This is of importance as it suggests that distance or proximity matters, although only in combination with the relative population size. We also find some evidence of horizontal dependence across municipalities with similar political preferences.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Kselman ◽  
Eleanor Neff Powell ◽  
Joshua A. Tucker

This paper develops a novel argument as to the conditions under which new political parties will form in democratic states. Our approach hinges on the manner in which politicians evaluate the policy implications of new party entry alongside considerations of incumbency for its own sake. We demonstrate that if candidates care sufficiently about policy outcomes, then the likelihood of party entry shouldincreasewith the effective number of status quo parties in the party system. This relationship weakens, and eventually disappears, as politicians’ emphasis on “office-seeking” motivations increases relative to their interest in public policy. We test these predictions with both aggregate electoral data in contemporary Europe and a data set on legislative volatility in Turkey, uncovering support for the argument that party system fragmentation should positively affect the likelihood of entry when policy-seeking motivations are relevant, but not otherwise.


2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-77
Author(s):  
Christina-Marie Juen ◽  
Markus Tepe ◽  
Michael Jankowski

In Germany, Independent Local Lists (UWG) have become an integral part of local politics in recent decades . Despite their growing political importance, the reasons for their electoral rise have hardly been researched . Recent studies argue that Independent Local Lists pursue anti-party positions, which makes them attractive to voters who are dissatisfied with the party system . Assuming that a decline of confidence in established parties corresponds with the experience of local deprivation, this contribution uses a multi-level panel data set to investigate how socio-economic (emigration, aging, declining tax revenue) and political­cultural (turnout, fragmentation) deprivation processes affect the electoral success of Inde­pendent Local Lists . The empirical findings suggest that Independent Local Lists are more successful in municipalities where voter turnout has fallen and political fragmentation has increased .


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document