Covenants Without the Sword International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War

2006 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Valentino ◽  
Paul Huth ◽  
Sarah Croco

Do the international laws of war effectively protect civilian populations from deliberate attack? In a statistical analysis of all interstate wars from 1900 to 2003 the authors find no evidence that signatories of The Hague or Geneva Conventions intentionally kill fewer civilians during war than do nonsignatories. This result holds for democratic signatories and for wars in which both sides are parties to the treaty. Nor do they find evidence that a state's regime type or the existence of ethnic or religious differences between combatants explains the variation in civilian targeting. They find strong support, however, for their theoretical framework, which suggests that combatants seek to kill enemy civilians when they believe that doing so will coerce their adversaries into early surrender or undermine their adversaries' war-related domestic production. The authors find that states fighting wars of attrition or counterinsurgency, states fighting for expansive war aims, and states fighting wars of long duration kill significantly more civilians than states in other kinds of wars.

1939 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. L. Rodgers

Undoubtedly the generally recognized rules governing the exertion of military force at any given period are the outcome of social and economic conditions as well as of the development of new modes of attack upon life and property. Yet many believe that new forms of the exertion of military strength may be restrained by international agreement made in time of peace and in the name of humanity. Although such agreements have been made in the past, such as the Hague agreements of 1899 and 1907, not all have been viable. It is doubtful if effective ways of striking down the enemy will be limited by the bare plea of “humanity”. Restraint on the exercise of belligerent force for the sole reason that the sufferings of war are great and cruel is instinctive but not logical, for war is death and injury of persons and destruction of property by which the enemy is forced to submit. As to this matter Oppenheim says in his International Law: … First is the principle that a belligerent should be justified in applying any amount and any kind of force which is necessary for the realization of the purpose of the war—namely, the overpowering of the opponent. Secondly, the principle of humanity is at work, which says that all such kinds and degrees of violence as are not necessary for the overpowering of the enemy should not be permitted to the belligerent.


2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Howland

The Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905), recently commemorated with several international conference volumes, is identified by a majority of contributors as the first modern, global war. In making such a judgment, these scholars note its scale, its nationalism, its colonialism and geopolitical repercussions. What is surprising, however, is that no one has remarked on another significance: it was the first war in which both belligerents pledged to adhere to the international laws of war. In that regard, the Russo–Japanese War marks a culmination of the tireless international diplomacy to secure legal limitations on warfare in the nineteenth century. In 1904, both Russia and Japan justified their operations according to international law, for the benefit of an international audience who had five years earlier celebrated some progress with the signing of The Hague Conventions in 1899.


2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Mantilla

AbstractWhy have states created international laws to regulate internal armed conflicts? This article is the first to theorize the emergence and design of these international rules, focusing on Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Drawing on original multicountry archival research, I develop the mechanism offorum isolationto explain the origins of Common Article 3, demonstrating the importance of social opprobrium pressure to explain why Britain and France switched from staunch opposition to support and leadership in 1949. Specifically, forum isolation pressured these European empires to concedeandto react strategically behind the scenes, saving face and safeguarding their security interests by deliberately inserting ambiguous language in the text of Common Article 3. This move later facilitated states' avoidance of this rule in many conflict cases.


2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean D'ASPREMONT

The exploitation of natural resources in times of conflict has been the object of a prolific literature due to the extremely laconic character of the standards of conduct prescribed by the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Such laconicism has led scholars to be creative in ensuring that this central aspect of modern conflicts falls within the scope of existing legal instruments. This article starts by depicting the rich argumentative creativity developed by scholars and experts to ensure a more comprehensive regulation of what has often been perceived as a form of international brigandage. Subsequently it reflects on the biases of the professional community that has dedicated its efforts to the elaboration of a fairer framework of natural resources exploitation in times of conflict. In particular, it formulates some critical remark on the “just world business” that has dictated the methodology behind most of the interpretative engineering to be found.


2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 378-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shlomy Zachary

The growing impact of terrorist acts in the past few years has lead to dramatic changes in the internal laws of the growing number of States that suffer from terrorism, but has also lead to various attempts to adapt international law - more specifically, the International Laws of War - to the new situation or threat, as many perceive it. The Laws of War, like most areas of Public International Law, deal with the relations between nations, while hardly dealing with non-governmental entities like terrorist organisations or the individual terrorist, thereby creating an apparent legal “loophole”. One of the solutions found by States in order to deal, legally, with terrorists, was by defining them “unlawful combatants”.This essay tries to examine the development of the term “unlawful combatant”, by examining some complications that might occur from the use of the term “unlawful combatant” as an intermediate, new status in international law. By using it as a new status. States try to exclude terrorists from finding protection under the Geneva Conventions, which are intended to safeguard various individuals during armed conflicts. After examining the term “unlawful combatant”, both from an historical and legal aspect, this essay will attempt to show that the existing Laws of War, which acknowledge only two statuses – the ‘civilian’ and the ‘combatant’ – provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of terrorism in its non-governmental sense. After exploring recent policies and legal developments in Israel and the Unites States, countries that use the term “unlawful combatant”, this essay will criticise the ambiguity of these definitions, and point out future problems that might arise from this ambiguity during armed conflicts.


2003 ◽  
Vol 75 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 423-433
Author(s):  
Jelena Lopičić-Jančić

The author writes about International conventions and other legal acts in the field of Law of War in the 19th century, with special emphasis on the criminal law protection of prisoners of war. She underlines that although the 1874 Brussels Declaration and the 1880 Oxford Manual of the Laws and Customs of War were not international conventions, they still represented very important international instruments, which had a great impact on the International Law of War in the 20th century. A number of principles established in those acts were later adopted in the Hague and the Geneva Conventions.


2002 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Orend

Sadly, there are few restraints on the endings of wars. There has never been an international treaty to regulate war's final phase, and there are sharp disagreements regarding the nature of a just peace treaty. There are, by contrast, restraints aplenty on starting wars, and on conduct during war. These restraints include: political pressure from allies and enemies; the logistics of raising and deploying force; the United Nations, its Charter and Security Council; and international laws like the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Indeed, in just war theory—which frames moral principles to regulate wartime actions—there is a robust set of rules for resorting to war (jus ad bellum) and for conduct during war (jus in bello) but not for the termination phase of war.


2016 ◽  
pp. 7-38
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Gil

Following the end of the cold war, the incidence of statebuilding interventions has visibly increased in the case of dysfunctional (failed) states. Today, such interventionism in a good faith promotes liberal values and is believed to be in line with international legal regimes that makes it distinctive from neo-imperial politics. Even if state-building does not generally refer to regular warfare, it often takes analogous forms to occupation, which was codified in jus in bello at the beginning of the XXth century. While the occupation law requires occupants to maintain status quo on the occupying territory (article 43 of Hague Regulations), armed state-building is transformative by definition that seems to undermine conservative provisions of the former. The article presents traditional criteria for occupation in the Hague and Geneva conventions as well as prospects and limitations of its refinement (jus post bellum). In theory, such a redefinition could launch the formulation of the statebuilding regime, which aims to reduce deficits or double-standards in international state-building by focusing on the interests of local stakeholders of transformative projects. Hence, the Author addresses three interlocking issues: occupation within state-building, the occupation law and state-building, and transformative occupation as state-building.


1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 674-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hunter Miller

The Conference for the Codification of International Law which met at The Hague from March 13 to April 12, 1930, was the first international conference specifically called for that purpose.In 1924 the League of Nations set up a Committee of Experts for the progressive codification of international law. The task of that committee was to select and propose for the first conference on codification a certain number of subjects within the field of international law. Three subjects, namely, Nationality, Territorial Waters and The Responsibility of States for Damage Caused in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, were finally agreed on as the subjects to be considered by the first conference.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 359-360
Author(s):  
Saskia Bruines

Ladies and Gentlemen, as Deputy Mayor of The Hague, I am glad that this esteemed panel will discuss the promise of cities in relation to international law. As a representative of the international city of peace and justice, this subject is of course close to my heart.


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