scholarly journals Shapley value cooperative game theory-based locational marginal price computation for loss and emission reduction

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Venkataramana Veeramsetty
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Distributed Generator ◽  
Power Company ◽  
Locational Marginal Price ◽  
Distribution Company ◽  
Marginal Price

AbstractAn iterative method based on Shapley Value Cooperative Game Theory is proposed for the calculation of local marginal price (LMP) for each Distributed Generator (DG) bus on a network. The LMP value is determined for each DG on the basis of its contribution to reduce loss and emission reduction, which is assessed using the Shapley Value approach. The proposed approach enables the Distribution Company (DISCO) decision-maker to operate the network optimally in terms of loss and emission. The proposed method is implemented in the Taiwan Power Company distribution network 7 warnings consisting of 84 buses and 11 feeders in the MATLAB environment. The results show that the proposed approach allows DISCO to operate the network on the basis of its priority between the reduction of active power loss and emission in the network

Query Games in Databases

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-85
Author(s):  
Ester Livshits ◽  
Leopoldo Bertossi ◽  
Benny Kimelfeld ◽  
Moshe Sebag
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Computational Aspects ◽  
Aggregate Query ◽  
Boolean Query

Database tuples can be seen as players in the game of jointly realizing the answer to a query. Some tuples may contribute more than others to the outcome, which can be a binary value in the case of a Boolean query, a number for a numerical aggregate query, and so on. To quantify the contributions of tuples, we use the Shapley value that was introduced in cooperative game theory and has found applications in a plethora of domains. Specifically, the Shapley value of an individual tuple quantifies its contribution to the query. We investigate the applicability of the Shapley value in this setting, as well as the computational aspects of its calculation in terms of complexity, algorithms, and approximation.

A New Collaborative Filtering Approach Based on Game Theory for Recommendation Systems

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Selma Benkessirat ◽  
Narhimene Boustia ◽  
Rezoug Nachida
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Collaborative Filtering ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Recommendation Systems ◽  
Internet Users ◽  
User Communities ◽  
The One

Recommendation systems can help internet users to find interesting things that match more with their profile. With the development of the digital age, recommendation systems have become indispensable in our lives. On the one hand, most of recommendation systems of the actual generation are based on Collaborative Filtering (CF) and their effectiveness is proved in several real applications. The main objective of this paper is to improve the recommendations provided by collaborative filtering using clustering. Nevertheless, taking into account the intrinsic relationship between users can enhance the recommendations performances. On the other hand, cooperative game theory techniques such as Shapley Value, take into consideration the intrinsic relationship among users when creating communities. With that in mind, we have used SV for the creation of user communities. Indeed, our proposed algorithm preforms into two steps, the first one consists to generate communities user based on Shapley Value, all taking into account the intrinsic properties between users. It applies in the second step a classical collaborative filtering process on each community to provide the Top-N recommendation. Experimental results show that the proposed approach significantly enhances the recommendation compared to the classical collaborative filtering and k-means based collaborative filtering. The cooperative game theory contributes to the improvement of the clustering based CF process because the quality of the users communities obtained is better.

scholarly journals MODIFICATION OF SHAPLEY VALUE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN DECISION MAKING

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 257-272
Author(s):  
Leszek Zaremba ◽  
Cezary S. Zaremba ◽  
Marek Suchenek
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Computer Program ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Practical Point ◽  
Actual Strength

Abstract The article presents a solution of a problem that is critical from a practical point of view: how to share a higher than usual discount of $10 million among 5 importers. The discount is a result of forming a coalition by 5 current, formerly competing, importers. The use of Shapley value as a concept for co-operative games yielded a solution that was satisfactory for 4 lesser importers and not satisfactory for the biggest importer. Appropriate modification of Shapley value presented in this article allowed to identify appropriate distribution of the saved purchase amount, which according to each player accurately reflects their actual strength and position on the importer market. A computer program was used in order to make appropriate calculations for 325 permutations of all possible coalitions. In the last chapter of this paper, we recognize the lasting contributions of Lloyd Shapley to the cooperative game theory, commemorating his recent (March 12, 2016) descent from this world.

scholarly journals ON COOPERATIVE GAME APPROACH TO PROFIT SHARING IN A FEW PROJECTS MANAGEMENT PROBLEM

2019 ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
N. Boyko ◽  
S. Dotsenko
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Management Problem ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
Common Resource

The article is consider three different mechanisms of project’s profit sharing, assuming that the projects have common resource pool and both resources and profit may be distributed at arbitrary way without losses. The resources and profit distribution mechanisms are based on cooperative game theory thesis. As three different alternatives, such cooperative game solutions, as Shapley value, nucleolus ant τ-value are proposed. The calculation routine is delivered by easy typical example.

UNIONS AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: SOME INSIGHTS FROM A SIMPLE THREE-PLAYER EXAMPLE

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 383-402
Author(s):  
HARALD WIESE
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Theory Building ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
A Value ◽  
Basic Input

The aim of this paper is to analyze the interconnections between employment and unionization. We will also see how unemployment benefits drive the interplay of employment and unionization. The basic input into our model stems from cooperative game theory. Building on the Shapley value, several values for TU games with coalition structures have been presented in the literature, most notably by Aumann and Drèze and Owen. We present a value that is capable of dealing with unemployment and unionization. We show that unemployment benefits increase wages but contribute to unemployment, that unemployment can be voluntary, and that unions tend to be beneficial for employed workers if there is overstaffing.

scholarly journals Convex Interval Games

2009 ◽  
Vol 2009 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Z. Alparslan Gök ◽  
R. Branzei ◽  
S. Tijs
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Allocation Scheme ◽  
Weber Set ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Interval Games

Convex interval games are introduced and characterizations are given. Some economic situations leading to convex interval games are discussed. The Weber set and the Shapley value are defined for a suitable class of interval games and their relations with the interval core for convex interval games are established. The notion of population monotonic interval allocation scheme (pmias) in the interval setting is introduced and it is proved that each element of the Weber set of a convex interval game is extendable to such a pmias. A square operator is introduced which allows us to obtain interval solutions starting from the corresponding classical cooperative game theory solutions. It turns out that on the class of convex interval games the square Weber set coincides with the interval core.

scholarly journals Satisfaction-Based Energy Allocation with Energy Constraint Applying Cooperative Game Theory

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 1485
Author(s):  
Samira Ortiz ◽  
Mandoye Ndoye ◽  
Marcel Castro-Sitiriche
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Energy Consumption ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
User Satisfaction ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Pv System ◽  
Novel Method ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Satisfaction Model

There has been an effort for a few decades to keep energy consumption at a minimum or at least within a low-level range. This effort is more meaningful and complex by including a customer’s satisfaction variable to ensure that customers can achieve the best quality of life that could be derived from how energy is used by different devices. We use the concept of Shapley Value from cooperative game theory to solve the multi-objective optimization problem (MOO) to responsibly fulfill user’s satisfaction by maximizing satisfaction while minimizing the power consumption, with energy constrains since highly limited resources scenarios are studied. The novel method uses the concept of a quantifiable user satisfaction, along the concepts of power satisfaction (PS) and energy satisfaction (ES). The model is being validated by representing a single house (with a small PV system) that is connected to the utility grid. The main objectives are to (i) present the innovative energy satisfaction model based on responsible wellbeing, (ii) demonstrate its implementation using a Shapley-value-based algorithm, and (iii) include the impact of a solar photovoltaic (PV) system in the energy satisfaction model. The proposed technique determines in which hours the energy should be allocated to maximize the ES for each scenario, and then it is compared to cases in which devices are usually operated. Through the proposed technique, the energy consumption was reduced 75% and the ES increased 40% under the energy constraints.

MARKETING DECISION ANALYSIS BY TURF AND SHAPLEY VALUE

2005 ◽  
Vol 04 (01) ◽  
pp. 5-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. MICHAEL CONKLIN ◽  
STAN LIPOVETSKY
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Analysis ◽  
Marketing Strategy ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Product Mix ◽  
Marketing Decision ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Sample Proportion

We consider a problem of marketing decisions for the choice of a product with maximum customer appeal. A widely used technique for this purpose is TURF, or Total Unduplicated Reach and Frequency, which evaluates a union of the events defined by the sample proportion of many products, or flavors of one product. However, when using TURF, it is often impossible to distinguish between subsets of different flavor combinations with practically the same level of coverage. An appropriate tool can be borrowed from cooperative game theory, namely, the Shapley Value, that permits the ordering of flavors by their strength in achieving maximum consumers' reach and provides more stable results than TURF. We describe marketing strategy reasons for using these techniques in the identification of the preferred combinations in media or product mix.

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