Fairness Theory in Economic Games and Group Bias of Fairness Norm Enforcement

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 940-950
Author(s):  
沿 肖
2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 329
Author(s):  
Zhen ZHANG ◽  
Chunhui QI ◽  
Yang WANG ◽  
Hui ZHAO ◽  
Xiaoxin WANG ◽  
...  

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica M. Nicklin ◽  
Rebecca L. Greenbaum ◽  
Laurel A. McNall ◽  
Robert G. Folger ◽  
Kevin J. Williams
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Alonso Diaz ◽  
Nicolás Enrique Arévalo Jaimes ◽  
Sebastian Balcucho ◽  
Daniel Duque ◽  
Tatiana García ◽  
...  

Exposure to violence has lasting effects on economic behavior years after it has ended. Previous literature has proved that there is an increase in altruism, impatience, and risk-seeking. However, it is unknown if regular citizens, not directly involved in the conflict, perceive such economic behavior in post-conflict actors. We asked participants to report, relative to them, how Colombia's post-conflict actors (ex-guerrillas, ex-paramilitaries, and victims) behave in different economic games (dictator game, lotteries, and intertemporal discounting). Our sample of university students believes that victims are less altruistic than current evidence with real victims, not particularly risky, and impatient. Also, that former combatants are risk-seeking, impatient, and altruistic towards victims. These beliefs about post-conflict actors' economic behavior do not consistently coincide with behavioral changes found in actual actors involved in violence and could guide reintegration policies.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cindel White ◽  
John Michael Kelly ◽  
Azim Shariff ◽  
Ara Norenzayan

Four experiments (total N = 3591) examined how thinking about Karma and God increases adherence to social norms that prescribe fairness in anonymous dictator games. We found that (1) thinking about Karma decreased selfishness among karmic believers across religious affiliations, including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and non-religious Americans; (2) thinking about God also decreased selfishness among believers in God (but not among non-believers), replicating previous findings; and (3) thinking about both karma and God shifted participants’ initially selfish offers towards fairness (the normatively prosocial response), but had no effect on already fair offers. These supernatural framing effects were obtained and replicated in high-powered, pre-registered experiments and remained robust to several methodological checks, including hypothesis guessing, game familiarity, demographic variables, between- and within-subjects designs, and variation in data exclusion criteria. These results support the role of culturally-elaborated beliefs about supernatural justice as a motivator of believer’s adherence to prosocial norms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 205316802095678
Author(s):  
Melissa M. Lee ◽  
Lauren Prather

International law enforcement is an understudied but indispensable factor for maintaining the international order. We study the effectiveness of elite justifications in building coalitions supporting the enforcement of violations of the law against territorial seizures. Using survey experiments fielded in the USA and Australia, we find that the effectiveness of two common justifications for enforcement—the illegality of a country’s actions, and the consequences of those actions for international order—increase support for enforcement and do so independently of two key public values: ideology and interpersonal norm enforcement. These results imply elites can build a broad coalition of support by using multiple justifications. Our results, however, highlight the tepidness of public support, suggesting limits to elite rhetoric. This study contributes to the scholarship on international law by showing how the public, typically considered a mechanism for generating compliance within states, can impede or facilitate third-party enforcement of the law between states.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimmo Eriksson ◽  
Pontus Strimling ◽  
Michele Gelfand ◽  
Junhui Wu ◽  
Jered Abernathy ◽  
...  

AbstractNorm enforcement may be important for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation. However, little is known about how preferred responses to norm violations vary across cultures and across domains. In a preregistered study of 57 countries (using convenience samples of 22,863 students and non-students), we measured perceptions of the appropriateness of various responses to a violation of a cooperative norm and to atypical social behaviors. Our findings highlight both cultural universals and cultural variation. We find a universal negative relation between appropriateness ratings of norm violations and appropriateness ratings of responses in the form of confrontation, social ostracism and gossip. Moreover, we find the country variation in the appropriateness of sanctions to be consistent across different norm violations but not across different sanctions. Specifically, in those countries where use of physical confrontation and social ostracism is rated as less appropriate, gossip is rated as more appropriate.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Georg Kanitsar

Peer punishment is widely lauded as a decentralized solution to the problem of social cooperation. However, experimental evidence of its effectiveness primarily stems from public good structures. This paper explores peer punishment in another structural setting: a system of generalized exchange. In a laboratory experiment, a repeated four-player prisoner’s dilemma is arranged either in a public good structure or in a circular network of generalized exchange. The experimental results demonstrate that the merits of peer punishment do not extend to generalized exchange. In the public good, peer punishment was primarily altruistic, was sensitive to costs, and promoted cooperation. In generalized exchange, peer punishment was also altruistic and relatively frequent, but did not increase cooperation. While the dense punishment network underlying the public good facilitates norm enforcement, generalized exchange decreases control over norm violators and reduces the capacity of peer punishment. I conclude that generalized exchange systems require stronger forms of punishment to sustain social cooperation.


1979 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Guesnerie ◽  
C. Oddou
Keyword(s):  

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