No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism
Metaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical realism. Secondly, I will argue that metaphysical realists must commit to metaphysical anthropocentrism in order to solve Putnam’s problem. Thirdly, I will argue that metaphysical anthropocentrism requires monotheism. Lastly, I argue that metaphysical realism is true. Therefore, we must be ontologically committed to God.
2017 ◽
Vol 225
(4)
◽
pp. 324-335
◽
Keyword(s):
2019 ◽
Vol 16
(4)
◽
pp. 429-443
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2018 ◽
2020 ◽