scholarly journals Triangles, Tropes, and τὰ τοιαʋ ̃τα: A Platonic Trope Theory

Plato Journal ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Christopher Buckels
Keyword(s):  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Trope Theory ◽  
Property Instances

A standard interpretation of Plato’s metaphysics holds that sensible particulars are images of Forms. Such particulars are fairly independent, like Aristotelian substances. I argue that this is incorrect: Platonic particulars are not Form images but aggregates of Form images, which are property-instances (tropes). Timaeus 49e-50a focuses on “this-suches” (toiauta) and even goes so far as to claim that they compose other things. I argue that Form images are this-suches, which are tropes. I also examine the geometrical account, showing that the geometrical constituents of the elements are also Form images. Thus everything in the sensible world is composed of tropes.

Abundant Properties

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer McKitrick
Keyword(s):  
Causal Powers ◽  
The Real ◽  
Trope Theory ◽  
Property Instances ◽  
Semantic Values

On an abundant conception of properties, properties serve as semantic values for most predicates and property names. Abundance is central to Dispositional Pluralism. Dispositional Pluralism is compatible with different theories of the metaphysics of properties. According to universalism (realism) properties are universals that are wholly present wherever they are instantiated. According to extensionalism (class nominalism) properties are sets of objects. According to trope theory, properties are sets of particular property instances, or tropes. In any case, properties correspond to sets of objects. Abundance is preferable to sparsity—the view that only an elite minority of sets of particulars correspond to properties. On most sparse views, the “real” properties are largely unknown. Consequently, sparse properties are unfit for the roles properties are posited to play: They rarely serve as the semantic values of predicates; they do not explain familiar causal powers; and it is not clear how they explain apparent similarities.

Technical or political? The socialist economic calculation debate

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiago Camarinha Lopes
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Austrian School ◽  
Economic Calculation ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Mainstream Economics ◽  
Political Position ◽  
Socialist Economic ◽  
Technical Terms

Abstract The paper presents both the key arguments and the historical context of the socialist economic calculation debate. I argue that Oskar Lange presented the most developed strategy to deal with bourgeois economics, decisively helping to create the scientific consensus that rational economic calculation under socialism is possible. Lange’s arguments based on standard economic theory reveal that the most ardent defenders of capitalism cannot reject socialism on technical terms and that, as a consequence, the Austrian School was left with no choice but to diverge from mainstream economics in its search to develop a framework that could support its political position. This shows that Mises’ challenge from 1920 was solved and has been replaced by a political posture developed by Hayek and leading Austrians economists, who have been struggling since the 1980s to revise the standard interpretation of the socialist economic calculation debate. I argue that this revision should not be uncritically accepted and conclude that socialism cannot be scientifically rejected; it can only be politically rejected, by those whose economic interests it opposes.

scholarly journals Dynamic game semantics

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-60
Author(s):  
Norihiro Yamada ◽  
Samson Abramsky
Keyword(s):  
Programming Languages ◽  
Functional Programming ◽  
Operational Semantics ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Functional Programming Languages ◽  
Game Semantics ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Cartesian Closed Categories ◽  
Cartesian Closed

Abstract The present work achieves a mathematical, in particular syntax-independent, formulation of dynamics and intensionality of computation in terms of games and strategies. Specifically, we give game semantics of a higher-order programming language that distinguishes programmes with the same value yet different algorithms (or intensionality) and the hiding operation on strategies that precisely corresponds to the (small-step) operational semantics (or dynamics) of the language. Categorically, our games and strategies give rise to a cartesian closed bicategory, and our game semantics forms an instance of a bicategorical generalisation of the standard interpretation of functional programming languages in cartesian closed categories. This work is intended to be a step towards a mathematical foundation of intensional and dynamic aspects of logic and computation; it should be applicable to a wide range of logics and computations.

scholarly journals Fuzzification - Decision Making in Terms of Uncertainty

ECONOMICS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-94
Author(s):  
Željko V. Račić
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Fuzzy Sets ◽  
Individual Preference ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Subjective Estimation ◽  
Qualitative Attribute ◽  
Theory Of Fuzzy Sets

Summary The theory of fuzzy sets allows to analyze insufficiently precise, accurate, complete phenomena which can not be modeled by the theory of probability or interval mathematics. We define fuzzy sets as sets where the boundary of the set is unclear and depends on subjective estimation or individual preference. In addition to the standard interpretation scale, described above, a set of numbers to each qualitative attribute must be assigned. In addition to the standard interpretation scale a set of numbers to each qualitative attribute must be assigned. First of all, it is necessary to determine the procedure for determining fuzzy numbers describing the attributes. One of the imperfections of the fuzzy sets is subjectivism when defining the boundaries of fuzzy sets and functions of belonging, which can significantly influence the final decision. The decision maker’s subjectivity is also present in the determination of weighted coefficients. However, in case of giving weight, fixed values are necessary. Some decisions require multidisciplinary knowledge, so the decision-making process includes more group decision-makers, who independently give their grades.

scholarly journals Frege’s Bedeutung

Problemos ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 123-131
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Standard Interpretation

The article raises the question what is the content of Frege’s infamous notion of Bedeutung? It is claimed that the so–called standard interpretation of this notion – Bedeutung as referential relation between a name and an object – was developed and established evaluating Frege’s ideas in philosophy of language in isolation from his logicist ideas. However, precisely his logicist concerns have motivated Frege’s interest in semantic issues. A broader consideration of Frege’s works reveals an internalist and rationalist notion of meaning, that is based on the context principle, and that should not be reduced to mere reference. The question of the meaning of subsentential components, for Frege, is closely related to the question of the meaning of the whole sentence, that is, the meaning of sub–sentential components should be construed as secondary with regard to the meaning of the whole sentence.

scholarly journals Kant on Existential Import

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Vanzo
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Square Of Opposition ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Quantification Theory ◽  
Traditional Logic ◽  
Existential Import ◽  
Modern Standard

AbstractThis article reconstructs Kant's view on the existential import of categorical sentences. Kant is widely taken to have held that affirmative sentences (theAandIsentences of the traditional square of opposition) have existential import, whereas negative sentences (EandO) lack existential import. The article challenges this standard interpretation. It is argued that Kant ascribes existential import only to some affirmative synthetic sentences. However, the reasons for this do not fall within the remit of Kant's formal logic. Unlike traditional logic and modern standard quantification theory, Kant's formal logic is free from existential commitments.

scholarly journals Two Ways to Particularize a Property

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 635-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT K. GARCIA
Keyword(s):  
Trope Theory ◽  
The Stability

ABSTRACT:Trope theory is an increasingly prominent contender in contemporary debates about the existence and nature of properties. But it suffers from ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation reveals two fundamentally different concepts of a trope: modifier tropes and module tropes. These types of tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. Modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. Thus, the choice between modifier tropes and module tropes is significant and divides the advantages of trope theorysimpliciter. In addition, each resulting trope theory is unstable: modifier trope theory threatens to collapse into realism, and module trope theory threatens to collapse into austere nominalism. This invites reflection on the stability of trope theory in general.

Berkeley v. Locke on Primary Qualities

Philosophy ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 55 (212) ◽  
pp. 149-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Made In

Locke was once supposed to have argued that since the colours, sounds, odours, and other ‘secondary’ qualities things appear to have can vary greatly according to the state and position of the observer, it follows that our ideas of the ‘secondary’ qualities of things do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects themselves. And Berkeley has been credited with the obvious objection that similar facts about the ‘relativity’ of our perception of ‘primary’ qualities show that they do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects either, so that both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities exist only ‘in the mind’. The falsity of this view of Locke has been amply demonstrated in recent years, but no corresponding revision has been made in what remains the standard interpretation of Berkeley's criticisms of Locke. His objections therefore appear to be based on misunderstanding and to be irrelevant to what is now seen to be Locke's actual view and his reasons for holding it. I think this account of Berkeley, like the old view of Locke, is a purely fictional chapter in the history of philosophy, and in this paper I try to show that Berkeley's criticisms involve no misunderstanding and amount to a direct denial of the view Locke actually held.

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