scholarly journals Mehhanistlikust ja mentalistlikust andekusest

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 145
Author(s):  
Amar Annus

Recent advances in cognitive neurosciences compellingly suggest that the human brain does not have a single cognitive system, but two parallel cognitive systems. These two systems normally blend more or less perfectly in the human mind. Only the failure of one reveals the existence of the other in a way that would otherwise be difficult to discern. This research has established that “human beings have evolved two parallel ways of thinking. One, which you might call people-thinking, mentalistic cognition – or more simply mentalism – is wholly concerned with understanding human beings, their minds, motives, and emotions; the other, which by contrast you could call things-thinking or mechanistic cognition, is concerned with understanding and interacting with the physical, non-human universe of inert objects“.In other words, the social brain works entirely differently from mechanistic thinking, using altogether different neural pathways. The current view in the cognitive sciences supports the dual process theory that distinguishes between analytical and intuitive styles of information processing. These two styles – analytical and intuitive – broadly correspond to mechanistic and mentalistic cognition modes. Analytical processing involves abstract, rule-based, logical and deliberate thought, whereas the intuitive style is implicit and contextualized, taking advantage of associations.These two styles can be viewed as the polar ends of a single continuum, best understood as processing modes which individuals move in and out of in a continuous manner, depending on the situational dynamics.However, these two cognitive styles can become the preferences for cognition and learning if one prevails over the other.The general discussions on higher cognitive processes usually do not cite evidence from the studies of clinical population groups. In my view, such discussions are necessary. In a clinical condition, the cognitive preference inevitably becomes a bias, even a strong bias for thinking and behaviour. The clinical conditions have genetic and epigenetic causes, even if these are only partly known. According to the Extreme Male Brain theory explaining autism, the continuum of cognitive capabilities extends between the natural faculties of empathizing and systemizing in the human brain.In neuroscience studies, the term anti-correlated networks of the brain has been coined to describe the phenomenon of alternating activation, in which mechanical tasks were able to deactivate the regions associated with social reasoning, and social tasks deactivated the regions associated with mechanical reasoning.The first mode of thinking is mechanistic and operates in a more bottom-up manner, being highly sensitive to the type of stimulus. However, the mentalizing system is more top-down, and is influenced by the cognitive context and much less by the surface characteristics of stimuli.The Imprinted Brain Theory describes the diametrical model of the social brain connecting the two cognition modes with mental illnesses. This model establishes a continuum of the intellectual capabilities of the social brain, extending from high mentalism in the psychotic spectrum to low mentalism in autistic spectrum conditions. Accordingly, human talents can be divided into two large groups – these with excellent people skills and those with elevated mechanistic skills. Because of anti-correlation, both groups have deficiencies in the respective opposite domain. Autistic savantism is an example of elevated mechanistic and less than average mentalistic capabilities. The imprinted brain theory suggests that a reversed pattern of elevated mentalistic talent with reduced mechanistic abilities is found in psychotic savantism, a previously unsuspected condition.The mentalistic kind of knowledge tends to be ideological, contextual, holistic, top-down, centrally coherent and globally connected. Mechanistic thinking is wired to find insights and patterns on the local level, and tends to be non-contextual, reductionist, bottom-up, and noncentrally coherent. Numerous clinical studies have shown an increased local processing style in autistic spectrum conditions, whereas the psychotic spectrum exhibits an increased global processing bias. The global style has an advantage in social tasks and the local processing bias in mechanistic tasks. A genius is someone who has elevated levels of talent in both modes of thinking.

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Dalsgaard

This article refers to carbon valuation as the practice of ascribing value to, and assessing the value of, actions and objects in terms of carbon emissions. Due to the pervasiveness of carbon emissions in the actions and objects of everyday lives of human beings, the making of carbon offsets and credits offers almost unlimited repertoires of alternatives to be included in contemporary carbon valuation schemes. Consequently, the article unpacks how discussions of carbon valuation are interpreted through different registers of alternatives - as the commensuration and substitution of variants on the one hand, and the confrontational comparison of radical difference on the other. Through the reading of a wide selection of the social science literature on carbon markets and trading, the article argues that the value of carbon emissions itself depends on the construction of alternative, hypothetical scenarios, and that emissions have become both a moral and a virtual measure pitting diverse forms of actualised actions or objects against each other or against corresponding nonactions and non-objects as alternatives.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-148
Author(s):  
Kristina Lekic

The paper aims to shed light on Searle?s notion of collective intentionality (CI) as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of ?we-intentionality?. Such is the case of individuals with autism, given that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD). The paper will argue that exclusion of individuals with autism is not a threat for Searle?s notion of collective intentionality, as the notion can be read as merely a biological disposition that all human beings share. Furthermore, the paper proposes the extension of Searle?s concept of CI so it can include behaviors of individuals who have the disposition towards CI, but which was not evolved through ontogenesis; namely, for individuals with autism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 42-63
Author(s):  
Fie Christensen

This paper explores the tension between perceiving autism as a spectrum of traits or as a core. A spectrum is defined as a tension between two extremes. A core, on the other hand, is defined by an essence or a pervasive structure. I present the views of three autistic women that try to establish autism as a core, in which people with autism are separate from the rest of humankind and not extreme versions of humanity, the consequences of their statements are that there are no extreme versions of autism. Autism as a ‘core’ manifests itself in behavior (e.g. whether you hug others in distress or not, an example put forward by the women), which allows them to reevaluate the diagnoses of fellow autistic humans. I argue that the worldview of the three women is exemplified by their use of examples, and that what could be considered as ‘extreme examples’ on a ‘human spectrum’, might represent ‘ideal examples’ in their view of the ‘autistic spectrum’. Thinking about autism as a spectrum with its own examples allows us to understand the social dynamics of broadening the autism criteria. Furthermore, this article discusses how extreme examples can be used to create new wholes when spectrums are being broadened to the point of bursting.


2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 868-885 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Kenneth Burns

I defend the case for an evolutionary theory of schizophrenia and the social brain, arguing that such an exercise necessitates a broader methodology than that familiar to neuroscience. I propose a reworked evolutionary genetic model of schizophrenia, drawing on insights from commentators, buttressing my claim that psychosis is a costly consequence of sophisticated social cognition in humans. Expanded models of social brain anatomy and the spectrum of psychopathologies are presented in terms of upper and lower social brain and top-down and bottom-up processes. Finally, I argue that cerebral asymmetry evolved as an emergent property of primary intrahemispheric reorganisation in hominoids.


2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clive Gamble ◽  
John Gowlett ◽  
Robin Dunbar

It is often the case in interdisciplinary accounts of human evolution that archaeological data are either ignored or treated superficially. This article sets out to redress this position by using archaeological evidence from the last 2.5 million years to test the social brain hypothesis (SBH) – that our social lives drove encephalization. To do this we construct a map of our evolving social complexity that concentrates on two resources – materials and emotions – that lie at the basis of all social interaction. In particular, novel cultural and biological mechanisms are seen as evolutionary responses to problems of cognitive load arising from the need to integrate more individuals and sub-units into the larger communities predicted by the SBH. The Palaeolithic evidence for the amplification of these twin resources into novel social forms is then evaluated. Here the SBH is used to differentiate three temporal movements (2.6–1.6 Ma, 1.5–0.4 Ma and 300–25 ka) and their varied evolutionary responses are described in detail. Attention is drawn to the second movement where there is an apparent disconnect between a rise in encephalization and a stasis in material culture. This disconnect is used to discuss the co-evolutionary relationship that existed between materials and emotions to solve cognitive problems but which, at different times, amplified one resource rather than the other. We conclude that the shape of the Palaeolithic is best conceived as a gradient of change rather than a set of step-like revolutions in society and culture.


2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 634-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
GRANT GILLETT

Abstract:Human beings are sensorimotor coupled to the actual world and also attuned to the symbolic world of culture and the techniques of adaptation that culture provides. The self-image and self-shaping mediated by that mirror directly affects the neurocognitive structures that integrate human neural activity and reshape its processing capacities through top-down or autopoietic effects. Thus a crack’d mirror, which disrupts the processes of enactive self-configuration, can be disabling for an individual. That is exactly what happens in postcolonial or immigration contexts in which individuals’ cultural adaptations are marginalized and disconnected in diverse and often painful and disorienting ways. The crack’d mirror is therefore a powerful trope for neuroethics and helps us understand the social and moral pathologies of many indigenous and immigrant communities.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominique Bouchet

This article explains why intercultural communication always should be studied in context and how even though misunderstanding is normally at stake in intercultural communication, one can argue that the promotion of mutual understanding actually is of mutual interest for all of humanity. Studying in context means paying attention to circumstances around the uses of signs as well as to the roles and moods of the users of signs. Promoting mutual understanding means avoiding a state of mind that implies the depreciation of the other. To be intercultural, a communication must not be infected by prejudices. Any real attempt at intercultural communication is a paradoxical procedure. It supposes that human beings who engage in it at one and the same time recognize the stranger as similar and as different. Also, it can lead to acceptance of the other and a better understanding of what communication is about as well as to rejection and obscurantism. In this paper, I argue that even though people always relate in various ways to common and different cultural backgrounds, they still have to relate to common issues that govern their ways, and that focusing on those common issues and studying the various communicative contexts and contents help promoting mutual understanding, as these activities highlight the implicit role of the value of respect in all interpersonal communication. Human beings cannot avoid evaluating situations, contexts, relations, peoples and cultures. How can we establish that mutual respect and open-mindedness are better than disdain and dogmatism? Well, precisely by affirming that human relations commonly build on the inevitability of communicating and contrasting values and norms. Meaning in interaction permanently transforms cultural elements and patterns into something new. Intercultural communication becomes more respectable when it acknowledges the variety of ways humans interact meaningfully and the plurality of their logic of (inter-)action. It is good and reasonable to value understanding because this variety and this pluralism always have kept the social alive and more than ever in our modern globalized world contribute to the creativity and interactivity of modern life. The interest of pragmatics in user attitudes, its focus on practical rather than on alethic modalities, can contribute to a more nuanced approach to intercultural communication, where the different elements of meaning in interaction can be studied in various bundles rather than in a single strand.


Perception ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 477-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael von Grünau ◽  
Zeina Saikali ◽  
Jocelyn Faubert

The motion-induction effect, where an illusory motion is perceived within a bar when it is shown next to a spot presented slightly earlier, was studied with respect to the idea that it is based on differential processing speeds between the two ends of the bar. First, by using just a bar with a luminance gradient, the existence of a motion illusion (gradient motion) within such a bar was demonstrated, presumably due to the different processing speeds of differential luminances. When such a bar was used in the motion-induction effect, it was shown to modulate, for short delays, the strength of the effect up or down, according to the direction of the gradient with respect to the position of the spot. When the same bar was used in the double-motion-induction effect (split priming), in which motion is usually away from the later spot, it totally determined the perceived direction of illusory motion, independently of gradient direction with respect to the later spot or the time between the two spots. These results demonstrate, on the one hand, that differential local processing speed is a likely mechanism to underlie the motion-induction effect. On the other hand, they also suggest the involvement of other more global (and perhaps top—down) processes.


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