scholarly journals Viral Sovereignty or Sequence Etiquette? Asian Science, Open Data, and Knowledge Control in Global Virus Surveillance

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 479-505
Author(s):  
Lyle Fearnley

Abstract On several occasions, the People’s Republic of China refused to share influenza viruses isolated on their territory with the World Health Organization pandemic flu surveillance system. Scholars in STS and allied disciplines have described these disputes as examples of growing conflict between global health norms of free exchange and Asian state claims of viral sovereignty. However, the discussion has largely overlooked the fact that laboratories in China freely shared genetic sequence data from isolated viruses, even when they refused to ship physical samples, a fact that complicates the opposition of open data and viral sovereignty with the different material forms of the physical sample and the nucleotide sequence. This article provides a comprehensive comparison of the heterogeneous circulations of influenza virus samples and virus gene sequences in global health influenza surveillance and argues this difference is rooted in the different knowledge-control regimes designed for exchanging samples and sequences. Engaging with debates on the position of Asian science within global scientific circulations, the article suggests that Asian scientists confront a multiplicity of global scientific infrastructures and do not necessarily rely on the authority of nation-state sovereignty to reshape global exchanges.

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 232-241
Author(s):  
Claudia Seitz

Abstract The current pandemic outbreak of corona virus SARS-CoV-2 shows the need for comprehensive European cooperation in drug development and the importance of genetic material and sequence data in research concerning this unknown disease. As corona virus SARS-CoV-2 is spreading across Europe and worldwide, national authorities and the European Union (EU) institutions do their utmost to address the pandemic and accelerate innovation to protect global health. In order to be prepared and to be able to respond immediately to serious epidemic and pandemic diseases, the EU has already adopted the Decision No (EU) 1082/2013 on serious cross-border threats to health. The World Health Organization (WHO) has established a global system to collect genetic material and information to protect a global influenza pandemic outbreak. The article describes the current legal landscape under EU and international law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (12) ◽  
pp. 1626-1637 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mara L. Russo ◽  
Andrea V. Pontoriero ◽  
Estefania Benedetti ◽  
Andrea Czech ◽  
Martin Avaro ◽  
...  

This study was conducted as part of the Argentinean Influenza and other Respiratory Viruses Surveillance Network, in the context of the Global Influenza Surveillance carried out by the World Health Organization (WHO). The objective was to study the activity and the antigenic and genomic characteristics of circulating viruses for three consecutive seasons (2010, 2011 and 2012) in order to investigate the emergence of influenza viral variants. During the study period, influenza virus circulation was detected from January to December. Influenza A and B, and all current subtypes of human influenza viruses, were present each year. Throughout the 2010 post-pandemic season, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, unexpectedly, almost disappeared. The haemagglutinin (HA) of the A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses studied were segregated in a different genetic group to those identified during the 2009 pandemic, although they were still antigenically closely related to the vaccine strain A/California/07/2009. Influenza A(H3N2) viruses were the predominant strains circulating during the 2011 season, accounting for nearly 76 % of influenza viruses identified. That year, all HA sequences of the A(H3N2) viruses tested fell into the A/Victoria/208/2009 genetic clade, but remained antigenically related to A/Perth/16/2009 (reference vaccine recommended for this three-year period). A(H3N2) viruses isolated in 2012 were antigenically closely related to A/Victoria/361/2011, recommended by the WHO as the H3 component for the 2013 Southern Hemisphere formulation. B viruses belonging to the B/Victoria lineage circulated in 2010. A mixed circulation of viral variants of both B/Victoria and B/Yamagata lineages was detected in 2012, with the former being predominant. A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses remained antigenically closely related to the vaccine virus A/California/7/2009; A(H3N2) viruses continually evolved into new antigenic clusters and both B lineages, B/Victoria/2/87-like and B/Yamagata/16/88-like viruses, were observed during the study period. The virological surveillance showed that the majority of the circulating strains during the study period were antigenically related to the corresponding Southern Hemisphere vaccine strains except for the 2012 A(H3N2) viruses.


2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 842-847
Author(s):  
Reiko Saito ◽  
◽  
Yadanar Kyaw ◽  
Yi Yi Myint ◽  
Clyde Dapat ◽  
...  

The epidemiological study of influenza in Southeast Asia is limited. We surveyed influenza in Myanmar from 2007 to 2013. Nasopharyngeal swabs were collected from patients in the two cities of Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw. Samples were screened using rapid influenza diagnostic kits and identified by virus isolation. Isolates were characterized by cyclingprobe-based real-time PCR, drug susceptibility assay, and sequencing. Samples collected numbered 5,173, from which 1,686 influenza viruses were isolated during the seven-year study period. Of these, 187 strains were of seasonal influenza A(H1N1), 274 of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, 791 of influenza A(H3N2), and 434 of influenza B. Interestingly, two zanamivir and amantadine-resistant strains each were detected in 2007 and 2008. These rare dual-resistant strains had a Q136K mutation in the NA protein and S31N substitution in the M2 protein. Our collaboration raised the influenza surveillance laboratory capacity in Myanmar and led Yangon’s National Health Laboratory – one of the nation’s leading research institutes – to being designated a National Influenza Center by the World Health Organization.


2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 5-6
Author(s):  
Influenza Project Team

Following the publications in Eurosurveillance on 31 January [1,2], the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), the European Influenza Surveillance Scheme (EISS), the World Health Organization (WHO) and their partners have agreed to update the data on the occurrence of resistance of influenza A/H1N1 viruses to oseltamivir appearing on the ECDC and EISS websites on a weekly basis (every Thursday afternoon). Data on the ECDC website are for European Union (EU) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries. The WHO has also published a global table, which it will also refresh weekly. All these data are available through an HTML page on the ECDC web-site [3]. The European data made available through EISS and the EU DG Research-funded European Surveillance Network for Vigilance Against Viral Resistance (VIRGIL) are based on the data that have been uploaded to the EISS antiviral resistance data-base by a fixed time on a Wednesday for publication on a Thursday.


Author(s):  
Jeremy Youde

While Chapter 3 focuses primarily on the evolution of global health governance, Chapter 4 pays more attention to its contemporary manifestation as a secondary institution within international society. This chapter discusses the current state of the global health governance architecture—who the important actors are, how they operate, how they have changed over the past twenty-five years, and how they illustrate the fundamental beliefs and attitudes within the global health governance system. In particular, the chapter discusses the relative balance between state-based and non-state actors, as well as public versus private actors. This chapter highlights five key players within contemporary global health governance: states; the World Health Organization; multilateral funding agencies; public–private partnerships; and non-state and private actors


Antibiotics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 234
Author(s):  
Piotr Szweda

Based on World Health Organization reports, the resistance of bacteria to well-known antibiotics is becoming a major global health challenge [...]


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng Li ◽  
Cynthia Jones ◽  
Girum S. Ejigu ◽  
Nisha George ◽  
Amanda L. Geller ◽  
...  

Abstract Background Three months after the first reported cases, COVID-19 had spread to nearly 90% of World Health Organization (WHO) member states and only 24 countries had not reported cases as of 30 March 2020. This analysis aimed to 1) assess characteristics, capability to detect and monitor COVID-19, and disease control measures in these 24 countries, 2) understand potential factors for the reported delayed COVID-19 introduction, and 3) identify gaps and opportunities for outbreak preparedness, particularly in low and middle-income countries (LMICs). We collected and analyzed publicly available information on country characteristics, COVID-19 testing, influenza surveillance, border measures, and preparedness activities in these countries. We also assessed the association between the temporal spread of COVID-19 in all countries with reported cases with globalization indicator and geographic location. Results Temporal spreading of COVID-19 was strongly associated with countries’ globalization indicator and geographic location. Most of the 24 countries with delayed COVID-19 introduction were LMICs; 88% were small island or landlocked developing countries. As of 30 March 2020, only 38% of these countries reported in-country COVID-19 testing capability, and 71% reported conducting influenza surveillance during the past year. All had implemented two or more border measures, (e.g., travel restrictions and border closures) and multiple preparedness activities (e.g., national preparedness plans and school closing). Conclusions Limited testing capacity suggests that most of the 24 delayed countries may have lacked the capability to detect and identify cases early through sentinel and case-based surveillance. Low global connectedness, geographic isolation, and border measures were common among these countries and may have contributed to the delayed introduction of COVID-19 into these countries. This paper contributes to identifying opportunities for pandemic preparedness, such as increasing disease detection, surveillance, and international collaborations. As the global situation continues to evolve, it is essential for countries to improve and prioritize their capacities to rapidly prevent, detect, and respond, not only for COVID-19, but also for future outbreaks.


Vaccines ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larisa Rudenko ◽  
Irina Kiseleva ◽  
Elena Krutikova ◽  
Ekaterina Stepanova ◽  
Irina Isakova-Sivak ◽  
...  

Influenza H7N9 virus is a potentially pandemic subtype to which most people are immunologically naïve. To be better prepared for the potential occurrence of an H7N9 pandemic, in 2017 the World Health Organization recommended developing candidate vaccine viruses from two new H7N9 viruses, A/Guangdong/17SF003/2016 (A/GD) and A/Hong Kong/125/2017 (A/HK). This report describes the development of live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) candidates against A/GD and A/HK viruses and study of their safety and immunogenicity in the ferret model in order to choose the most promising one for a phase I clinical trial. The A/HK-based vaccine candidate (A/17/HK) was developed by classical reassortment in eggs. The A/GD-based vaccine candidate (A/17/GD) was generated by reverse genetics. Ferrets were vaccinated with two doses of LAIV or phosphate-buffered saline. Both H7N9 LAIVs tested were safe for ferrets, as shown by absence of clinical signs, and by virological and histological data; they were immunogenic after a single vaccination. These results provide a compelling argument for further testing of these vaccines in volunteers. Since the A/HK virus represents the cluster that has caused the majority of human cases, and because the A/HK-based LAIV candidate was developed by classical reassortment, this is the preferred candidate for a phase I clinical trial.


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