scholarly journals The Supreme Court and deprivation of liberty: where are we now?

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 417-424
Author(s):  
Nick Brindle
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Social Care ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Implications ◽  
Health And Social Care ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Mental Capacity Act 2005 ◽  
Low Threshold ◽  
Mental Capacity Act ◽  
Acid Test

SummaryDeciding on where the tipping point between restrictions and deprivation arises in care settings has important legal implications, but until recently case law has not much helped to resolve these challenging issues. An important milestone has been the Supreme Court judgment in the so-called Cheshire West case. This judgment, handed down in March 2014, set a low threshold to apply (the ‘acid test’) in deciding when someone may be being deprived of their liberty and therefore that additional legal authorisation is required. The application of the acid test is not straightforward and its effects are wide-ranging. In this article, I discuss the evolution of the concept of deprivation of liberty in health and social care, the implications of the judgment and the application of the acid test. I also briefly highlight the interface between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Mental Health Act 1983.

Medical treatment and best interests: judicial interpretation of values, wishes and beliefs under the Mental Capacity Act 2005

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 165-173
Author(s):  
Owen P. O'Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Medical Treatment ◽  
Clinical Decision ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Mental Capacity Act 2005 ◽  
Mental Capacity Act ◽  
The Uk

Purpose The prominence of the best interests principle in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 represented an important transition to a more resolutely patient-centred model regarding decision-making for incapable adults (“P”). This paper aims to examine the courts’ consideration of P’s values, wishes and beliefs in the context of medical treatment, reflect on whether this has resulted in a wide interpretation of the best interests standard and consider how this impacts clinical decision makers. Design/methodology/approach A particular focus will be on case law from the Court of Protection of England and Wales and the Supreme Court of the UK. Cases have been selected for discussion on the basis of the significance of their judgements for the field, the range of issues they illustrate and the extent of commentary and attention they have received in the literature. They are presented as a narrative review and are non-exhaustive. Findings With respect to values, wishes and beliefs, the best interests standard’s interpretation in the courts has been widely varied. Opposing tensions and thematic conflicts have emerged from this case law and were analysed from the perspective of the clinical decision maker. Originality/value This review illustrates the complexity and gravity of decisions of the clinical decision makers and the courts have considered in the context of best interests determinations for incapacitated adults undergoing medical treatment. Subsequent to the first such case before the Supreme Court of the UK, emerging case law trends relating to capacity legislation are considered.

Operationalising the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) in support of brain injury survivors – views from practice

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jade Scott ◽  
Stephen Weatherhead ◽  
Jill Manthorpe
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Brain Injury ◽  
Social Care ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Health And Social Care ◽  
Mental Capacity Act 2005 ◽  
Decision Making Styles ◽  
Tentative Explanation ◽  
Mental Capacity Act

Purpose Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS), as part of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (DoLS, 2007), was established to provide a legal framework for decision-making in respect of adults who lack capacity to make decisions in relation to their care and residence in England and Wales. The purpose of this study was to explore the DoLS decision-making process from the perspectives of health and social care practitioners when working with individuals with an acquired brain injury (ABI). Design/methodology/approach A total of 12 health and social care practitioners were interviewed in 2019–2020 about their experiences of using and making or supporting decisions in the DoLS framework with ABI survivors. Data were analysed, and a tentative explanation of variations in DoLS decision-making was developed. Findings Three distinct approaches emerged capturing different decision-making styles (risk-averse, risk-balancing and risk-simplifying) which appeared to influence the outcome of DoLS assessments. A range of mediating factors seemed to account for the variability in these styles. The wider contextual challenges that impact upon practitioners’ overall experiences and use of DoLS processes in their ABI practice were noted. Research limitations/implications The findings highlight a need for changes in practice and policy in relation to how DoLS or similar processes are used in decision-making practice with ABI survivors and may be relevant to the implementation of the Liberty Protection Safeguards that are replacing the DoLS system. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to explore accounts of DoLS decision-making practices in ABI service.

The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
The Impact

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

The UK courts and EU law post-Brexit

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. Christopher-Vajda
Author(s):  
Christopher Vajda
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Following the expiry on 31 December 2020 of the ‘transition period’ under the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement, the relationship between UK and EU law had changed. Whilst much EU legislation at that date will continue to apply in UK law as ‘retained EU law’ and judgments of the EU courts handed down before that date will remain binding on UK courts as ‘retained EU case law’, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can depart from that case law. Whilst EU court judgments handed down after that date are not binding on UK courts, they may be taken into account. This article considers both the status of EU retained case law and when the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may depart from it, and the future of EU law that is not ‘retained EU case law’ and how judgments of the European Courts and national courts of its Member States may influence UK judges in the future.

The rebirth of medical paternalism: An NHS Trust v Y

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Foster
Keyword(s):  
Patient Autonomy ◽  
Public Funding ◽  
Mental Capacity ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Health Board ◽  
Medical Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Mental Capacity Act 2005 ◽  
Medical Paternalism ◽  
Mental Capacity Act

Over the last quarter of a century, English medical law has taken an increasingly firm stand against medical paternalism. This is exemplified by cases such as Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority, Chester v Afshar, and Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board. In relation to decision-making on behalf of incapacitous adults, the actuating principle of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is respect for patient autonomy. The only lawful acts in relation to an incapacitous person are acts which are in the best interests of that person. The 2005 Act requires a holistic assessment of best interests. Best interests are wider than ‘medical best interests’. The 2018 judgment of the Supreme Court in An NHS Trust v Y (which concerned the question of whether a court needed to authorise the withdrawal of life-sustaining clinically administered nutrition/hydration (CANH) from patients in prolonged disorders of consciousness (PDOC)) risks reviving medical paternalism. The judgment, in its uncritical endorsement of guidelines from various medical organisations, may lend inappropriate authority to medical judgments of best interests and silence or render impotent non-medical contributions to the debate about best interests—so frustrating the 2005 Act. To minimise these dangers, a system of meditation should be instituted whenever it is proposed to withdraw (at least) life-sustaining CANH from (at least) patients with PDOC, and there needs to be a guarantee of access to the courts for families, carers and others who wish to challenge medical conclusions about withdrawal. This would entail proper public funding for such challenges.

scholarly journals Life After Bilski

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Real World ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Patent Law ◽  
District Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
Abstract Ideas ◽  
New Applications

In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court declined calls to categoricallyexclude business methods - or any technology - from the patent law. It alsorejected as the sole test of subject matter eligibility the FederalCircuit’s deeply-flawed "machine or transformation" test, under which noprocess is patentable unless it is tied to a particular machine ortransforms an article to another state or thing. Subsequent developmentsthreaten to undo that holding, however. Relying on the Court’s descriptionof the Federal Circuit test as a "useful and important clue', the U.S.Patent and Trademark Office, patent litigants, and district courts have allcontinued to rely on the machine-or-transformation test in the wake ofBilski: no longer as the sole rule, but as a presumptive starting pointthat threatens to effectively become mandatory. In this Article, we suggesta new way to understand the exclusion of abstract ideas from patentablesubject matter. No class of invention is inherently too abstract forpatenting. Rather, the rule against patenting abstract ideas is an effortto prevent inventors from claiming their ideas too broadly. By requiringthat patent claims be limited to a specific set of practical applicationsof an idea, the abstract ideas doctrine both makes the scope of theresulting patent clearer and leaves room for subsequent inventors toimprove upon - and patent new applications of - the same basic principle.Recasting the abstract ideas doctrine as an overclaiming test eliminatesthe constraints of the artificial machine-or-transformation test, as wellas the pointless effort to fit inventions into permissible or impermissiblecategories. It also helps understand some otherwise-inexplicabledistinctions in the case law. Testing for overclaiming allows courts tofocus on what really matters: whether the scope of the patentee's claimsare commensurate with the invention’s practical, real-world contribution.This inquiry, we suggest, is the touchstone of the abstract ideas analysis,and the way out of the post-Bilski confusion.

scholarly journals Pravni položaj poštenog i nepoštenog posjednika u odnosu na vlasnika stvari

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 527-543
Author(s):  
Jadranko Jug
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Basic Method ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
The Right

This paper deals with the problems related to the legal position of honest and dishonest possessors in relation to the owner of things, that is, it analyses the rights belonging to the possessors of things and the demands that possessors may require from the owners of things to whom the possessors must submit those things. Also, in contrast, the rights and requirements are analysed of the owners of things in relation to honest and dishonest possessors. In practice, a dilemma arises in defi ning the essential and benefi cial expenditure incurred by honest possessors, what the presumptions are for and until when the right of retention may be exercised for the sake of remuneration of that expenditure, when the statute of limitations expires on that claim, and the signifi cance of the provisions of the Civil Obligations Act in relation to unjust enrichment, management without mandate and the right of retention, and which provisions regulate these or similar issues. The answers to some of these dilemmas have been provided in case law, and therefore the basic method used in the paper was analysis and research of case law, especially decisions by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia. The introduction to the paper provides the basic characteristics of the concept of possession and possession of things, and the type and quality of possession, to provide a basis for the subsequent analysis of the legal position of the possessor of a thing in relation to the owner of that thing.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document