Misunderstanding institutional rules: Electoral-list mobility in Poland, 2005–2015

O objetivo é averiguar a correlação dos fatores motivacionais e produtivos no contexto institucional da Polícia Civil. O estudo de caso foi conduzido por entrevistas em profundidade com um Delegado de Polícia, um Investigador de Polícia, e um Escrivão de Polícia. A análise de conteúdo foi utilizada. Conclui-se que há evidente correlação entre o desenvolvimento de artefatos motivacionais, sejam eles de ordem ambiental ou individual, com a produtividade na instituição da Polícia Civil. Destaca-se também, que apesar do controle e avaliação dos índices de produtividade serem predominantemente burocráticos, institucionalizados e legitimados, a ligação que se estabelece com a manifestação dos artefatos motivacionais é subjetiva, relacional e intangível nas normas institucionais. Destaca-se este evento neste artigo, porque como foi visto anteriormente, tanto a natureza do trabalho, quanto o ambiente da Polícia Civil, estão em total desencontro ao desenvolvimento de produtividade e motivação no sentido clássico destas vertentes. The aims is to determine the correlation of the motivational and productive factors in the institutional context of the Civil Police. The case study was conducted by in-depth interviews with a Chief of Police, Police Investigator, and Actuary Police. The content analysis was used for fixed grid. It is concluded that there is clear correlation between the development of motivational artifacts, whether environmental or individual order, with productivity in the civil police institution. Also noteworthy is that despite the control and evaluation of productivity indexes were predominantly bureaucratic, institutionalized and legitimized, the connection that is established with the manifestation of motivational artifacts is subjective, relational and intangible assets in the institutional rules. It highlights this event in this article, because as discussed above, both the nature of the work, as the environment of the Civil Police, are in complete disagreement with the development of productivity and motivation in the classical sense of the aforementioned areas.

Download Full-text

Was Duverger Correct? Single-Member District Election Outcomes in Fifty-three Countries

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123412000233 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 43 (1) ◽

pp. 201-220 ◽

Cited By ~ 34

Author(s):

Matthew M. Singer

Keyword(s):

Institutional Arrangements ◽

District Level ◽

Party Competition ◽

Plurality Rule ◽

Third Place ◽

Institutional Rules ◽

Large Numbers ◽

Level Data ◽

Number Of Parties ◽

Duverger's Law

In districts where only one seat is contested, the electoral formula (plurality or majority) should be a major determinant of the number of parties that receive votes. Specifically, plurality rule should generate two-party competition while other institutional arrangements should generate electoral fragmentation. Yet tests of these propositions using district-level data have focused on a limited number of cases; they rarely contrast different electoral systems and have reached mixed conclusions. This study analyses district-level data from 6,745 single-member district election contests from 53 democratic countries to test the evidence for Duverger's Law and Hypothesis. Double-ballot majoritarian systems have large numbers of candidates, as predicted, but while the average outcome under plurality rule is generally consistent with two-party competition, it is not perfectly so. The two largest parties typically dominate the districts (generally receiving more than 90 per cent of the vote), and there is very little support for parties finishing fourth or worse. Yet third-place parties do not completely disappear, and ethnic divisions shape party fragmentation levels, even under plurality rule. Finally, institutional rules that generate multiparty systems elsewhere in the country increase electoral fragmentation in single-member plurality districts.

Download Full-text

Institutionalizing Party Systems in Multiethnic States: Integration and Ethnic Segmentation in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1992

Slavic Review ◽

10.2307/2697119 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 61 (2) ◽

pp. 292-314 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Carol Skalnik Leff ◽

Susan B. Mikula

Keyword(s):

Party System ◽

Ethnic Politics ◽

Party Systems ◽

Party Politics ◽

Institutional Setting ◽

Federal State ◽

The Czech Republic ◽

Institutional Rules ◽

Political Resources ◽

Multiethnic States

A country’s multinational diversity does not by itself predict the way this diversity will be reflected in the party system. The pattern of party politics also depends on the context: electoral and institutional rules, differential political assets, and different incentives to cooperate or dissent. To demonstrate variations in the dynamics of ethnic politics, this article examines the divergent ways in which Slovak political parties were organized within the larger political system in two periods—the interwar unitary Czechoslovak state and the postcommunist federal state. Differences in political resources and institutional setting help explain why interwar Slovakia had a hybrid party system composed of both statewide and ethnoregional parties, while the postcommunist state saw the emergence of two entirely separate party systems in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In turn, differing patterns of party politics in these two cases had different consequences for the management of ethnonational conflict in the state.

Download Full-text

One Step Forward or One Step Back? Explaining the Performance Paradox in the Civil Service of Bangladesh

The Making of Contemporary Maldives: Isolation, Dictatorship and Democracy ◽

10.52823/asuf9612 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 2 (1) ◽

pp. 1-29

Author(s):

Asif M Asif M Shahan

Keyword(s):

Institutional Change ◽

Institutional Context ◽

Behavioral Pattern ◽

Political Context ◽

The Political ◽

Institutional Rules ◽

The People ◽

Specific Manner ◽

Bureaucratic Responsiveness ◽

One Step

In Bangladesh, two contrasting scenarios regarding the responsiveness of the bureaucrats working at the field level are present. Whereas some bureaucrats reach out to the people and respond to their demands, others remain unresponsive and unapproachable. So, why do the bureaucrats working at the grassroots, while performing under the same rules, same institutional context and reality, perform in two different ways while interacting with citizens? How can these two contradictory sets of understanding regarding bureaucratic responsiveness coexist in Bangladesh? This article attempts to unpack this puzzle by relying on a slightly modified version of historical institutionalism. Building on Bell’s model of ‘agent-centric institutional change’ and by using a modified version of Mahoney & Thelen’s framework of institutional change, it argues that dialectical interaction between agents (bureaucrats) and institutions (i.e., rules- both formal and informal, norms that affect the behavior of the agents) within the broader political setting can best explain the variation in behavioral pattern of the bureaucrats. The political context allows agents to exercise discretion in a specific manner in executing their roles and functions while being constrained by institutional rules and norms. The dialectical interaction between structure (political context), agent, and institution determines the current administrative reality, which has allowed the contradiction to emerge and sustain.

Download Full-text

QUALIS OF TECHNICAL PRODUCTION: METRIC DEVELOPMENT FOR MANUALS

Revista do Colégio Brasileiro de Cirurgiões ◽

10.1590/0100-69912015s01018 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 42 (suppl 1) ◽

pp. 87-88

Author(s):

Adhemar Monteiro Pacheco Jr. ◽

Carlos José Lazzarini Mendes

Keyword(s):

Professional Misconduct ◽

Institutional Rules ◽

Ongoing Process ◽

Methodological Rigor ◽

Technical Production ◽

The Subject

There are few authors focused on the study of preparing manuals criteria, often criticized for methodological rigor of the information. However, it is interesting to understand what is going wrong; to understand prognosis in self-handling; in prevention of complications; in identifying better services and information; in encouraging the pursuit of excellence in the healthcare. In its preparation should be valued the basic requirements of a manual, which are: 1) wrote in simple words, being concise, efficient, clear with index or table of contents; 2) using the existing institutional rules; 3) being flexible; and 4) having ongoing process of review, update and distribution. In the process of evaluation of Medicine III manuals may have the following stratification: M4 - 100 points: when there is ISBN registration and disclosure in other languages; M3 - 75 points: registration with the ISBN only in our country; M2 - 50 points: registered in regional libraries; M1 - 25 points: manual use for inter-departmental or intra-institutional groups; M0 - 0 point: use of manual in intra-departmental teaching. In conclusion, it is known that the use of manuals is focused to the ones who do not know the subject; however, it is also an important tool that can minimize errors, avoid professional misconduct, optimize resources, and at the end allowing assessment of the subject at hand.

Download Full-text

Proper characterisation of the parol evidence rule and its applicability in international arbitration

Arbitration International ◽

10.1093/arbint/aiab029 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Darius Chan ◽

Louis Lau Yi Hang

Keyword(s):

Dispute Resolution ◽

Common Law ◽

International Arbitration ◽

Institutional Rules ◽

Procedural Rule ◽

Rules Of Evidence

Abstract Most arbitral statutes and institutional rules give great latitude to tribunals on the admissibility of evidence, and do not mandate application of domestic rules of evidence. In common law jurisdictions where the parol evidence rule applies, the issue that arises is whether the parol evidence rule is necessarily a procedural rule of evidence which tribunals are not bound to apply, especially in jurisdictions which have codified the rule under domestic evidence legislation. Notwithstanding any codification, this article argues that the parol evidence rule at common law is a substantive rule of contractual interpretation that should be applied as part of the lex contractus in international arbitration proceedings. Faithful application of the parol evidence rule as a substantive rule of contractual interpretation ensures that adjudicators arrive at the same interpretation on the same set of facts, thereby promoting uniformity, predictability, and consistency, regardless of the mode of dispute resolution.

Download Full-text

Ad Hoc or Institutional Arbitration - A Clear-Cut Distinction? A Closer Look at Borderline Cases

10.31228/osf.io/bmeur ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Ulrich G. Schroeter

Keyword(s):

Ad Hoc ◽

Theory And Practice ◽

Present Contribution ◽

Borderline Cases ◽

Institutional Rules ◽

Clear Cut ◽

Definition Of ◽

Core Characteristics ◽

Insight Into ◽

Mix And Match

It is generally accepted in both theory and practice of arbitration that there are two basic forms of arbitration, ad hoc and institutional. This long established dichotomy has rarely been questioned, and it has mostly worked well in international arbitration practice.The present contribution investigates the traditional distinction between ad hoc and institutional arbitration in more detail by looking at "borderline cases", i.e. constellations that cannot easily be allocated to one of these two categories. Four groups of borderline cases are discussed: (1) UNCITRAL arbitrations, in particular those administered by arbitral institutions; (2) cases in which the parties have chosen institutional rules, but not the issuing institution (and vice versa), (3) the modification of institutional rules by the parties and the identification of a possible "mandatory" core of institutional rules, and (4) "mix and match" (or "hybrid") arbitrations combining one arbitral institution's rules with the case's administration by a different arbitral institution. By identifying the factors that were decisive for these borderline cases being regarded as institutional or ad hoc, the article is trying to gain insight into the core characteristics underlying each arbitration category. Drawing on these insights, it develops and explains a novel definition of "institutional arbitration".

Download Full-text

Legislative Governing Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies

Comparative Political Studies ◽

10.1177/0010414089022001002 ◽

1989 ◽

Vol 22 (1) ◽

pp. 33-65 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

MILDRED SCHLESINGER

Keyword(s):

Correlation Analysis ◽

Third Republic ◽

Parliamentary Democracy ◽

Electoral Rules ◽

Parliamentary Democracies ◽

Institutional Rules ◽

Multiparty Systems ◽

Leadership Group ◽

Two Measures ◽

Legislative Committees

A neglected aspect of parliamentary democracies that do not conform to the British model is the relation between executive and legislative leadership. In multiparty systems with strong legislative committees, committee chairmen constitute a governing coalition comparable to the cabinet. Given the coalitional nature of each leadership group, their partisan composition may not be identical; nor need they be equally stable. These are matters of importance for the operation of government. This article examines the relations between the two coalitions in the primordial parliamentary democracy, the French Third Republic. Using correlation analysis, I found a weak partisan relation between the two coalitions during the five legislatures of the interwar years. Using two measures of stability, durability and the continuity of coalitions beyond formal tenure, I found the legislative coalition always more stable. Institutional rules and the multiparty system helped account for these differences. Nevertheless, there was enough variation from legislature to legislature to show that electoral rules and results had an impact. Variations resembled those in the American republic. Periods of greater similarity in partisan composition coincided with greater effectiveness or stability for the executive; periods of divided control coincided with lesser executive stability. This was of consequence for the making of policy.

Download Full-text