TECHNIQUES OF ON‐SITE INSPECTION

Geophysics ◽  
1964 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-258
Author(s):  
Warren H. Westphal ◽  
Sylvan Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Seismic Event ◽  
Nuclear Explosion ◽  
Geographic Area ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Aerial Imaging ◽  
Gravity Measurements ◽  
On Site Inspection ◽  
Sufficient Precision ◽  
Electrical Geophysics

On‐site inspection of an unidentified seismic event comprises observations and measurements in a defined geographic area to distinguish between underground nuclear explosions and other sources of signals. If the event is determined to be a nuclear explosion, the detonation point must be located with sufficient precision to permit collection of radiochemical samples. This target will be a relatively small cavity or rubble zone buried at a depth at least ten times its diameter. A well‐executed test will be essentially devoid of surface evidences of emplacement activities and explosion. Suggested techniques of on‐site inspection include visual observations, aerial imaging, seismic‐noise monitoring, radiochemical and radioactivity exploration, electrical geophysics, and magnetic, geothermal, and gravity measurements. Some of these techniques are similar to those used by the exploration industry. Successful application to on‐site inspection problems requires intensive research and important modifications.

Key Aspects for the Definition of On-site Inspection Challenging Environments

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feihong Kuang ◽  
Gustavo Haquin Gerade
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Explosion ◽  
Climatic Conditions ◽  
Vegetation Coverage ◽  
Climate Conditions ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Challenging Environment ◽  
On Site Inspection ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Key Aspects

<p>On-site inspection (OSI) is an element of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), with the sole purpose to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the Treaty. An OSI could be launched in any environment where a triggering event occurred. A challenging environment may affect not only the signatures and observables of a nuclear explosion, but also the possibility to conduct the OSI. Harsh environmental conditions, such as extreme climate conditions, high vegetation coverage and complicated topographic characteristics, among others, could slow down the deployment of field missions, and affect the state-of-health of OSI equipment and even the performance of inspectors, thereby compromising the whole inspection. Thus, the operationalization of OSI in different environments is an important aspect in the development of OSI capability. In this respect, well defined OSI environment is an important step towards the development of comprehensive OSI capabilities. Based on the analysis of historical underground nuclear explosions data and knowledge on the environmental impact on observables, equipment and inspectors, a definition of OSI environment was developed. Climatic conditions were grouped into the main five groups of the Köppen-Geiger classification scheme. Vegetation coverage was re-grouped in four of the 16 classes of land coverage (not including water bodies) following the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme. Complicated landforms grouped in topographic classification using a digital elevation model based on slope gradient, surface texture and local convexity within neighboring cells was used to classify topographic relief of four types of landforms for OSI. In this presentation, it is shown how these key environmental aspects will impact the conduct of an OSI.</p>

scholarly journals On site inspection for nuclear test ban verirication

1994 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
P. D. Marschall
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Explosion ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
The Political ◽  
Chemical Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Chemical Weapon Convention ◽  
On Site Inspection ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

The problem of verifying compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty is mainly a technical one. However the problem of detecting, locating and identifying nuclear explosions has, since the late 1950s, been intimately involved with the political problems associated with negotiating a treaty. In fact there are few other areas in which policy, diplomacy and science have been so interwoven. This paper attempts to illustrate how technology can. be applied to solve some of the political problems which arise when considering the role of an On Site Inspection (OSI) to determine whether or not a nuclear explosion, in violation of a treaty, has occurred or not. It is hoped that the reader, with a scientific background, but with little or no experience of treaty negotiations, will gain an. insight as to how technical matters can interact with political requirements. The demands made on scientists to provide technical support for negotiating and rnonitoring compliance of a treaty have increased significanfly over the last 40 years. This is a period in which a number of major treaties have contained a significant technical component e.g. the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Threshold Treaty) and the Chemical Weapon Convention. This paper gives an indication of some of the political decisions which will have to be made and suggests some of the technical methods which are of value in the identification of a clandestine nuclear explosion.

On the Indicators of the Radioecological Situation at the Mid-Botuobin Oil and Gas Condensate Field with Underground Nuclear Explosions

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
V.E. Stepanov ◽  
V.D. Yakovleva ◽  
E.V. Sleptsova
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Development ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Nuclear Explosion ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosion ◽  
Laboratory Studies ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Radionuclide Composition ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Impact Zones

The results of expeditionary and laboratory studies of the radiation situation of 2001–2002 and dosimetry measurements of 2017 are presented. there are small radioactive spots. The radionuclide composition in the soil-vegetation cover of the impact zones of the underground nuclear explosion has been studied. Data obtained prior to the industrial development of the field are reperator for further radioecological research and can be used by subsoil users in the development of the area.

scholarly journals Discriminating underground nuclear explosions leading to late-time radionuclide gas seeps

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dylan Robert Harp ◽  
Suzanne Michelle Bourret ◽  
Philip H. Stauffer ◽  
Ed Michael Kwicklis
Keyword(s):  
Late Time ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Gas Seeps

Study of low-magnitude seismic events near the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site

1997 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 1563-1575
Author(s):  
Frode Ringdal
Keyword(s):  
Monitoring Network ◽  
Test Site ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
P Wave ◽  
Scaling Effects ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Novaya Zemlya ◽  
Source Scaling ◽  
Low Magnitude

Abstract A study of available seismic data shows that all but one of the 42 known underground nuclear explosions at Novaya Zemlya have been detected and located by stations in the global seismic network. During the past 30 years, only one seismic event in this area has been unambiguously classified as an earthquake (1 August 1986, mb = 4.3). Several other small events, most of which are thought to be either chemical explosions or aftereffects of nuclear explosions, have also been detected. Since 1990, a network of sensitive regional arrays has been installed in northern Europe in preparation for the global seismic monitoring network under a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT). This regional network has provided a detection capability for Novaya Zemlya that is shown to be close to mb = 2.5. Three low-magnitude events have been detected and located during this period, as discussed in this article: 31 December 1992 (mb = 2.7), 13 June 1995 (mb = 3.5), and 13 January 1996 (mb = 2.4). To classify the source types of these events has proved very difficult. Thus, even for the mb = 3.5 event in 1995, we have been unable to provide a confident classification of the source as either an earthquake or explosion using the available discriminants. A study of mb magnitude in different frequency bands shows, as expected, that the calculation of mb at regional distances needs to take into account source-scaling effects at high frequencies. Thus, when comparing a 4 to 8 or 8 to 16 Hz filter band to a “teleseismic” 2 to 4 Hz band, the smaller events have, relatively speaking, significantly more high-frequency energy (up to 0.5 mb units) than the larger events. This suggests that a P-wave spectral magnitude scale might be appropriate. The problem of accurately locating small events using a sparse array network is addressed using the 13 January 1996 event, which was detected by only two arrays, as an illustrative example. Our analysis demonstrates the importance of using accurately calibrated regional travel-time curves and, at the same time, illustrates how array processing can be used to identify an interfering phase from a local disturbance, thereby avoiding location errors due to erroneous phase readings.

Could the Beirut Explosion perturb the Ionosphere? Pre-results Using TEC-GNSS observations.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Freeshah ◽  
Xiaohong Zhang ◽  
Erman Şentürk ◽  
Xiaodong Ren ◽  
Muhammad Arqim Adil ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Ammonium Nitrate ◽  
Space Weather ◽  
Global Navigation Satellite Systems ◽  
Electron Content ◽  
Free Electrons ◽  
Total Electron ◽  
Satellite Systems ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Global Navigation Satellite

<p>Natural hazards such as shallow earthquakes and volcanic explosions are known to generate acoustic and gravity waves at infrasonic velocity to propagate in the atmosphere layers. These waves could induce the layers of the ionosphere by change the electron density based on the neutral particles and free electrons coupling. Recently, some studies have dealt with some manmade hazards such as buried explosions and underground nuclear explosions which could cause a trigger to the ionosphere. The Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) provide a good way to measure ionospheric total electron content (TEC) through the line of sight (LOS) from satellite to receiver. The carrier-to-code leveling (CCL) technique is carried out for each continuous arc where CCL eliminates potential ambiguity influence and it degrades the pseudo-range noise. Meanwhile, the CCL retains high precision in the carrier-phase. In this study, we focus on the Beirut Explosion on August 4, 2020, to check slant TEC (STEC) variations that may be associated with the blast of Beirut Port. The TECs were analyzed through the Morlet wavelet to check the possible ionospheric response to the blast. An acoustic‐gravity wave could be generated by the event which could disturb the ionosphere through coupling between solid earth-atmosphere-ionosphere during the explosion. To verify TEC disturbances are not associated with space weather, disturbance storm-time (Dst), and Kp indices were investigated before, during, and after the explosion. The steady-state of space weather before and during the event indicated that the observed variations of TEC sequences were caused by the ammonium nitrate explosion. There was a large initial explosion, followed by a series of smaller blasts, about ~30 seconds, a colossal explosion has happened, a supersonic blast wave radiating through Beirut City. As a result of the chemistry behind ammonium nitrate’s explosive, a mushroom cloud was sent into the air. We suggest that these different explosions in strength and time could be the reason for different time arrival of the detected ionospheric disturbances over GNSS ground-based stations.</p>

Evidence of tectonic release from underground nuclear explosions in long-period P waves

1983 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 593-613
Author(s):  
Terry C. Wallace ◽  
Donald V. Helmberger ◽  
Gladys R. Engen
Keyword(s):  
Upper Mantle ◽  
High Stress ◽  
Test Site ◽  
Strike Slip ◽  
Body Waves ◽  
Release Time ◽  
P Waves ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Long Period

abstract In this paper, we study the long-period body waves at regional and upper mantle distances from large underground nuclear explosions at Pahute Mesa, Nevada Test Site. A comparison of the seismic records from neighboring explosions shows that the more recent events have much simpler waveforms than those of the earlier events. In fact, many of the early events produced waveforms which are very similar to those produced by shallow, moderate-size, strike-slip earthquakes; the phase sP is particularly obvious. The waveforms of these explosions can be modeled by assuming that the explosion is accompanied by tectonic release represented by a double couple. A clear example of this phenomenon is provided by a comparison of GREELEY (1966) and KASSERI (1975). These events are of similar yields and were detonated within 2 km of each other. The GREELEY records can be matched by simply adding synthetic waveforms appropriate for a shallow strike-slip earthquake to the KASSERI observations. The tectonic release for GREELEY has a moment of 5 ՠ1024 dyne-cm and is striking approximately 340°. The identification of the sP phase at upper mantle distances indicates that the source depth is 4 km or less. The tectonic release time function has a short duration (less than 1 sec). A comparison of these results with well-studied strike-slip earthquakes on the west coast and eastern Nevada indicate that, if tectonic release is triggered fault motion, then the tectonic release is relatively high stress drop, on the order of several hundred bars. It is possible to reduce these stress drops by a factor of 2 if the tectonic release is a driven fault; i.e., rupturing with the P velocity. The region in which the stress is released for a megaton event has a radius of about 4 km. Pahute Mesa events which are detonated within this radius of a previous explosion have a substantially reduced tectonic release.

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