scholarly journals A Behavioral Analysis of Stochastic Reference Dependence

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (9) ◽  
pp. 2760-2782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusufcan Masatlioglu ◽  
Collin Raymond
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Behavioral Analysis ◽  
Reference Dependence ◽  
Quadratic Utility ◽  
Rank Dependent Utility ◽  
Trivial Intersection ◽  
Gain Loss ◽  
New Applications

We examine the reference-dependent risk preferences of Kőszegi and Rabin (2007), focusing on their choice-acclimating personal equilibria. Although their model has only a trivial intersection (expected utility) with other reference-dependent models, it has very strong connections with models that rely on different psychological intuitions. We prove that the intersection of rank-dependent utility and quadratic utility, two well-known generalizations of expected utility, is exactly monotone linear gain-loss choice-acclimating personal equilibria. We use these relationships to identify parameters of the model, discuss loss and risk aversion, and demonstrate new applications. (JEL D11, D81)

scholarly journals An Experimental Comparison of Risky and Riskless Choice—Limitations of Prospect Theory and Expected Utility Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui-Kuan Chung ◽  
Paul Glimcher ◽  
Agnieszka Tymula
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Experimental Comparison ◽  
Reference Dependence ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Gain Loss

Prospect theory, used descriptively for decisions under both risk and certainty, presumes concave utility over gains and convex utility over losses; a pattern widely seen in lottery tasks. Although such discontinuous gain-loss reference-dependence is also used to model riskless choices, only limited empirical evidence supports this use. In incentive-compatible experiments, we find that gain-loss reflection effects are not observed under riskless choice as predicted by prospect theory, even while in the same subjects gain-loss reflection effects are observed under risk. Our empirical results challenge the application of choice models across both risky and riskless domains. (JEL C91, D12, D81)

scholarly journals Risk aversion over finite domains

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Baccelli ◽  
Georg Schollmeyer ◽  
Christoph Jansen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Absolute Risk ◽  
Risk Attitudes ◽  
Convex Domains ◽  
Rank Dependent Utility ◽  
Comparative Risk ◽  
Finite Domains ◽  
Comparative Risk Aversion ◽  
Special Case

AbstractWe investigate risk attitudes when the underlying domain of payoffs is finite and the payoffs are, in general, not numerical. In such cases, the traditional notions of absolute risk attitudes, that are designed for convex domains of numerical payoffs, are not applicable. We introduce comparative notions of weak and strong risk attitudes that remain applicable. We examine how they are characterized within the rank-dependent utility model, thus including expected utility as a special case. In particular, we characterize strong comparative risk aversion under rank-dependent utility. This is our main result. From this and other findings, we draw two novel conclusions. First, under expected utility, weak and strong comparative risk aversion are characterized by the same condition over finite domains. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Second, under expected utility, weak (respectively: strong) comparative risk aversion is characterized by the same condition when the utility functions have finite range and when they have convex range (alternatively, when the payoffs are numerical and their domain is finite or convex, respectively). By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Thus, considering comparative risk aversion over finite domains leads to a better understanding of the divide between expected and non-expected utility, more generally, the structural properties of the main models of decision-making under risk.

scholarly journals Are Risk Preferences Stable across Contexts? Evidence from Insurance Data

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 591-631 ◽  
Author(s):  
Levon Barseghyan ◽  
Jeffrey Prince ◽  
Joshua C Teitelbaum
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Poisson Processes ◽  
Insurance Data ◽  
Unique Dataset

Using a unique dataset, we test whether households' deductible choices in auto and home insurance reflect stable risk preferences. Our test relies on a structural model that assumes households are objective expected utility maximizers and claims are generated by household-coverage specific Poisson processes. We find that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data. Our analysis suggests that many households exhibit greater risk aversion in their home deductible choices than their auto deductible choices. Our results are robust to several alternative modeling assumptions. (JEL D11, D83)

AND, INJUSTICE FOR SOME CORRUPT EXCHANGE AND THE RISK-AVERSE OFFICIAL

2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary E. Marche
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Organized Crime ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Enforcement Official ◽  
Optimal Law Enforcement

Although corruption and optimal law enforcement literature have addressed the effects of corruption, little has been done to analyze the decision to become corrupt. For example, little is known about risk preferences and how they might affect the nature of a corrupt exchange scheme. To answer this question, a theoretical analysis is developed that considers the noncoercive incentivea and circumstances necessary for a law enforcement official, assumed averse to criminal risk, to choose a corrupt exchange with organized crime that involves murder. Risk-aversion and the severity of the crime involved are shown to reduce the likelihood of detecting the corruption scheme and murder is shown to be optimal. Corruption schemes involving less risk averse offenders are analyzed and compared.

Disentangling Intertemporal Substitution and Risk Aversion Under the Expected Utility Theorem

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Oscar Lau
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Axiomatic Approach ◽  
Intertemporal Substitution ◽  
Standard Time ◽  
Separable Form ◽  
Straightforward Extension

Abstract This paper presents an axiomatic approach to separately control for the attitudes toward intertemporal substitution and risk aversion under the expected utility theorem. The standard time-separable form is recovered only if the functions dictating the two attitudes are identical. Risk aversion is defined on consumption amount rather than on utility (as in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974 and 1981)). Moreover, the agent is allowed to trade his lottery outcome to optimize his consumption. As a result, this approach provides a straightforward extension of the familiar Arrow-Pratt results to multiple periods. These include categorizing, measuring, and comparing risk aversions.

Risk Preferences and Incentives for Evidence Acquisition and Disclosure

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-342
Author(s):  
Erin Giffin ◽  
Erik Lillethun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Optimal Design ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Low Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Good Decision ◽  
Legal Rules

Abstract Civil disputes feature parties with biased incentives acquiring evidence with costly effort. Evidence may then be revealed at trial or concealed to persuade a judge or jury. Using a persuasion game, we examine how a litigant’s risk preferences influence evidence acquisition incentives. We find that high risk aversion depresses equilibrium evidence acquisition. We then study the problem of designing legal rules to balance good decision making against the costs of acquisition. We characterize the optimal design, which differs from equilibrium decision rules. Notably, for very risk-averse litigants, the design is “over-incentivized” with stronger rewards and punishments than in equilibrium. We find similar results for various common legal rules, including admissibility of evidence and maximum awards. These results have implications for how rules could differentiate between high risk aversion types (e.g., individuals) and low risk aversion types (e.g., corporations) to improve evidence acquisition efficiency.

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