scholarly journals The Surge of Economic Nationalism in Western Europe

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 128-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Italo Colantone ◽  
Piero Stanig
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Adjustment Costs ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Shocks ◽  
Political Effects ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Main Message

We document the surge of economic nationalist and radical-right parties in western Europe between the early 1990s and 2016. We discuss how economic shocks contribute to explaining this political shift, looking in turn at theory and evidence on the political effects of globalization, technological change, the financial and sovereign debt crises of 2008–2009 and 2011–2013, and immigration. The main message that emerges is that failures in addressing the distributional consequences of economic shocks are a key factor behind the success of nationalist and radical-right parties. We discuss how the economic explanations compete with and complement the “cultural backlash” view. We reflect on possible future political developments, which depend on the evolving intensities of economic shocks, on the strength and persistence of adjustment costs, and on changes on the supply side of politics.

Authoritarianism and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-144
Author(s):  
Erik R. Tillman
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Study Data ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
The Political ◽  
Populist Radical Right ◽  
National Election Study ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Immigration Attitudes ◽  
Party Support ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines the relationship between authoritarianism and the likelihood of voting for populist radical right parties in Western Europe. Radical right parties share an ideology based around nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. This ideology appeals to high authoritarians because it promises tough measures to preserve social cohesion, so high authoritarians are more likely to vote for radical right parties. This prediction is tested using national election study data from a range of West European countries. The results show that high authoritarians are more likely to vote for radical right parties, but even more so if they have weaker attachments to the political mainstream. The final set of analyses examines whether economic anxieties or anti-immigration attitudes moderate this relationship. While economic anxieties matter little to radical right party support, high authoritarians who oppose immigration are more likely to vote for a radical right party. These findings build on existing research by providing a stronger explanation of previous findings linking anti-immigration attitudes or cultural anxieties to radical right party support.

scholarly journals The Radical Right as Niche Parties? The Ideological Landscape of Party Systems in Western Europe, 1980–2014

2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 84-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Wagner ◽  
Thomas M Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Economic Issues ◽  
Niche Parties ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
The Right

The emergence of the radical right as a strong competitor to mainstream parties has fundamentally reshaped patterns of competition in many European party systems. In this article, we systematically explore changes to the ideological landscape in Western Europe by examining whether there has been programmatic mainstreaming of radical right parties due to (a) accommodation to and (b) moderation by radical right parties. We examine positions and salience on liberal-authoritarianism and the salience of economic issues using manifesto data from 68 parties in 17 countries. Our findings provide empirical support for a rightward shift in European party systems: on liberal-authoritarianism, mainstream left and right parties have increased their emphasis and moved to the right. Yet radical right parties have generally remained niche competitors; they are increasingly extreme and more focused on liberal-authoritarianism. Our analysis has important implications for understanding party systems, party competition and citizen representation in Europe.

The Strategic Adaptation of the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe

2019 ◽  
pp. 837-862
Author(s):  
Elie Michel
Keyword(s):  
Working Class ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Strategic Adaptation ◽  
Populist Radical Right ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Radical Right Parties

Populist radical right parties have long been considered to mobilize their voters on specific issues, which they are deemed to “own.” Voters support these parties largely because of their “nativist” agenda, and more precisely because of their stance against immigration. In fact, research had established a “winning formula” of electoral persuasion for radical right parties, referring to a combination of “economically neoliberal” and “authoritarian” appeals that would jointly explain the strong electoral support. However, populist radical right parties have transformed their positions, through “second order messages,” by investing in a socioeconomic issue agenda. These parties can increase their electoral support by siding with their working class voters on redistributive issues, particularly through a welfare chauvinist frame. This chapter argues that populist radical right parties have strategically shifted on this latter dimension in order to adapt to their voters’ preferences. It shows that, in view of increased electoral persuasion, populist radical right parties modify some of their positions to tailor them to their working-class core electoral clientele.

The Myth of Global Populism

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
David Art
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
The People ◽  
Industrial Democracies ◽  
Policy Deliberation ◽  
Previous Decade ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Core Features

The “rise of global populism” has become a primary metanarrative for the previous decade in advanced industrial democracies, but I argue that it is a deeply misleading one. Nativism—not populism—is the defining feature of both radical right parties in Western Europe and of radical right politicians like Donald Trump in the United States. The tide of “left-wing populism” in Europe receded quickly, as did its promise of returning power to the people through online voting and policy deliberation. The erosion of democracy in states like Hungary has not been the result of populism, but rather of the deliberate practice of competitive authoritarianism. Calling these disparate phenomena “populist” obscures their core features and mistakenly attaches normatively redeeming qualities to nativists and authoritarians.

Radical Right Parties in Office: Incumbency Records and the Electoral Cost of Governing

2012 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 574-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tjitske Akkerman ◽  
Sarah L. de Lange
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Research ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Integration Policies ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Additional Support ◽  
National Governments ◽  
Electoral Performance

AbstractRadical right parties are becoming increasingly likely candidates to participate in government coalitions in Western Europe. Comparative research on the electoral performance of these parties in government is still scarce. Our overview of the electoral effects of government participation of six parties in national governments shows that they do not run a higher risk of losing votes after government participation than other parties. There is considerable variation, however. Some radical right parties experienced great losses, while others won additional support. Focusing on the ways in which radical right parties conducted themselves in government, we explore why some parties won votes and others lost in post-incumbency elections. We compare their policy achievements with regard to immigration and integration policies, the performance of their ministers, and the party coherence of the six parties in office. Our analysis shows that policy records do not fully explain the variation in post-incumbency electoral results. Weak performance and internal party conflict prevent parties from credibly laying claim to the policy achievements of coalition governments and demonstrate that some of these parties were not ready for office.

scholarly journals The radical right, the labour movement and the competition for the workers’ vote

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadja Mosimann ◽  
Line Rennwald ◽  
Adrian Zimmermann
Keyword(s):  
Working Class ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Labour Movement ◽  
Non Union ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Better Than

This article analyses the capacity of radical right parties to attract support from union members in recent elections in Western Europe. It is argued that unionized voters resist the appeals of the radical right better than non-union members. Using data from the European Social Survey 2010–2016, the article shows that union members are overall less likely to vote for the radical right than non-union members. Even though it is found that unionized working-class and middle-class voters are less likely to vote radical right than their non-unionized peers in the pooled sample, it is also observed that these subgroups of unionized voters and especially unionized working-class voters are not immune to radical right voting in all the countries analysed. The article thus indicates a growing capacity of the radical right to attract unionized working-class segments of the electorate in some countries and to directly compete with left parties for these voters.

The League of Polish Families between East and West, past and present

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah L. de Lange ◽  
Simona Guerra
Keyword(s):  
Eastern Europe ◽  
European Country ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Central And Eastern Europe ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Historical Legacy ◽  
East European ◽  
Depth Study ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Historical Legacies

Historical legacies play an important role in the rise of radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. This article conducts an in-depth study of the trajectory of a particular radical right party, the League of Polish Families, in a particular Central and East European country, Poland. The central objective of the article is to highlight that, although there are important similarities between the League of Polish Families and other radical right parties in both Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe, the League of Polish Families differs in some respects, such as the composition of electorate and ideology from these parties. The article shows that the observed differences have their roots in the Polish historical legacy, that on some accounts deviates from the historical legacies present in other Central and East European countries.

Do religious voters support populist radical right parties? Opposite effects in Western and East-Central Europe

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882098518
Author(s):  
Kamil Marcinkiewicz ◽  
Ruth Dassonneville
Keyword(s):  
Central Europe ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Far Right ◽  
East Central Europe ◽  
East Central ◽  
Populist Radical Right ◽  
Religious Devotion ◽  
Radical Right Parties

The rise of populist radical right parties fuels a discussion about the roots of their success. Existing research has demonstrated the relevance of gender, education and income for explaining the far-right vote. The present study contributes to the aforementioned debate by focusing on the role of religiosity. The data collected in the eighth round of the European Social Survey (2016) allow examining in more detail the political relevance of attendance at religious services and other measures of religious devotion. This study focuses in particular on 15 countries, 11 from Western Europe and 4 from East-Central Europe. In none of the Western European countries is there evidence of a positive relationship between religiosity and vote for a populist radical right party. In fact, in many countries of this region more religious voters are substantively less inclined to support far-right movements. The situation is different in parts of East-Central Europe. In Poland, and to a weaker extent also in Hungary, the probability of a vote for right-wing populists increases with religiosity.

The Development of Radical Right Parties in Western Europe

2002 ◽  
pp. 3-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Schain ◽  
Aristide Zolberg ◽  
Patrick Hossay
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Radical Right Parties
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