Income mobility and the welfare state: an international comparison with panel data

1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 331-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Fabig

This article examines gross and net equivalent income mobility in the western and eastern states of Germany, in Great Britain and in the United States, using panel data of these countries from the period 1989-95. By comparing the differences between the mobility of gross and net equivalent income internationally, it analyses to what extent the welfare state reduces income mobility, thereby testing hypotheses concerning international differences in the mobility-reducing effect of the welfare state. The results show that the largest mobility-reducing effect is observed in eastern states of Germany, followed by western Germany. While the reduction of gross equivalent income mobility by the tax and transfer system is much smaller in Great Britain, this reduction cannot be observed in the USA at all. These results support the hypothesis that the mobility-reducing effect of the tax and transfer system is much stronger in conservative welfare states like Germany than in liberal welfare states like Great Britain and the USA. Résumé Cet article étudie les flux de revenus brut et net (y compris transferts) des individus dans le temps en Allemagne de l'Est et de l'Ouest, en Grande-Bretagne et aux Etats-Unis à partir de données couvrant la période 1989-95. Sur base d'une comparaison international sur les dynamiques entre revenus équivalents nets et bruts, il analyse dans quelle mesure le système de protection sociale réduit ces différences. Les résultats indiquent que l'effet de réduction le plus important s'observe en Allemagne de l'Est, suivie de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest. Si en Grande-Bretagne, cette réduction par le système de redistribution et d'imposition est nettement plus faible, aucune réduction ne s'observe aux Etats-Unis. Ces résultats soutiennent l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'effet réducteur de la mobilité des revenus par le système d'imposition et de redistribution est plus important dans les systèmes de sécurité sociale conservateurs comme l'Allemagne que dans le systèmes de protection sociale qualifié de libéraux comme la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis.

2006 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Hay

AbstractThe appeal to globalization as a non-negotiable external economic constraint plays an increasingly significant role in the linked politics of expectation suppression and welfare reform in contemporary Europe. Yet, although it threatens to become something of a self- fulfilling prophecy, the thesis that globalization entails welfare retrenchment and convergence is empirically suspect. In this paper it is argued that there is little evidence of convergence amongst European social models and that, although common trajectories can be identified, these have tended to be implemented more or less enthusiastically and at different paces to produce, to date, divergent outcomes. Second, I suggest that it is difficult to see globalization as the principal agent determining the path on which European social models are embarked since the empirical evidence points if anything to de-globalization rather than globalization. The implications of this for the future of the welfare state in Europe and for the USA as a model welfare state regime are explored.


Author(s):  
Jacob S. Hacker ◽  
Philipp Rehm

Abstract Leading accounts of the politics of the welfare state focus on societal demands for risk-spreading policies. Yet current measures of the welfare state focus not on risk, but on inequality. To address this gap, this letter describes the development of two new measures, risk incidence and risk reduction, which correspond to the prevalence of large income losses and the degree to which welfare states reduce that prevalence, respectively. Unlike existing indicators, these measures require panel data, which the authors harmonize for twenty-one democracies. The study finds that large losses affect all income and education levels, making the welfare state valuable to a broad cross-section of citizens. It also finds that taxes and transfers greatly reduce the prevalence of such losses, though to varying degrees across countries and over time. Finally, it disaggregates the measures to identify specific ‘triggers’ of large losses, and finds that these triggers are associated with risks on which welfare states focus, such as unemployment and sickness.


Author(s):  
David Garland

Every developed country has a distinctive welfare state of its own. Welfare states generally rely on the same basic institutions, but these institutions can operate in different ways. Welfare state programmes are government programmes, but while public authority is necessary to establish, fund, and regulate these programmes, the nature of government involvement varies. Three worlds of welfare have been identified: social democratic; conservative; and liberal. ‘Varieties’ describes the welfare state regimes that developed in Sweden, Germany, and the USA, each of which exemplifies one of these ‘worlds’ of welfare. It goes on to consider briefly the welfare regimes beyond the ‘three worlds’ and how Britain’s welfare regime has changed over time.


1990 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe van Parijs

ABSTRACTNo major reform of the welfare state has a chance of going through unless one can make a plausible case as to both its ‘ethical value’ and its ‘economic.value’, that is, that it would have a positive effect in terms of both justice and efficiency. In this essay, this rough conjecture is first presented, and its plausibility probed, on the background of some stylised facts about the rise of modern welfare states in the postwar period. Next, the focus is shifted to the current debate on the introduction of a basic income, a completely unconditional grant paid ex ante to all citizens. It is argued that if basic income is to have a chance of meeting the strong twofold condition stipulated in the conjecture, some major changes are required in the way one usually thinks about justice and efficiency in connection with social policy. But once these changes are made, as they arguably must be, the chance that basic income may be able to meet the challenge is greatly enhanced.


2005 ◽  
Vol 70 (6) ◽  
pp. 921-948 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Brady ◽  
Jason Beckfield ◽  
Martin Seeleib-Kaiser

Previous scholarship is sharply divided over how or if globalization influences welfare states. The effects of globalization may be positive causing expansion, negative triggering crisis and reduction, curvilinear contributing to convergence, or insignificant. We bring new evidence to bear on this debate with an analysis of three welfare state measures and a comprehensive array of economic globalization indicators for 17 affluent democracies from 1975 to 2001. The analysis suggests several conclusions. First, state-of-the-art welfare state models warrant revision in the globalization era. Second, most indicators of economic globalization do not have significant effects, but a few affect the welfare state and improve models of welfare state variation. Third, the few significant globalization effects are in differing directions and often inconsistent with extant theories. Fourth, the globalization effects are far smaller than the effects of domestic political and economic factors. Fifth, the effects of globalization are not systematically different between European and non-European countries, or liberal and non-liberal welfare regimes. Increased globalization and a modest convergence of the welfare state have occurred, but globalization does not clearly cause welfare state expansion, crisis, and reduction or convergence. Ultimately, this study suggests skepticism toward bold claims about globalization's effect on the welfare state.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 269-276
Author(s):  
Doğa Başar Sariipek ◽  
Gökçe Cerev ◽  
Bora Yenihan

The focus of this paper is the interaction between social innovation and restructuring welfare state. Modern welfare states have been reconfiguring their welfare mixes through social innovation. This includes a productive integration of formal and informal actors with support and leading role of the state. This collaboration becomes significantly important since it means the integration of not only the actors, but also their capabilities and resources in today’s world where new social risks and new social challenges have emerged and no actor can overcome these by its own. Therefore, social innovation is a useful tool in the new role sharing within the welfare mix in order to reach higher levels of satisfaction and success in welfare provision. The main point here is that this is not a zero-sum competition; gaining more power of the actors other than the state – the market, civil society organisations and the family – does not necessarily mean that the state lost its leading role and power. This is rather a new type of cooperation among actors and their capabilities as well as their resources in welfare provision. In this sense, social innovation may contribute well to the debates over the financial crisis of the welfare state since it may lead to the more wisely use of existing resources of welfare actors. Thanks to social innovative programs, not only the NGOs, but also market forces as well as citizens are more active to access welfare provisions and social protection in the broadest sense. Thus, social innovative strategies are definitely a solid step taken towards “enabling” or “active” welfare state.


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