II. Domestic Politics and Security Policy Change in the 1980s

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Line J Borup ◽  
Nanna Ø Weye ◽  
Vibeke Jensen ◽  
Kirsten Fonager

Abstract Background The social security policy for disability pension (DP) was changed in Denmark in 2013 and eligibility requirements were tightened. We describe and compare the use of healthcare among individuals with incident DP before and after the policy change. Methods This was a follow-up study based on data from nationwide databases. The study included individuals with incident DP aged 18–64 years and living in The North Denmark Region. We included individuals with incident DP before (2010–12, n = 6286) and after (2014–15, n = 1042) the 2013 policy change. Poisson regression was used to examine group differences in (i) contact to healthcare and (ii) hospitalization. For this purpose, we used incidence rate ratios stratified on type of contact before being awarded DP. Results We found a change of diagnoses for healthcare use towards higher proportions of cardiovascular, pulmonary, neurological and cancer diseases and lower proportion with musculoskeletal disorder in the populations being granted DP after policy changes. For individuals with psychiatric contact before being granted DP, we found no significant differences between periods in psychiatric healthcare after DP was awarded. For individuals with somatic contact before being granted DP, we found an increased risk of contact to somatic healthcare and hospitalization after DP requirements were tightened. Conclusion The study demonstrated that individuals who were granted DP after the eligibility requirements had been tightened suffered from more medical conditions and had an ongoing need for healthcare. In contrast, no significant difference in risk of psychiatric contact or hospitalization after DP was demonstrated.


Author(s):  
Christian Lequesne ◽  
Avtansh Behal

The European Union (EU) is a multilevel governance whose dynamics of change cannot be understood outside the perspective of each member state. France has contributed to the politics and policies of the EU, but the EU has also had an impact on French domestic politics and policies. As a founding member state of the European Communities (EC), France has played since the 1950s a major role in the development of European institutions, policies, and reforms leading to the EU. France has also, however, always had a paradoxical position regarding the institutional design of the EU. On one side, France has supported the principle of supranationality in the economic areas of EU integration (market and monetary policy). On the other side, it has preferred the intergovernmental method for foreign policy and defense. France’s influence in the EU was for a long time exercised in co-leadership with Germany. The return of Germany to full sovereignty after its reunification, the enlargements of the EU toward the East, and a growing asymmetry between French and German economies made the Franco-German partnership less central in the 1990s. France’s influence on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has diminished to the benefit of Germany, while it has remained central for the definition of a EU foreign and security policy. Like most of the EU member states, France has also to cope domestically with a growing politicization of the EU issue in the domestic context since the middle of the 1990s. Opposition to the EU has arisen among French public opinion and has restrained the autonomy of the French executive (president of the republic and government) in the EU negotiations. The dominant narrative in France about EU membership has four main components: being a founding member state, being a big member state, co-leading the EU with Germany, and making sure that the EU maximizes the French national interest. The relationships of the main French institutional actors with the EU focus on the president of the Republic, the prime minister, and the National Parliament, as well as major national courts and interest groups. The political debates on the EU in the French public sphere involve the mainstream political parties, the rise of Euroskepticism, the referendum campaigns on EU issues, and general trends in the public opinion. France’s contributions to the main EU policies include membership in the EMU, the commitment to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the attitudes toward the enlargement processes, and the future of the EU institutional reforms.


Author(s):  
Brett Ashley Leeds ◽  
T. Clifton Morgan

Security issues have long been linked to the study of international relations. The crucial issue which scholars and decision makers have sought to understand is how states can avoid being victimized by war while also being prepared for any eventuality of war. Particular attention has been devoted to alliances and armaments as the policy instruments that should have the greatest effect on state war experiences. Scholars have attempted to use balance of power theories to explain the interrelationships between arms, alliances, and international conflict, but the overwhelming lack of empirical support for such theories led the field to look for alternatives. This gave rise to new theorizing that recognized variance in national goals and an enhanced role for domestic politics, which in turn encouraged empirical tests at the nation state or dyadic level of analysis. Drawing from existing theoretical perspectives, more specific formal models and empirical tests were invoked to tackle particular questions about alliances and arms acquisitions. Despite significant advances in individual “islands of theory,” however, integrated explanations of the pursuit and effects of security policies have remained elusive. An important consideration for the future is to develop of theories of security policy that take into account the substitutability and complementarity of varying components. There have been two promising attempts at such integrated theorizing: the first explains the steps to war and the second is based on the assumption that states pursue two composite goods through foreign policy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (04) ◽  
pp. 1940009
Author(s):  
WILLIAM NORRIS

This is a study of learning and socialization in China’s foreign security policy, examining how China has at times been more assertive and in other instances has taken a more accommodating approach in its foreign security policy behavior. This paper argues that China has been “socialized” by its international security environment by exploring Kenneth Waltz’s theoretical mechanism of the “socialization” of states in the international system. The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the early 2000s, the Senkaku/Diaoyutai crises from 2012 to 2015, and the South China Sea in the mid-1990s are all instances in which China has employed force only to suffer strategically. This has eventually led to a less confrontational posture and contributed to the pursuit of a more cooperative engagement strategy with both Southeast Asia (from 1998 to 2008) and Taiwan ([Formula: see text]2006–2016). Variations in China’s assertiveness can be explained by the combination of domestic politics and signals from China’s international security environment.


1999 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald B. Thomas

Scholars studying the processes that lead to significant alterations in public policies have identified two major sources of change: policy-oriented conflict and policy-oriented learning. Many investigations of specific cases of consequential policy change also suggest that “shocks” from outside the policy subsystem, (that is, the specific political arena where a policy issue is formulated and implemented) are often necessary for significant policy change to occur. Rather than being competing explanations of policy change, this paper argues that external shocks, conflict, and learning often interact to generate windows of opportunity which enable policies to be significantly altered. These perspectives on policy change are then qualitatively applied to recent changes in U.S. national security policy which have allowed formerly secret spy satellite technology to be used in commercial data gathering systems. The final part discusses the implications of this research for the theory of policy change and for U.S. national security policy.


1986 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Ross

The concepts of triangular structure and pattern of relations are useful in understanding conflict in U.S.-China relations, particularly over Taiwan, and in explaining the context in which Chinese domestic politics influences the P.R.C.'s policy toward the United States. Through their influence on relative bargaining strengths, shifting patterns of relations have determined Beijing's readiness either to push for change in U.S.-Taiwan relations or to accept the status quo until China's bargaining position improves. The pace of policy change within a particular pattern of relations has been influenced by the P.R.C.'s domestic politics, which has also compelled the leaders to protect their domestic position by issuing statements aimed at the domestic audience.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Mieczysław P. Boduszyński ◽  
Christopher K. Lamont ◽  
Philip Streich

What determines Japan's willingness to flex its limited military muscle abroad? While analysts and scholars closely watched Japanese "militarization" under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2012-2020), Japan had already deployed its military overseas over a decade ago in support of U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By contrast, in 2014, Japan was unwilling to support U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria. This presents a puzzle, as the fight against ISIL offered the kind of international legitimacy that the 2003 Iraq invasion lacked, and Japan traditionally seeks. Moreover, ISIL had killed Japanese citizens. This paper explains Japan's varying policies in Iraq in 2003 and 2014, thereby shedding light on the determinants of Japanese national security policy more generally. Our argument focuses on domestic political factors (especially the pluralist foreign policymaking) and strategic thinking rooted in realism. We argue that Japanese policies are driven by domestic politics, profound suspicions about the utility of military force and fears of becoming entangled in a seemingly never-ending conflict. While Koizumi may have had more room to manoeuvre despite long-standing public opposition to overseas military deployments when he dispatched the SDF to Iraq in 2003, it is precisely such deeply-entrenched popular anathema that many blame for the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) historic and devastating loss in the 2009 election. Abe was unwilling to repeat such a risky venture in 2014. We also highlight the role of realist calculations on both Japanese elites and the public, who by 2014 had come to see China rather than state or non-state actors in the Middle East as a primary security threat. We thus confirm Midford's finding that "defensive realism" tends to drive Japanese foreign policy thinking. Japanese citizens are not pacifists, as conventional wisdom might hold. Instead, Japanese public opinion supports the use of minimum military force when and if Japan is attacked to defend Japan's national sovereignty and territory but is much more suspicious of such power when it comes to deployments and the pursuit of other foreign policy goals.


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